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The Legality of the West Bank
Wall: Israel's High Court of
Justice v. the International Court
of Justice
Victor Kattan*

ABSTRACT

This Article offers a critique of the decision reached by
Israel's High Court of Justice in the Mara'abe Case (2005) as
well as some aspects of the International Court of Justice's
Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(2004). The Article takes a socio-legal and facts-based approach
to analyzing the decisions' discussions of settlements, selfdetermination, and self-defense, examining all three topics in
light of several recent legal and political developments.
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"Is the separationfence legal? That is the question before us."
-Judge Barak, Mara'abev. The Prime Minister of Israel,
introductory paragraph.

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 15, 2005, the Israel Supreme Court, sitting as the
High Court of Justice (HCJ), rendered its decision in Mara'abe v. The
Prime Minister of Israel,' in which it questioned a number of points of
law arising from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) on the Legal Consequences of the Constructionof a Wall
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.2 The case in Israel arose as a

1.
HCJ 7957/04 [2005] (Isr.), translatedin 45 I.L.M. 202 (2006).
2.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (July 9), reprinted in 43 I.L.M.
1009 (2004) [hereinafter ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion]. For further commentary on this
Advisory Opinion, see generally Susan Akram & Michael Link, The Wall and the Law:
A Tale of Two Judgments (2006); Aeyal M. Gross, The Construction of a Wall Between
The Hague and Jerusalem: The Enforcement and Limits of HumanitarianLaw and the
Structure of Occupation, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2006); Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion
on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(2005) (including contributions from Watson, Pomerance, Falk, Wedgwood, Murphy,
Scobbie, Kretzmer, Imseis and Dennis); Pieter H.F. Bekker, The World Court's Ruling
Regarding Israel's West Bank Barrier and the Primacy of International Law: An
Insider's Perspective, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 553 (2005); Paul J. I. M. De Waart,
International Court of Justice Firmly Walled in the Law of Power in the IsraeliPalestinian Peace Process, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 467 (2005); Jean-Franqois Gareau,
Shouting at the Wall: Self-Determination and the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 489
(2005); Andrea Bianchi, Dismantling the Wall: The ICJ's Advisory Opinion and Its
Likely Impact on International Law, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 343 (2004); and Marco
Pertile, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory: A Missed Opportunity for International Law?, 4 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 121
(2004). See also 39 ISR. L. REV. (2006) (dedicating a special double issue to discuss the
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result of a number of petitions filed against the Prime Minister of
Israel, the Minister of Defence, the Commander of the Israeli army,
3
the "separation fence" authority, and the Alfe Menashe local council.
The petitioners, Palestinian residents of a number of villages affected
by the route of the wall, argued that in light of the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion, Israel's actions in continuing its construction were
unlawful. 4 On July 9, 2004, the ICJ concluded that the wall and its
associated rigime of settlements, checkpoints, and closed military
zones are contrary to international law. 5 The HCJ therefore had to
rule on the legality of the wall that its government has been building
in Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) of the West Bank since June
2002, while taking into account the advice of the principal judicial
6
organ of the United Nations (U.N.).
The terminology used by the ICJ and the HCJ to describe Israel's
vast concrete-and-wire barrier differed. The HCJ referred to it as the
"separation fence," and the ICJ simply called it the "wall," as this was
the language the General Assembly used in its request for an
Advisory Opinion. 7
In deference to the ICJ and the world
organization, the terminology they employed will be used throughout

domestic and international legal issues arising from the construction of the "separation
barrier"); 13 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 337 (2004-2005) (reprinting the Advisory Opinion,
Palestine's written statement to the Court, and several articles).
3.
Alfe Menashe is an Israeli settlement situated close to the Palestinian town
of Qalqilya in the West Bank.
4.
Interestingly, the HCJ issued simultaneous versions of the judgment in
both English and Hebrew, something it does not normally do. The other time it issued
versions in both languages was in the Beit Sourik case. lain Scobbie notes that neither
decision has been issued in an official Arabic text. Unlike English, Arabic is one of the
High Court's official languages and is the tongue spoken by the principle petitioners in
both cases. Iain Scobbie, Regarding/Disregarding:The Judicial Rhetoric of President
Barak and the International Court of Justice's Wall Advisory Opinion, 5 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 269, 287 (2006).
5.
As Roger O'Keefe writes:
What is meant ... by its 'associated regime' is to be found among paragraphs
114 to 137. One aspect of this r6gime is obviously the range of legislative and
regulatory measures associated with the Wall, from the requisitions of land to
the restrictions imposed on the Palestinian populace by the declaration of the
Closed Area ....
In short, the opinion finds not only the construction of the
Wall to be illegal but with it the policy and practice of Israeli settlements in the
occupied territories, considered as part of its 'associated rigime.'
It follows that the checkpoints and the closed military zones associated with the Wall
are also per se unlawful. Roger O'Keefe, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory:A Commentary, 37 REV. BELGE DROIT INT'L
92, 133 (2004).
6.
The Advisory Opinion was acknowledged by the U.N. General Assembly on
2 August 2004. G.A. Res. 10/15, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/15
(Aug. 2, 2004).
7.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1029, para. 67.
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the remainder of this Article.8 This Article employs a socio-legal and
facts-based approach in analyzing the decisions reached by the HCJ
and the ICJ on the legality of the wall, since it is usually the facts of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rather than the substance of the law
that prove to be a point of contention. After all, it was on the basis of
"the facts" that Israel's HCJ would ultimately reject the ICJ's
Advisory Opinion.9 In the following pages, the ICJ's opinion and the
decisions of the HCJ will be compared and contrasted, concentrating
on three areas of controversy: (a) Israeli civilian settlement activity,
(b) self-determination, and (c) self-defense. These inter-related topics
have been chosen for further analysis because they are at the core of
the Israel-Palestine conflict. The right of self-defense cannot be
debated without an understanding of why there is a conflict in the
first place, and an understanding of why there is a conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians cannot be comprehended without taking
into account the question of self-determination. Correspondingly, it
will be necessary to refer to the Israeli civilian settlements
constructed in and around East Jerusalem and scattered throughout
the West Bank because they are of direct relevance to any discussion
of self-determination. Special attention has been devoted to the issue
of self-defense, as the ICJ's opinion on this issue has proved to be
particularly contentious. To date, the Israeli government has said
that it will not abide by the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, but will only
adhere to the decisions reached by its HCJ. 10 It is therefore essential
to clarify some of the substantive issues that arose in these cases,
especially as Israel is still building the wall. Therefore, the final

8.
Although it should be said that structure only takes the form of eightmeter-high-concrete slabs when it passes through areas densely populated by
Palestinians such as Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Bethlehem, and East Jerusalem.
The
remainder of the structure is a fenced complex with electronic sensors and surveillance
cameras surrounded by rolls of barbed wire, accompanied by ditches, an earth-covered
tracer road (so footprints can be seen), patrol roads and "closed military zones"
approximately 40-100 meters wide. For a description of the wall, see generally the
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in the PalestinianTerritories Occupied by Israel Since 1967,
U.N. Doc. E/CN4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003) (preparedby John Dugard).
9.
See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] (Isr.),
translatedin 43 I.L.M. 1099, 28 (2004).
[T]he Fence is motivated by security concerns. As we have seen in the
government decisions concerning the construction of the Fence, the government
has emphasized, numerous times, that 'the Fence, like the additional obstacles,
is a security measure. Its construction does not express a political border, or
any other border.

Id.
10.
"Israel vowed to press on with the construction of the West Bank
separation fence after the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a resolution
condemning the barrier late Tuesday." Shlomo Shamir, Israel Summons EU Envoys
Over Support for Anti-fence Ruling, HA'ARETZ (Jerusalem), July 21, 2004.
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section of this Article will be devoted to the debate over the legal
effect of Advisory Opinions generally, and particularly the effect of
the Advisory Opinion on the wall as a guide for the U.N. in its quest
for peace in the Middle East.
Although the Israeli Government's written statement to the ICJ
was replete with references to Palestinian terrorism," it is
noteworthy that the statement did not justify the building of the West
Bank wall as necessary to stop Palestinian terrorist attacks against
its nationals in Israel and in West Bank settlements. 12 This is
because Israel did not raise the merits of the case in its written
statement, which was solely concerned with issues of jurisdiction and
propriety. 13 Palestine's written statement argued that the wall is
tantamount to annexation because it is being constructed primarily in
occupied territory rather than in Israeli territory, which circumvents
Israeli civilian settlement blocs, by-passes roads and land designated
for their future construction and expansion, and encompasses
underground aquifers and water wells. 14 In other words, the issue is
the not the wall itself, but its route through OPT. 15 This concern was
reflected in the question submitted by the U.N. General Assembly to
the ICJ in December 2003, which asked:

11.
See Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and
Propriety,
3.53-86 (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/131/1579.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007); Letter from Alan Baker, Ambassador,
Deputy Dir. and Legal Advisor, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Int'l Court of
Justice (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1579.pdf
(accompanying the Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and
Propriety to the ICJ).
12.
According to Israel, the purpose of including factual information on
Palestinian terrorist attacks in its written statement was to assist the ICJ "properly to
exercise its discretion under Article 65 (1) of the Statute and decide whether or not to
answer the question referred to it." Written Statement of the Government of Israel on
Jurisdiction and Propriety, supra note 11, 3.54.
13.
Written Statement of the Government of Israel on Jurisdiction and
Propriety, supra note 11.
14.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Written Statement, Submitted by Palestine,
280-297 (Jan.
30, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1555.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2007).
15.
As pointed out by Vaughan Lowe in his oral pleadings:
The issue here is not whether Israel has a right to build a Wall: it is whether it
has a right to build the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Palestine's
main point is that whatever security effects the Wall might have could be
secured by building the Wall along the Green Line, on Israeli territory, so that
there is no legal justification for building it in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Public Sitting, at 47 (Req. for Advisory Op.) (Feb. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.icj.cij.org/docket/files/131/1503.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) [hereinafter
Request for Wall Advisory Opinion].
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What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the
wall being built by Israel, the Occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as
described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General
16
Assembly resolutions?

II. THE HCJ AND THE WALL
The HCJ has handed down two principal decisions concerning
the legality of the wall. On June 30, 2004, some nine days before the
ICJ rendered its Advisory Opinion, the HCJ first ruled in Beit Sourik
Village Council v. the Government of Israel1 7 that the wall could be
built in the West Bank, in and around occupied East Jerusalem, but
that in a number of sections the wall's route did not satisfy the
proportionality test established by the court.1 8 In response to the
petitioner's argument that the route of the wall was motivated by
political reasons (i.e. to incorporate into Israel certain Israeli civilian
settlements established inside the West Bank), the HCJ held: "[I]t is
the security perspective-and not the political one-which must
examine a route based on its security merits alone, without regardfor
the location of the Green Line." 19 Of course the HCJ could only reach
this conclusion by not addressing the applicability to the West Bank
of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War of 1949 (hereafter
Geneva Convention IV). 20 This is because that article prohibits an
occupying power from transferring its civilian population to the

16.
G.A. Res. 10/14, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec.
8, 2003) (emphasis added).
17.
HCJ 2056/04 [2004] (Isr.), translatedin 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004).
18.
This begs one to ask what is, and what is not, proportional, from an Israelisecurity perspective. Alain Pellet has observed:
[P]roportionality seems more a general directive than a criterion in the proper
sense of the word; its appraisal rests on the subjective judgment of those
involved and, for this reason, it is ill-suited to serve as a means of
distinguishing that which is lawful from that which is not, a process which is
the raison d'tre of a criterion.
Alain Pellet, The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 169, 173 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992);
see generally Gross, supra note 2 (detailing criticisms of the ICJ's application of the
proportionality principle).
19.
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] (Isr.), translated
in 43 I.L.M. 1099, 30 (2004) (emphasis added).
20.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
IV].
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territory it occupies.2 1 Had the HCJ examined the legality of the
Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank by applying
the relevant provisions of Geneva Convention IV, it would have been
difficult for the HCJ to have reached the conclusion that the wall was
a lawful measure to protect the settlements. Instead, the HCJ
uncritically accepted the Israeli government's position that the wall is
not a political measure, even though most of it is being constructed in
territory over which it has no sovereignty. 22 This may also explain
why there was so little reference to international law in its judgment,
particularly on the question of self-determination and human rights
law. 23 Instead, the HCJ decided that there was a lawful basis for
constructing the wall according to its interpretation of the law of
belligerent occupation and Israeli administrative law.2 4 On this basis
the HCJ found that a small section of the wall (approximately 30
kilometers) should be re-routed because it inflicted disproportionate
harm upon Palestinian residents and could not be justified by Israel's
security needs. 25 It was up to the individual military commander in
the occupied territories to balance Israel's security needs with the
needs of the local inhabitants. As the HCJ's decision in Beit Sourik
was delivered before the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, the remainder of
this article will focus on the Mara'abe case, which challenged the
ICJ's Advisory Opinion on both factual and legal grounds.
In Mara'abe, the HCJ chose to avoid the question of the
applicability of Geneva Convention IV as it did in the Beit Sourik
case 2 6 -and as it had done several times in earlier decisions-by
relaying the position of its government, which has declared that it
practices the "humanitarian parts" of the Convention:
In light of that declaration on the part of the government of Israel, we
see no need to re-examine the government's position. We are aware
that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
determined that The Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the Judea
and Samaria area [that is, the West Bank], and that its application is
not conditional upon the willingness of the State of Israel to uphold its
provisions. As mentioned, seeing as the government of Israel accepts
that the humanitarian aspects of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply

Id.
21.
22.
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik, 7 28.
23.
See infra notes 140, 464-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
lack of reference to international law by the ICJ.
See HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik, TT 26-32 ("Regarding the central question
24.
raised before us, our opinion is that the military commander is authorized-by the
international law applicable to an area under belligerent occupation-to take
possession of land, if this is necessary for the needs of the army.").
Id. 80.
25.
26.
Id. 24.
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in the area, we are not of the opinion that we must take a stand on that
27
issue in the petition before us.

It may fairly be asked what parts of Geneva Convention IV the HCJ
does not consider to be "humanitarian." As it has never taken a
stance on its applicability to the OPT, this issue will remain a
mystery. 28 Yet on the day the Israeli army took over the West Bank
on June 7, 1967, the military commander of the Israeli army issued a
proclamation that he had assumed all governmental powers in the
area, and that the prevailing law would remain in force subject to any
orders that he would promulgate. 29 Attached to this proclamation
was the Security Provisions Order that contained detailed provisions
for Israeli rule in the occupied areas.3 0 According to these provisions,
[a] military tribunal and the administration of a military tribunal shall
observe the provisions of the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949...
with respect to legal proceedings, and in case of conflict between this
Order and the said Convention, the provisions of the Convention shall
31
prevail.

David Kretzmer writes that after the 1967 war ended, it became clear
to the Israeli political establishment that the Israeli army's
perception of the territories during that war as "occupied territories"
was incompatible with their political stance because they viewed the
territories as "liberated. '3 2 He opines that this was most probably the
reason why the above provision was revoked soon after the war.33
Michael Lynk notes that the HCJ shares a common narrative with
the Israeli government and military on the origins and principal
features of the Israel-Palestine conflict: "It accepts that the state is
under attack, that the occupation has been largely benign, that the
military and the government are motivated by security concerns and

27.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 14 (2006).
28.
See U.S. Dep't of State [USDOS], Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor, Israel and the Occupied Territories (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm (describing, in its section on "The
occupied territories," disagreement between the Israeli government and other groups
over how the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention applied to Israel's authority
in OPT, and whether Israel "largely observed the Geneva Convention's humanitarian
provisions").
29.
DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 32 (2002).
30.
Id.
31.
Id. (emphasis added); ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1035-36,
para. 93; see also Mazen Qupty, The Application of InternationalLaw in the Occupied
Territories as Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, supra note
18, at 119-20 n.126 (citing Booklet No. 1 (1967), 5, at 12). Kretzmer cites in footnote 2
the Proclamation Regarding the Taking of Power by the IDF (7.6.1967) in 1
Proclamations,Orders and Appointments of the Judea and Samaria Command at 3.
32.
KRETZMER, supra note 29, at 32-33.
33.
Id.
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guided by human values, and that the benefit of any judicial doubt
should be given to the military unless the minimal legal restraints on
the occupation have been unmistakably ignored. '34 That the HCJ is
security-minded and government-oriented in its decisions relating to
the OPT is also a view endorsed by Israeli lawyers and academics in
35
Israeli universities.
The HCJ is well aware that the position of the Israeli
government on Geneva Convention IV is at odds with the views of the
international community and the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), the body charged with the task of monitoring the
Convention3 6 and the application of International Humanitarian Law
(IHL).3 7 In 1990, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution that
called on the Geneva Convention IV parties to make sure that Israel
respects its obligations, in accordance with Article 1 of the
Convention. 38 The U.N. Security Council has reaffirmed that Geneva
Convention IV is applicable to the Palestinian and other Arab
territories occupied by Israel since June 1967, and has called upon
Israel to "abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and
responsibilities" under that Convention. 39
The U.N. General
40
Assembly has adopted several resolutions to the same effect.

34.
Michael Lynk, Down by Law: The High Court of Israel, InternationalLaw,
and the Separation Wall, 35 J. PALESTINE STUD. 6, 8-9 (2005).
35.
See generally KRETZMER, supra note 29, at 196. For a more recent
exposition of his views, see David Kretzmer, The Supreme Court of Israel: Judicial
Review During Armed Conflict, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 392 (2005). See also Yoav
Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the
Israeli High Court of Justice During the Intifada, 33 L. & Soc'Y REV. 319, 322-24
(1999).
36.
See Statutes of the International Committee of the Red Cross, art. 4(c),
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/html/icrc-statutes-080503
(last visited Oct.
17, 2007) (providing that the ICRC shall "undertake the tasks incumbent upon it under
the Geneva Conventions, to work for the faithful application of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to take cognizance of any
complaints based on alleged breaches of that law").
37.
See Declaration of the Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the
Fourth Geneva Convention and Statement of the ICRC, Dec. 5, 2001,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/5FLDPJ (last visited Oct. 17, 2007)
(discussing the applicability of Geneva Convention IV to the OPT); United Kingdom
Materials on International Law 2002, 73 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 942 (2002) (discussing
British State practice). See also Matthew Happold, The Conference of High Contracting
Partiesto the Fourth Geneva Convention, 4 Y.B. INT'L HUM. L. 389 (2004); Ardi Imseis,
On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 65-138 (2003); Hussein A. Hassouna, The Enforcement of the Fourth Geneva
Convention in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, Including Jerusalem, 7 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 461 (2001).

38.
S.C. Res. 681,
1-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (Dec. 20, 1990).
39.
S.C. Res. 1322, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (Oct. 7, 2000); S.C. Res. 605, 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/605 (Dec. 22, 1987).
40.
See G.A. Res. 43/21, 4, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 45th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
AJRES/43/21 (Nov. 3, 1988) ("Demands that Israel, the occupying Power, abide
immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
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Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions requires the
Contracting Parties "to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances." The ICJ held in Nicaragua v.
United States of America that this requirement derives not only from
the Conventions, "but from the general principles of humanitarian
'41
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression."

III.

THE WALL AND ISRAELI CIVILIAN SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

On the question of the legality of Israeli civilian settlement
activity in the OPT, Judge Barak, the President of the HCJ who
presided over the hearings and wrote the unanimous decision for the
three-judge panel, declared:
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the military commander is authorized
to construct a separation fence in the area for the purpose of defending
the lives and safety of the Israeli settlers in the area. It is not relevant
whatsoever to this conclusion to examine whether this settlement
activity conforms to international law or defies it, as determined in the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at The Hague.
42
For this reason, we shall express no position regarding that question.

With the benefit of hindsight and with the availability of an array of
literature published on the topic, including Pictet's official
commentary (which was published before Israel occupied the West
Bank in 1967), 43 Judge Barak was in an ideal position to examine the
legality of Israeli civilian settlements in the OPTs. It is therefore
perplexing that he chose to avoid addressing the issue.44 This is

Civilian Persons in Time of War."); G.A. Res. 38/180A,
6, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess.,
102d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AJRES/38/180 (A-E) (Dec. 19, 1983) ("Reaffirms its
determination that all relevant provisions of the Regulations annexed to the Hague
Convention IV of 1907, and the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, continue to apply to the Syrian
territory occupied by Israel since 1967.); G.A. Res. 37/123A,
6, U.N. GAOR, 37th
Sess., 108th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/371123 (A-F) (Dec. 16, 1982) ("Reaffirms its
determinationthat all the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August
1949, continue to apply to the Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967."); G.A.
Res. 32/91A, 3, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., 101st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. AJRES/32/91(A-C)
(Dec. 13, 1977) ("Calls again upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the
provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967.").
41.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 1 (emphasis added); Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 220 (June 27).
42.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 19 (2006).
43.
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
44.
One reason may be that Barak was seeking to avoid a clash with the
legislature. Since the HCJ's jurisdiction over acts of the Israeli military in the OPTs
rests on an interpretation of an Israeli statute, the Knesset (Israel's parliament) can
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especially true because the settlements violate not only international
law, but also, to the extent that they are built on private Palestinian
property, Israeli municipal law. 45 Instead, Judge Barak (who recently
retired as President of the Supreme Court) concluded that the
military commander of the West Bank is authorized to construct the
wall for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of the Israeli
settlers. 46 In reaching this conclusion, the HCJ in effect directly
47
challenged the ICJ, which was unanimous on this finding of law.
Judge Buergenthal (who dissented from the decision to hear the case)
agreed with his colleagues when it came to the settlement issue in his
Declaration.
Referring to Article 49, paragraph 6 of Geneva
Convention IV, he wrote:
I agree that this provision applies to the Israeli settlements in the West
Bank and that their existence violates Article 49, paragraph 6. It
follows that the segments of the wall being built by Israel to protect the
settlements are ipso facto in violation of international humanitarian
48
law.

Note the use of terminology by Judge Buergenthal: where the wall is
being built to protect the settlements, it is in violation of IHL by its
very existence. In other words, one of the consequences of the
illegality of the settlement enterprise is that any measures
undertaken to protect settlers must also be considered unlawful. In
this respect, it should be said that the illegality of Israeli civilian
settlement activity has never been in any doubt, not even in Israel.

always redefine the court's jurisdiction so as to limit its review over decisions relating
to the occupied territories. This is because Israel has no formal constitution, and, thus,
judicial rulings on any subject can be overruled by legislation. See Yoav Dotan,
JudicialReview and PoliticalAccountability: The Case of the High Court of Justice in
Israel, 32 ISR. L. REV. 448, 469 (1998) (suggesting that "unlike other systems with
entrenched constitutions (such as the United States), the fear of 'judicial tyranny' is far
from being real").
45.
See Talia Sasson Report, Summary of the Opinion Concerning
Unauthorized
Outposts, http://www.fmep.org/documents/sassonreport.html
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Sasson Report] (explaining that the summary
opinion has been prepared at the request of the Prime Minister's bureau). According to
the report, written by Talia Sasson, a former State prosecutor: "It is absolutely
prohibited to establish outposts on private Palestinian property. Such an action may in
certain circumstances become a felony." In this regard, Sasson cites the HCJ ruling in
the case of Elon Moreh, HCJ 390/79 Dweikat et al. v. Israel [1979] IsrSc 34(1) 1. See 9
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345 (1979) (offering an English summary of the case); see also
Steven Erlanger, West Bank Settlements on Private Land, Data Shows, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/14/africa/web0314israel.php ("An up-to-date Israeli government register shows that 32.4 percent of
the property held by Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank is private,
according to the advocacy group that sued the government to obtain the data.").
46.
For a recent commentary on Judge Barak's legacy, see Nimer Sultany, The
Legacy of Justice Aharon Barak: A Critical Review, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 83
(2007), http://www.harvardilj.org/online/113.
47.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1055, 1080-81.
48.
Id. at 1080-81, para. 9 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
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In fact, in 1967, Theodor Meron, who was then working as the legal
counsel to Israel's Foreign Ministry, wrote in a "Top Secret"
Memorandum: "My conclusion is that civilian settlement in the
administered territories contravenes the explicit provisions of the
Fourth Geneva Convention. '49 In contrast, Judge Barak advanced
two principal reasons that the wall could protect the settlements
(although he refrained from ruling on their legality): (1) "The
authority to construct the wall for the purpose of defending the lives
and safety of Israeli settlers is derived from the need to preserve
'public order and safety,' as mentioned in Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations;" 50 and (2) "Israelis living in the area are Israeli citizens.
The State of Israel has a duty to defend their lives, safety, and well51
being."
Judge Barak then qualified this last point by holding that "the
scope of the human right of the Israelis living in the area, and the
level of protection of the right, are different from the scope of the
human right of an Israeli living in Israel and the level of protection of
that right. '52 This was because the area in question (a part of the
West Bank between Qalqilya and the Alfe Menashe settlement) "is
not part of the State of Israel. '53 Consequently, Israeli law does not
apply there, and those who live in the area "live under the regime of
However, according to a leaked EU
belligerent occupation." 54
document, the HCJ (in an important decision relating to the Gaza
Disengagement Plan that has not been translated)55 reiterated the
distinction 56 it makes between the legal status of occupied East

GERSHOM GORENBERG, THE ACCIDENTAL EMPIRE: ISRAEL AND THE BIRTH OF
49.
THE SETTLEMENTS, 1967-1977, at 99-102 (2006). Since the 1970s, legal advisors at the
U.S. State Department have accepted that the settlements contravene Article 49(6) of
Geneva Convention IV. See Letter of H. J. Hansell, Legal Advisor, USDOS to House
Comm. on International Relations, Apr. 21, 1978, in 17 I.L.M. 777 (1978) (giving advice
on the illegality of Israeli civilian settlement activity).
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
50.
and Its Annex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43,
Oct. 18, 1907, U.S.T.S. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]; HCJ 7957/04
Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in 45 I.L.M. 202, IT 18-20
(2006).
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe, 21.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
54.
Id.
See Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, April 16, 2004,
55.
(last
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon-eng.htm
visited Oct. 18 2007) (containing an outline of the Gaza Disengagement Plan and links
to related documents).
See Muhammad Abdullah Iwad & Zeev Shimshon Maches v. Military
56.
Court, Hebron District & Military Prosecutor for the West Bank Region, reprinted in 48
INT'L L. REP. 63 (1975) (making a distinction between the legal status of East
Jerusalem and other Palestinian cities in the West Bank); see also infra note 111
(discussing the court's decisions in Hanzalis and elsewhere).
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Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza.5 7 Apparently, the HCJ
ruled that it was legal to take into account political considerations, in
addition to security considerations, for the routing of the wall in East
Jerusalem because that part of the city has been "Israeli territory"
since its annexation in 1967.58 The Court thus clarified its earlier
ruling in the Beit Sourik case, in which it had found that the military
commander could not construct the wall in the West Bank if his
59
reasons were political.
If this is indeed the case, then the HCJ seems to have drawn a
distinction between East Jerusalem, which the Israeli government
considers part of Israel under its municipal law, and the West Bank
60
and Gaza, which under IHL is classified as occupied territory.
However, it should be emphasized that this finding of law is at
complete odds with international law. 61 Even in a war of self-defense,
the acquisition and annexation of territory by forcible means is
illegitimate. 62 Although the question of whether an international law

57.
MISSION,

See SEPARATION BARRIER/WALL, JERUSALEM AND RAMALLAH HEADS OF
REPORT ON EAST JERUSALEM (2005), http://www.passia.org/jerusalem

(discussing the separation barrier that
meetings/2005/EU-Report-Jerusalem.htm
separates most of East Jerusalem from the West Bank, separating Palestinians from
other Palestinians). The suppressed report was an internal EU document written by
British staff at that country's consulate in East Jerusalem and was leaked to the press.
58.
Id.
59.
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] (Isr.), translated
in 43 I.L.M. 1099, 27 (2004).
See Law and Administration Ordinance-Amendment No. 11- Law, 572760.
1967, 13 LSI 75, 75 (1967) (Isr.) ('The law, jurisdiction and administration of the State
shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated by the Government by order.");
Sabri Jiryis, Israeli Laws as Regards Jerusalem, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
PALESTINE PROBLEM WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

182

(Hans Kochler ed., 1981) (citing Official Gazette (Kovetz Ha-Takanot), No. 2064, 28
June, 1967, at 2690-91 (Hebrew)).
61.
See S.C. Res. 478, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980)
(determining "that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by
Israel, the Occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and
status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent 'basic law' on
Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith"); LORD MCNAIR & A.D.
WATTS, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WAR 369 n.2 (1966); S.C. Res. 298, para. 3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971) ("[A]Ill legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel
to change the status of the City of Jerusalem ...are totally invalid and cannot change
that status."); S.C. Res. 446, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979) ("Calls once
more upon Israel, as the occupying Power ... to desist from taking any action which
would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially
affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967,
including Jerusalem."); S.C. Res. 452, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July 20, 1979)
("Calls upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the
establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.").
62.
See the first principle to the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, approved by the General Assembly-with the
assent of Israel-in G.A. Res. 2625, at 121, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/8082
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overrides a municipal law when the two conflict will depend
exclusively (at the municipal level) on the constitutional law of that
state, it is interesting to note that Judge Barak, in his latest treatise,
has written that "the theoretical principle of rule of law leads to a
number of presumptions," which include "the need to ensure rule of
law on the international plane by making sure domestic law is
compatible with public international law."63 Evidently, there is a
difference between Judge Barak's decisions on the judicial level and
his scholarly work, and in this respect his scholarly writings seem to
be a more accurate reflection of the law as it should be, especially
since, for the purposes of state responsibility, a state may not rely on
the provisions of its internal law to justify a failure to comply with
international law. 6 4 It is important to stress this inability on the part
of the state to rely on its internal law because declarative statements
of customary international law by the ICJ could be viewed by some
Israeli judges as part of domestic Israeli law. Some judges could take
this view because, in Israel, customary international law (as opposed
to treaty law) automatically becomes part of municipal law, with no
65
need for an act of the Israeli legislature to make it binding.
Although Geneva Convention IV is a treaty, certain of its provisions
reflect customary international law. 66 According to a recent ICRC
study, state practice establishes that Article 49(6) is a norm of
customary international law. 67 Presumably then, this provision is
binding in Israeli law and could be invoked by Israeli judges to
outlaw those settlements established in the occupied territories.
A. The Settlements and Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
The HCJ's finding that the need to preserve "public order and
safety" in the OPT-as mentioned in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague

(1970).

See also ROBERT YEWDALL JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1963) (writing four years before Israel captured East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula that "it
would be a curious law of self-defence that permitted the defender in the course of his
defence to seize and keep the resources and territory of the attacker"); D. W. Bowett,
InternationalLaw Relating to Occupied Territory: A Rejoinder, 87 LAW Q. REV. 473
(1971) (conceding that "states cannot acquire territory by resort to force").
63.
AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW: TRANSLATED FROM
THE HEBREW BY SARI BASHI 360 (2005) (citing M. HUNT, USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
ENGLISH COURTS (1997)).
64.
JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS art. 32 (2002).

65.
See, e.g., Ruth Lapidoth, InternationalLaw Within the Israeli Legal System,
24 ISR. L. REV 451, 452 (1990) (noting that in Israel, international custom is part of
municipal law and that this position was adopted very early in Israel's history by the
Supreme Court).
66.
See Geneva Convention IV, supranote 20, art. 49.
67.
See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUIS DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: VOLUME 1 RULES 462-63, rule 130 (2005).
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Regulations-gives the military commander the authority to
construct the wall for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of
Israeli settlers in the West Bank is also unpersuasive. 68 Article 43
provides:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, that latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
69
country.

In 1967, the legitimate power in East Jerusalem and the West Bank
was Jordan, which claimed that its title rested not on conquest but on
the consent of the inhabitants. 70 Even if Jordan was not viewed as
the "legitimate" power, it still had the rights and duties of an
occupying power before it annexed those territories. 71 Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT)
provides that, as a general rule of interpretation, a treaty should be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
72
be given to the terms of the treaty in light of its object and purpose.

68.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202,
18-19 (2006).
69.
1907 Hague Regulations, supranote 50, art. 43 (emphasis added).
70.
The United Kingdom granted de jure recognition to the union, but most
states withheld de jure recognition (although they may have granted de facto
recognition). In particular, the other Arab states denounced the union as a betrayal of
the Palestinian cause and as a breach of a resolution passed by the Arab League
prohibiting the annexation of any part of Palestine. See The Policy of the Arab States
Towards the Question of Palestine, Resolution 320-Sess.12-Sched.6, Apr. 13, 1950, in
MUHAMMAD KHALIL, THE ARAB STATES AND THE ARAB LEAGUE: A DOCUMENTARY
RECORD VOLUME II 166 (1962).
Eventually a compromise was reached; Jordan

declared that the annexation of the West Bank was without prejudice to the final
settlement of the Palestine issue, which the other Arab states accepted. See Michael
Akehurst, The Place of the Palestiniansin an Arab-IsraeliPeace Settlement, 70 ROUND
TABLE 443 (1980) (discussing Resolution 242, which outlined the terms of the
settlement).
71.
Jordan incorporated East Jerusalem and the West Bank into its Kingdom
in 1950 after overrunning the territory in the 1948 war and subsequently occupying it.
It did this in collusion with the Provisional Government of Israel. See generally AVI
SHLAIM, COLLUSION ACROSS THE JORDAN: KING ABDULLAH, THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT,
AND THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE (1988).

72.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 4, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (providing that "the Convention applies only to treaties which are
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to
such States"). Although the ICJ has held that Articles 31 and 32 reflect customary
international law, and although there is evidence to indicate that this represented the
law in the mid- 1950s, it has been argued that there is less evidence to suggest that this
was reflective of international law in 1907 at the time of the Hague Peace Conference.
However, in the Iron Rhine Arbitration, Between Belgium and the Netherlands,
Permanent Court of Arbitration (May 24, 2005), available at http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asppagid=1155, the Arbitral Tribunal, which included three ICJ
judges (Judges Higgins, Simma, and Tomka) and two Professors (Alfred H.A. Soons
and Guy Schrans), held at paragraph 45 that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT reflect
pre-existing customary international law, and thus may be (unless there are particular
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Assuming that when Article 43 was drafted its authors envisaged the
possibility of a prolonged occupation, it is clear from the plain and
ordinary meaning of Article 43's text that it is concerned with
restoring and ensuring-as far as possible-public order and safety,
while respecting the laws already in force in the country. 73 After all,
"good faith," as Judge Barak has recently written, "is a fundamental
'74
principle that permeates the objective purpose of every statute.
Evidently, one can only restore and ensure public order and life (the
word "safety" was a mistranslation from the original, official, and
authoritative French text) for those persons who already inhabit the
area in question.7 5 Those Israeli civilian settlements established in
the OPTs after those territories were captured by Israel in June 1967
necessarily violated Article 49(6) of Geneva Convention IV, which
prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population
into the territory it occupies.7 6 The settlements have also violated
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations because Israel changed its laws
to facilitate the settlement enterprise.7 7 Moreover, Jordan ratified
Geneva Convention V on May 29, 1951. Consequently, the laws
embodied in Geneva Convention IV were part of Jordanian law when

indications to the contrary) applied to treaties concluded before the entry into force of
the Vienna Convention in 1980. They reached this conclusion by referring to the ICJ's
jurisprudence in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island and Pulau Ligitan/Sipadancases which
concerned treaties concluded in the 19th century. Id.
73.
Some have argued that this refers to the status quo ante (i.e. the situation
in the OPTs before its capture by Israeli forces on 4 June 1967). See, e.g., HCJ 337/71
Christian Soc'y for the Holy Places v. Minister of Def. et al., translated in 2 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 354 (1972) (Cohn, J., dissenting) (arguing that the intention of the words to
restore and ensure public order and life in Article 43 is concerned with "the status quo
ante ... to ensure their continued existence").
74.
BARAK, supra note 55, at 361. See also Robert Kolb, Principles as Sources
of InternationalLaw (With Special Reference to Good Faith),53 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1,
13-25 (2006) (discussing good faith in depth).
75.
According to Edmund Schewnk, a comparison of the original French text of
the Hague Regulations with the English translation of "la vie publique" has been
translated into "safety." The literal translation of "la vie publique" is "public life."
Edmund Schewnk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague
Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393, 393 n.1 (1945).
76.
See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 43, at 283.
It is intended to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by
certain Powers, which transferred portions of their own population to occupied
territory for political and racial reasons or in order, as they claimed, to colonize
those territories. Such transfers worsened the economic situation of the native
population and endangered their separate existence as a race.
Id. (emphasis added).
77.
In his seminal study, Raja Shehadeh describes the various legal tools Israel
has used to facilitate its settlement policy in the occupied territories by declaring
Palestinian land to be "State land," "State property," "abandoned"; requisitioning it for
"military purposes"; expropriating it for "public purposes"; and acquiring it for "Jewish
purchase." RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 15-59
(1985).
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Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan in the June 1967 war.
Israel is bound by that Convention not only because it has ratified
7
it,
8 but also because it is the occupying power under Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations, which reflected customary international law
years before Israel occupied the West Bank.7 9 Thus Geneva
Convention IV was, prior to Israel's occupation, one of the "laws in
80
force in the country," which Israel was obliged to respect.
Because Article 4 restricts the scope of Geneva Convention IV to
"protected persons," the HCJ has sought to rely on the Hague
Regulations where there are no such restrictions. 8 ' However, this
still does not change the fact that the settlements, which the HCJ has
admitted the wall is designed to protect, are contrary to Article 49(6)
of Geneva Convention IV. 8 2 It is therefore hardly surprising that the
HCJ refuses to address its applicability. Yet the Hague Regulations
are supposed to be supplemented by the relevant provisions of
Geneva Convention IV, as well as the Additional Protocols of 1977
(which Israel has not ratified, although Additional Protocol 1 (AP1)
may be said to represent customary international law, and was even
mentioned in the General Assembly's December 2003 resolution

78.
Israel signed the Convention on December 8, 1949, and ratified it on July 6,
1951. Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfIWebSign?
ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
79.
Article 43 was considered as reflecting customary international law before
Israel captured the West Bank in the 1967 war. See Trial of the German major war
criminals, 41 AM. J INT'L L. 248-249 (1947) ("[B]y 1939 these rules laid down in the
[Hague] Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war .. ");Cessation of vessels and tugs
for navigation on the Danube case, 1 R.I.A.A. 104 (1921). In fact, almost identical
words to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations had been used in previous Conventions.
See Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, July
29, 1899; The Laws of War on Land arts. 43-44, Sept. 9, 1880; Project of an
International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War arts. 2-3, Aug. 27,
1874. For a survey of this legislation, see DORIS APPEL GRABER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 1863-1914 (1949).

80.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20. With regard to the first part of
Article 43, one highly-respected jurist in Israel has noted that it "must not be seen as a
source of supplementary rights and authority for the Occupying Power, transcending
the limits determined by the constraints of discharging its duty. See Yoram Dinstein,
The Israel HCJ and the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, 27 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 1, 16 (1995).
81.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 4. Article 4 of Geneva
Convention IV provides that it only applies to "protected persons" who are defined as
"those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case
of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
which they are not nationals." This obviously cannot include nationals of the State of
Israel, the occupying power.
82.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 19 (2006).
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requesting the Advisory Opinion from the ICJ).8 3 Thus, contrary to
the findings of the HCJ, Article 43 cannot be construed as providing
the Israeli military commander with the obligation to defend the lives
and safety of Israelis living in illegal settlements by constructing a
wall.
Article 43 was never drafted to accommodate a settler
population; rather, it was intended to safeguard the interests of the
local population who found itself under belligerent occupation.
84
Hence, the whole of Article 43 is written in the past tense.
It may also be queried whether establishing Israeli civilian
settlements amidst a Palestinian population struggling for
independence and statehood in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and
the Gaza Strip for nearly four decades is likely to restore and ensure
public order and life. 8 5 Indeed, it would seem that the very presence
of the Israeli settlements contributes to acts of violence, riots, and
civil disturbance.8 6 Some would even argue that the continued
construction of the settlements was one of the primary factors that
led to the collapse of the "Oslo Peace Process. 8 7T
Therefore,

83.
See G.A. Res. ES-10/14, supra note 16 (reaffirming in the preamble "the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention as well as Additional Protocol 1 to the
Geneva Conventions to Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem"
(emphasis added)). On the customary status of some of API's provisions, see Fausto
Pocar, Protocol 1 Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Customary
InternationalLaw, 31 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 145 (2002).
84.
1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 50, art. 43.
85.
There have been numerous studies on the impact of population transfers on
the communities affected by the transfer. See, e.g., U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights,
Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Final Report of the
Special Rapporteur on human rights and population transfer, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.211997/23 (June 27, 1997). This report was preceded by a Preliminary
Report UN doc. E/CN.5.Sub.2/1993/17 and Corr.1 and a Progress Report UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/19 and Corr.1.
For criticisms of the Draft Declaration on
Population Transfer and Implantation of Settlers, see Emily Haslam, Unlawful
PopulationTransfer and the Limits of InternationalCriminal Law, 61 C.L.J. 66 (2002).
On population transfer generally, see, for example, Eric Kolodner, PopulationTransfer:
The Effects of Settler Infusion Policies on a Host Population's Right to SelfDetermination, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 159 (1994). See also Christa Meindersma,
Population Exchanges: International Law and State Practice- Part 1, 9 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 335 (1997) (examining the human rights implications of population
exchange agreements); Christa Meindersma, Legal Issues Surrounding Population
Transfer in Conflict Situations, 41 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 31 (1994) (providing an
overview of existing and emerging legal standards relevant to ongoing situations of
population transfer).
86.
See generally Settler Violence, B'Tselem, Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, http://www.btselem.org/english
Settler-Violence/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (documenting settler violence against
Palestinians).
87.
Ron Pundak, Director-General of Israel's Peres Peace Centre in Tel Aviv
who was a key player in the 1993 Oslo negotiations, attributes its failures to the
Netanyahu years of government (1996-1999), as well as to the "patronizing Israeli
attitude towards the Palestinians-one of occupier to occupied-[which] continued
unabated." Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?, 43 SURVIVAL 31, 33
(2001).
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encouraging one's nationals to emigrate to the occupied territory
might, according to Israeli lawyer Eyal Benvenisti, "impinge on the
local 'public' order and civil life' and therefore be proscribed by
international law, particularly by Article 43."88
B. The Settlers, the Settlements, and Human-Rights Law
It is submitted that Israeli settlers may not invoke human rights
law to justify their living in the OPTs for the following four reasons:
(1) IHL prohibits establishing settlements in occupied territories and
is the lex specialis in situations of belligerent occupation; (2) human
rights law does not give the settlers the right to live wherever they
like; (3) the provisions of the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip8 9 regarding the
settlements are irrelevant to the matter at hand, and cannot derogate
from Geneva Convention IV; and (4) the law of self-determination as
a norm of customary international law, as the primordial human
right and as a jus cogens norm, trumps any rights the settlers may
have under general human rights law.
The ICJ has held, in accordance with the long-established
position of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights and the practice of
the European Court of Human Rights (as reflected in a series of cases
concerning Turkey's occupation of northern Cyprus), that
international humanitarian and human rights law applies where the
occupying power has effective control of the occupied territory. 90 As a
result, the indigenous Palestinian population of the West Bank is also
entitled to the protection of human rights law. 9 1 It is therefore clear
that Palestinians inhabiting the OPTs are covered by both
international humanitarian and human rights law. 92 However, in
cases of conflict between these two branches of law, it has been

88.

EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 21 (1993)

(emphasis added).
89.
Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
Isr.-Palestine, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 557 (1997).
90.
See Loizidou v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 40/1993/435/514,
56 (1996)
("Those affected by such policies or actions therefore come within the 'jurisdiction' of
Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention (art. 1). Her obligation to secure
to the applicant the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention therefore extends to
the northern part of Cyprus."); see also Decision as to the Admissibility of Bankovic v.
Belgium, Application No. 52207/99, 41 I.L.M. 517, paras. 70-71 (2002) (finding an
obligation to secure an area outside its national territory under its effective control).
Turkey has occupied northern Cyprus since July 20, 1974.
91.
See HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated
in 45 I.L.M. 202,
27 (2006) (stating that the HCJ "shall assume-without deciding
the matter-that the international conventions on human rights apply in the area").
92.
See ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1040, paras. 111, 113
(discussing the applicability of human rights law to the OPTs). Israel ratified the
Covenants on Human Rights on January 3, 1992.
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suggested that the latter should be interpreted in light of the former
93
as the law specific to belligerent occupation.
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ held that the protection of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 94 (ICCPR) does
not cease in times of war unless a state has derogated from certain of
its provisions in a time of national emergency. 95 The Advisory
Opinion notes, however, that respect for the right to life is not a
provision that can be derogated from, and that the right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. 96 The ICJ
then held: "The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life ... then
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct
of hostilities.'97 In its Advisory Opinion in Wall, the ICJ cited its
opinion in Nuclear Weapons, stipulating that there are three possible
situations with regard to the relationship between international
humanitarian and human rights law:
Some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian
law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to
answer the question put to it, the Court will have to take into
consideration both these branches of international law, namely human
98
rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.

In other words, both of these branches of law may, depending on the
circumstances, be applicable to situations of belligerent occupation,
which the ICJ recently affirmed in its decision in Armed activity in
the Congo.99 However, where there is a clash between human rights

93.
See ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Working Paper on the Relationship Between Human Rights
Law and InternationalHumanitarianLaw, para. 76, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14
(Jun. 21, 2005) (prepared by Franqoise Hampson & Ibrahim Salama) (noting that the
case law strongly suggests that human rights bodies should interpret the norms of
human rights law in light of international humanitarian law). See also id. paras. 57,
69, where the authors conclude that lex specialis was not being used by the ICJ in its
Wall Advisory Opinion to displace human rights law and that whether IHL/human
rights law is applicable is not a question of "either ... or." They conclude that the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission and
Court of Human Rights strongly suggests that in situations of conflict, human rights
bodies should interpret the norms of human rights law in light of the law of armed
conflict and IHL, as the lex specialis.
94.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
95.
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226,
25, 35 (July 8).
96.
Id.
97.
Id. (emphasis added).
98.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1038-39, para. 106.
99.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 215 (Dec. 19).
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and humanitarian law, it would seem that IHL would prevail in
situations of armed conflict. 0 0° Although the ICJ in its Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion was discussing the test of what is an
arbitrary deprivation of life, its finding that IHL is the lex specialis in
the course of armed conflict would in principle apply to all conflict
situations. 10 1 It would therefore seem that in case of dispute,
international humanitarian law as embodied in The Hague
Regulations, Geneva Convention IV, and the Additional Protocolsinsofar as they reflect customary international law' 0 2-would prevail
over human rights law. Thus, even though Israeli settlers are
protected by the law of human rights, this cannot preclude the
wrongfulness
of breaching
specific
rules
of international
humanitarian law such as Article 49(6) of Geneva Convention IV.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that while Israelis are
entitled to have their human rights respected, the settlements in
which they live are unlawful. The government of Israel must
therefore cease construction of the settlements and refrain from
encouraging its nationals to settle in them.' 0 3 The fact that the
settlers have human rights under international law should also not
prevent them from being relocated from occupied territory. 10 4 The
settlers cannot invoke human rights law to reside wherever they like,
as Article 12 of the ICCPR provides: "Everyone lawfully within the

100.
In other words, human rights law remains applicable in situations of armed
conflict, except when it is in direct conflict with the law of armed conflict. See generally
CHARLES GARRAWAY, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE "WAR ON TERROR": DO THE RULES NEED
CHANGING? (2006), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/
download/-/id384/file4019_bpwaronterror.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (analyzing
the relationship between human rights law in the "War on Terror").
101.
See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law:
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of InternationalLaw, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (discussing lex
specialis generally).
102.
See HENCKAERTS, supra note 67 (clarifying and elucidating this reflection of
customary international law in this recent ICRC study).
103.
Various financial incentives are used to encourage people to move into
settlements. See generally B'TSELEM, LAND GRAB: ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE
WEST BANK (2002), http://www.btselem.orgDownload/200205_Land_GrabEng.pdf
[hereinafter LAND GRAB] (discussing a number of methods the Israeli government
used). Although during Israel's Gaza disengagement plan in September 2005, 8500
Israeli settlers were forced to evacuate Gaza, 14,000 Israeli settlers moved into
settlements in the Went Bank. Chris McGreal, Israel Redraws the Roadmap, Building
Quietly and Quickly, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 18, 2005, at 17.
104.
See HCJ 1661/05 Regional Council of Gaza Beach v. Knesset (not
translated); see also Chatham House, Disengagement From Gaza-Legal Issues,
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/download/-/id286/
file/3922_ilp200605.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (providing a summary of highlights
from the case in English). In this case, Israel's High Court of Justice rejected the
claims advanced by the Gaza settlers that their human rights would be breached if
they were forced to relocate from the Gaza Strip. Paradoxically, many of these settlers
moved to the West Bank, as noted in McGreal, supra note 103, at 17.
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territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to
liberty

of

movement

and

freedom

to

choose

his

residence."'

Palestine, as long as it remains OPT, is clearly not a state.

0 5

10 6

Secondly, the settlements are not situated in the State of Israel, but

in the occupied territories. 10 7 Moreover, their presence in those
08
territories is unlawful, and Article 12 is consequently inapplicable.1
Israel may therefore not invoke human rights law to defend the
settlers and the settlements in which they live. 10

9

Nor may Israel invoke the security provisions of the Interim
Agreement it concluded with the PLO, as Judge Barak did in
Mara'abe.110 Although Article XII (1) of the Interim Agreement
provides Israel with the responsibility for "overall security of Israelis
and settlements," this article does not necessarily make the

settlements lawful, as it is only concerned with security and public
order. Even if one were to interpret these provisions as "legalizing"
the settlements, such legalization would be prohibited by Article 47 of
Geneva Convention IV, which provides:
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in
any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of
a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor
by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied
territoriesand the Occupying Power, nor by an annexation by the latter
11 1
of the whole or part of the occupied territory."

105.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 94, at 176
(emphasis added).
106.
See Efrat Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402 F.3d 274, 292 (1st Cir.
2005) ("We recognize that the status of the Palestinian territories is in many ways sui
generis. Here, however, the defendants have not carried their burden of showing that
Palestine satisfied the requirements for statehood under the applicable principles of
international law at any point in time."). For articles on the question of Palestinian
statehood, see Francis A. Boyle, The Creationof the State of Palestine, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L.
301 (1990); James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much Too
Soon?, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 307 (1990); and Jean Salmon, Declaration of the State of
Palestine, 5 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 48 (1989), translated in 33 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS
DE DROIT INT'L 37-62 (1988).
107.
LAND GRAB, supra note 103, at 7.
108.
Id.
109.
Nor may Israel benefit from its own wrongdoing. This derives from the
principle of ex injurianon jus oritur. As Judge Elaraby noted in his separate opinion in
Wall: "The general principle that an illegal act cannot produce legal rights-ex injuria
jus non oritur-is well recognized in international law." ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion,
supra note 2, at 1087, para. 3.1 (declaration of Judge Elaraby). See generally R.Y.
Jennings, Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 64, 72-74 (1965) (discussing
the principle of ex injuria non oriturjus).
110.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 14 (2006).
111.
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 47 (emphasis added).
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Pictet notes that "[a]greements concluded with the authorities of the
occupied territory represent a more' subtle means by which the
Occupying Power may try to free itself from the obligations
incumbent on it under occupation law."11 2 In this regard, it is
important to note that Article XXXI (7) of the Interim Agreement on
Final Clauses provides, "Neither side shall initiate or take any step
that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations."' 1 3 This
article clearly prohibits any new settlement activity as such activity
would affect the status of the West Bank before the outcome of the
permanent status negotiations as well as any measures taken to
incorporate them within Israel itself. Effectively, Israel is prohibited
by Geneva Convention IV from any settlement activity per se, while
the Interim Agreement prohibits the creation of any new settlements
and the expansion of existing settlements.
Thus two separate
treaties (Geneva Convention IV and the Interim Agreement) prohibit
Israeli civilian settlement activity in the OPTs, as does Israeli
municipal law where the settlements are built on private Palestinian
property." 4
It could therefore be argued that any measures
undertaken by Israel to protect the settlements, which are in
themselves unlawful, are contrary to international law." 5
Finally, common Article 1 to both the ICCPR and the
6
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights"
(ICESCR) provides: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
' 7
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." "
Evidently, this is the preeminent human right from which all other
human rights flow. It is also widely regarded to be a peremptory
norm of international law, as reflected in both custom and treaty law,
and is therefore presumably binding under Israeli law." 8 Therefore,
even if general human rights law is applicable to the settlers, the
Palestinian people's right of self-determination takes precedence,
especially as the Israeli settlements established after 1967 directly

112.
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 43, at 274.
113.
Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, supra note 89.
114.
See generally Sasson Report, supra note 45 (discussing the settlements and
Israeli municipal law).
115.
This was indeed argued by counsel for Jordan and it seems to have been
accepted by the ICJ. See Request for Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, para. 9
(pleading by Sir Arthur Watts, Senior Legal Advisor to Jordan).
116.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
117.
See infra Part IV (addressing in detail what underlies the Palestinian right
of self-determination).
118.
Customary law as opposed to treaty law is binding upon domestic courts in
Israel. See Lapidoth, supra note 65, at 452 (noting that "[a]s in most states, in Israel,
too, international custom is automatically part of municipal law, with no need for an
act of transformation" from the legislature to make the law binding on the courts).
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conflict with their right of self-determination. The Palestinian people
cannot pursue this internationally recognized right when the settlers,
the soldiers, and the Israeli government are interfering with their
economic, social, and cultural development. 119
C. The Settlements as De Facto Annexation
Despite claims to the contrary, l2 0 Israel's construction of the wall
in the West Bank (in and around East Jerusalem) and its enclosure of
the large settlement blocs located there are acts that in their very
essence amount to de facto annexation. Indeed, Judge Barak's
repetition in his judgment in Mara'abeof the assertion he had made
in Beit Sourik, that "the military commander is not authorized to
order the construction of a separation fence if the reason behind the
fence is a political goal of 'annexing' territories of the area to the
State of Israel and to determine Israel's political border," is
undoubtedly correct. 121 However, after making this statement, Judge
Barak went on to conclude that the wall's route was not politically
motivated, and that it is therefore not tantamount to de facto
annexation. 122 This conclusion is, however, a very odd one to reach,
especially since state representatives from the government of Israel
had previously admitted, in a public session concerning the wall in
another case, that "political considerations" did dictate to a certain
extent the wall's route. 123
Surely, therefore, the only logical
conclusion is that those sections of the wall that incorporate the large
Israeli settlement blocs into Israel are acts tantamount to de facto
annexation, according to Judge Barak's statement in Beit Sourik.
It may be true that Israel has not in fact annexed the territories
de jure because it did not purport to annex East Jerusalem through

119.
For example, one major issue is the utilization of natural resources in the
West Bank by the settlers and private Israeli companies. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3171
(XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (Dec. 17, 1973); G.A.
Res. 1803 (XVII), 5, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14,
1962) (General Assembly resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources). In the context of natural resources in Palestine and the Golan Heights, see
G.A. Res. 57/269, U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/269 (Mar. 5, 2003). See also NICO SCHRIJVER,
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES 152-56

(1997) (discussing permanent sovereignty over the OPTs).
120.
See HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated
in 45 I.L.M. 202, 1 14 (2006) (arguing that the areas have not been "annexed" and thus
are not governed by Israeli law, but instead by public international law regarding
belligerent occupation).
121.
Id. 15.
122.
Id. 98.
123.
See Yuval Yoaz, State Prosecution Concedes Political Aim for Jerusalem
Fence, HA'ARETZ (Jerusalem), June 21, 2005, available at http://www.christusrex.org/
wwwl/news/haaretz-6-21-05a.html (concerning construction of a separation fence in
northern Jerusalem).
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the act of its legislature until 1980.124 But for all intents and
purposes, Israel effectively annexed that city soon after its capture in
1967, an action that was condemned by the U.N. Security Council on
several occasions. 125 This condemnation was even acknowledged by
the HCJ in a number of decisions from the late 1960s and early
1970s. 126 Israel may, in fact, refrain from any de jure act of
annexation precisely to avoid condemnation from the U.N. Security
Council. But is it not annexation in all but name for Israel to
incorporate the settlement blocs by widening the municipal
boundaries 127 of Jerusalem, to expand already existing settlements so
that they protrude further into occupied territory (such as the
proposed E-1 settlement abutting Ma'aleh Adumim, see map 3 in
Appendix), and to administer these territories as a part of the state of
Israel? This logic must have swayed the ICJ, which found that it
could not "remain indifferent to certain fears expressed to it that the
route of the wall will prejudge the future frontier between Israel and
Palestine, and the fear that Israel may integrate the settlements and
their means of access. '' 128 It then held:

124.
Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 209 (19791980) (Isr.). See S.C. Res. 478, 5(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES1478 (Aug. 20, 1980) (calling on
"those States that ha[d] established diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw"
them); see also S.C Res. 476, U.N. Doc. S/RES/476 (June 30, 1980) (holding an
emergency session to discuss the legal consequences of building the wall). At present,
Jerusalem is not recognized as Israel's capital by any country in the world. See Israel
Science and Technology, Embassies and Consulates in Israel, http://www.science.co.il
Embassies.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (showing all foreign embassies in Israel are
located in Tel Aviv, not Jerusalem). Costa Rica and El Salvador, the only countries to
have had embassies in Jerusalem, moved them to Tel Aviv in August 2006. See Gil
Hoffman, Costa Rica to Relocate Embassy to TA, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 17, 2006,
available at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satelite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2F
ShowFull&cid=1154525889070; El Salvador To Move Embassy From Jerusalem,
YNETNEWS.COM,
Aug.
25,
2006,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L3295745,00.html.
125.
See S.C. Res. 298, U.N. Doc. S[RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971); S.C. Res. 271, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/271 (Sept. 15, 1969); S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/267 (July 3, 1969);
S.C. Res. 252, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252 (May 21, 1968); G.A. Res. 2254 (ES-V), U.N. GAOR,
5th Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (July 14, 1967); G.A. Res. 2253
(ES-V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (July 4,
1967).
126.
See Muhammad Abdullah Iwad & Zeev Shimshon Maches v. Military
Court, Hebron District, supra note 49; Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, 36 LSI 7 (1981)
(Isr.); Jurisdiction and Administration Order (No.1), 5727-1967 (1967) (Isr.). The HCJ
has stated that from the date of the 1967 Order, "united Jerusalem became an
inseparable part of Israel." HCJ 171/68 Hanzalis v. Greek Orthodox Patriarchal
Church [1968] (Isr.), translated in 48 INT'L L. REP. 93 (1970).
127.
For an article examining the various measures Israel has used to expand
its control over East Jerusalem by expropriating Palestinian land, constructing Jewish
settlements, zoning Palestinian lands as "green areas," developing town planning
schemes, demolishing Palestinian homes, and revoking Palestinian residency permits,
see Ardi Imseis, Facts on the Ground: An Examination of Israeli Municipal Policy in
East Jerusalem, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1039 (2000).
128.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1042, para. 121.
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The Court considers that the construction of the wall and its associated
r6gime create a "fait accompli" on the ground that could well become
permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal
characterizationof the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto
129
annexation.

Indeed, the prognosis of the ICJ, as well as that of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur (who-in his periodic reports to the Human Rights
Commission-had defined as de facto annexation Israel's actions in
130
constructing the wall around East Jerusalem), proved to be correct.
In February 2006, B'Tselem-the Israeli Information Center for
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories-reported that Israel had
effectively annexed the Jordan Valley by barring almost all
Palestinians from entering the region. 131 The Jordan Valley accounts
for a third of the West Bank. 132 The result of this annexation is that
Palestinians in the West Bank are hemmed in on all sides: by the
wall in the north, west, and south, and by the "security corridor" in
133
the Jordan Valley to the east (see map 2 in Appendix).
Ehud Olmert, Israel's acting Prime Minister, told the Knesset
(Israel's Parliament) on February 12, 2006, that "the first objective of
the next Knesset will be to fix the permanent borders of Israel.' 34
Prior to this statement, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State,
had been quoted by Agence France-Presse as saying, "[U]nder no
circumstances should anyone try and do that [set borders] in a
preemptive or predetermined way, because these are issues for
negotiation at final status.' 1 35 And even before Secretary Rice's
statement, Tzipi Livni, who was then Israel's Minister of Justice, was
quoted by an Israeli newspaper as saying that the wall would serve

129.
Id. (emphasis added).
130.
See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, John Dugard, on the Situation of
Human Rights in the PalestinianTerritories Occupied by Israel Since 1967, 14, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6 (Sept. 8, 2003). In April 2006, the Human Rights Commission was
replaced by a new Human Rights Council. See G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. AIRES/60/251
(Apr. 3, 2006) (establishing the new Human Rights Council to be based in Geneva).
131.
Israel Has De Facto Annexed the Jordan Valley, B'TsELEM, Feb. 13, 2006,
available at http://www.btselem.org/English/Settlements/20060213 Annexation of_
theJordanValley.asp. According to a report, Ehud Olmert, Israel's acting Prime
Minister, said that Israel intends to keep control of the Valley, even after it pulls out of
other parts of the West Bank and draws new borders-as a defensive move. Chris
McGreal, Israel Excludes Palestiniansfrom Fertile Valley, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 14,
2006, at 22 ("It is impossible to abandon control of the eastern border of Israel."
(quoting Olmert)).
132.
McGreal, supra note 131, at 22.
133.
For a recent and in-depth study of the effect of the Wall in combination
with Israel's prolonged 40-year occupation, see AMNESTY INT'L, ENDURING
OCCUPATION: PALESTINIANS UNDER SIEGE IN THE WEST BANK, (2007), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/resources/pdf/Israelreport.pdf.
134.
Marius Schattner, Fixing borders is Israel's top priority: Olmert,
LEBANONWIRE, Feb. 13, 2006.
135.
Id.
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as "the future border of the State of Israel" and that the HCJ in its
'136
rulings "is drawing the country's borders.
Even if Israel does at some future date incorporate the West
Bank settlements into Israel by passing a law in the Knesset, the ICJ
in its Advisory Opinion made it clear that all territory to the east of
the 1949 Israel-Jordan armistice line is occupied territory in which
Israel only has the status of an occupying power. 13 7 This, of course,
includes East Jerusalem and the settlements surrounding it. The
laws of occupation therefore remain applicable to that territory,
regardless of what Israel's municipal laws may say.

IV. THE

WALL AND SELF-DETERMINATION

The cumulative impact of the wall (its route, scale, and
composition), its associated r6gime (checkpoints, military laws, and
closed military zones), the "security corridor" in the Jordan Valley (a
no-go area for Palestinians), and the discriminatory road system 138
linking Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank to each other
and to nearby military bases, substantially reduces the territorial
sphere in which the Palestinian people seek to exercise their right of
self-determination. 139 In its discussion of the wall's route and the
regime associated with the wall in both the Beit Sourik and Mara'abe
cases, the HCJ hardly mentioned these so-called "facts on the ground"
or the recognition that the Palestinian people have a right of selfdetermination as a matter of international law. 140 It was also

136.
Yuval Yoaz, Justice Minister: West Bank Fence Is Israel's Future Border,
HA'ARETZ (Jerusalem), Dec. 1, 2005.
137.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1031, para. 78.
138.
See B'TSELEM,
INFORMATION
SHEET,
FORBIDDEN
ROADS:
THE
DISCRIMINATORY WEST BANK ROAD REGIME (2004), available at http://www.btselem.
org/DownloadI200408_ForbiddenRoadsEng.pdf
(analyzing the forbidden roads
regime from an international law perspective). See also Samira Shah, On the Road to
Apartheid: The Bypass Road Network in the West Bank, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV
221 (1997-8).
139.
According to the Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights, supra note 130, 15, the right of self-determination is closely linked to
the notion of territorial sovereignty. A people can only exercise the right of selfdetermination within a territory. Id. The amputation of Palestinian territory by the
Wall seriously interferes with the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people
as it substantially reduces the size of the self-determination unit (already small) within
which that right is to be exercised." Id. See also Written Statement Submitted by
Palestine, paras. 548-549, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Req. for Advisory Op.) available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/131/1555.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (naming several ways in
which the Palestinians claimed the wall interfered with the people's selfdetermination).
140.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202,
48-49 (2006); HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel
[2004] (Isr.), translated in 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004).
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inadequately addressed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion.141 For
instance, the ICJ's historical r6sum6 in paragraphs 70 through 78,
which touches upon the origins of the question of self-determination,
was not faultless-as Judge Kooijmans noted. 142 Therefore, a much
more rigorous assessment of how the construction of the wall
adversely affects the right of self-determination would have been
appropriate, especially as the ICJ accepted that the wall "severely
impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of [their] right of selfdetermination.' 1 43 The question of self-determination lies at the
heart of the Israel-Palestine conflict and is linked to the controversy
concerning Israel's right of self-defense from attacks emanating from
occupied territory, which will be addressed in Part V.
It is submitted that the manner in which the ICJ dealt with the
question of self-determination was rather formulaic. The Court first

141.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1034-53, paras. 88, 115, 118,
122, 155, 159. Judge Higgins also chastised the court for implicitly adopting a "postcolonial view of self-determination" without any particular legal analysis. Whilst she
"approves of the principle invoked," she is "puzzled as to its application in the present
case." Id. at 1062-63, paras. 29-30 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). So is the
author of this Article. For further criticism, see id. at 1071-72, paras. 31-33 (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
142.
Id. at 1067, para. 7 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). For example, in
paragraph 71, the ICJ recalls that the Arab population of Palestine and the Arab
States rejected the partition plan, contending that it was unbalanced, and that on May
14, 1948, Israel declared its independence whereupon armed conflict broke out between
Israel and a number of Arab States. However, the court does not point out that armed
conflict broke out between the Zionists and the Palestine Arabs immediately after the
adoption of the partition plan on November 29, 1947, whereupon the Zionists
conquered territory in excess of the limits established in the partition resolution before
it declared its independence at midnight on May 15, 1948. Nor does the court refer to
the mass exodus of the Palestinian population between November 1947 and May 1948
(when some of the biggest expulsions took place), or to the fact that British troops
remained in effective control of Palestine until June 29, 1948, when they completed
their evacuation. See Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,
submitted to the Secretary-General for Transmission to the Members of the United
Nations, U.N. Doc. A/648 (Sept. 16, 1948) (prepared by Count Folke Bernadotte)
(discussing the mass Palestinian exodus of over 300,000 Arabs and the termination of
the Mandate of partition on May 15, 1948). For historical analysis, see Benny Morris,
Revisiting the PalestinianExodus of 1948, in THE WAR FOR PALESTINE: REWRITING THE
HISTORY OF 1948, at 37-59 (Eugene L. Rogan & Avi Shlaim eds., 2002).
143.
As the ICJ noted,
the route chosen for the Wall gives expression in loco to the illegal measures
taken by Israel with regard to Jerusalem and the settlements, as deplored by
the Security Council . . . .There is also a risk of further alterations to the
demographic composition of the Occupied Palestinian Territory resulting from
the construction of the Wall inasmuch as it is contributing ... to the departure
of Palestinian populations from certain areas. That construction, along with
measures taken previously, thus severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian
people of [their]right of self-determination,and is therefore a breach of Israel's
obligation to respect that right
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1042-43, para. 122 (emphasis added).
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mentions self-determination in paragraph 88 of its Advisory Opinion,
noting that self-determination is "enshrined in the U.N. Charter and
reaffirmed by the General Assembly in Resolution 2625 (XXV)."'1 44 It
then cites Article 1 common to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, as well as
its jurisprudence in Namibia and East Timor.145 In paragraph 118,
the ICJ observed that "as regards the principle of the right of peoples
to self-determination . . . the existence of a 'Palestinian people' is no
longer in issue. 1 46 Actually, the existence of "a Palestinian people"
has never really been an issue, for Palestinians had been recognized
as "a people" during the time of the League of Nations. 147 Already in
1922, the British government had recognized "the people of
Palestine," who were specifically mentioned no fewer than six times
in an exchange of correspondence between the Palestine Arab
Delegation and J.E. Shuckburgh, who was instructed to write on
behalf of Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the
Colonies. 148 Moreover, Britain was prepared to create an Arab
agency to occupy a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the
Jewish agency under Article 4 of the Mandate. That is, it was to be
recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and
cooperating with the administration in such economic, social, and
other matters as may affect the interests of the non-Jewish
population, and, subject to the control of the administration, of
assisting and taking part in the development of the country. Upon
the establishment of the Arab Agency, Britain, as the Mandatory
Power, intended to approach the League of Nations to seek 1its
49
approval and place these changes upon "a formal footing."'
However, this offer was unanimously declined by the Arab leaders of
the day on the ground that "it would not satisfy the aspirations of the
Evidently, the leaders of Palestine's Arab
Arab people."'150

144.

Id. at 1034, para. 88.

145.

Id.

Id. at 1041-42, para. 118.
146.
147.
Palestine: Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the
Zionist Organisation,Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, June, 1922
(His Majesty's Stationary Office 1922).
148.
See id. at No. 2, para. 2 ("It is the object of providing the people of Palestine
with a constitutional channel for the expression of their opinions and wishes that the
draft constitution has been framed." (emphasis added)); id. at No. 2, para. 4 ("There is
no question of treating the people of Palestineas less advanced than their neighbours in
Iraq and Syria." (emphasis added)); id. at No. 2, para. 5 ("His Majesty's Government
are ready and willing to grant to the people of Palestine the greatest measure of
independence consistent with the pledges referred to." (emphasis added)). Thus, the
Palestinian people were recognized as a people from 1922 onwards.
149.
Report of the Palestine Royal Commission Presented by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament, League of Nations Doc.
C.495.M.336.1937.VI, ch. VI (1937).
Musa Kazem Pasha, on behalf of a group of Arab notables which included
150.
Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, Haj Amin al Husseini and Khalil Effendi Sakakini, added
that the Arabs, "having never recognized the status of the Jewish Agency, have no
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community therefore had legal and political rights that were
recognized and acknowledged by Great Britain. 15 1 It would therefore
have been prudent for the ICJ to have, at the very least, noted that
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination had its
genesis in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the period in
which Palestine was placed under the tutelage of Britain during the
Mandate. 152 "Although decolonization [wa]s not explicitly referred to,
the overall concept behind Article 22 of the Covenant may be
regarded as the first manifestation of the ultimate goal to
abrogate ... colonial system[s], [a goal] that was still being pursued
by many European states" at the time. 153 After all, the Mandate
system-like the U.N. Charter system-did not explicitly promote
continued or new colonial power. 154 And it was the idea underlying
the concept of the Mandate and its "sacred trust" that would

desire for the establishment of an Arab Agency on the same basis." See Palestine:
Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency, Correspondence with the High Commissioner
for Palestine, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, Nov. 1923 (His
Majesty's Stationary Office 1923). See also U.N. Special Comm. on Palestine, Report to
the GeneralAssembly, 101, U.N. Doc. A/364 (Sept. 3, 1947) (noting a past comparison
of a proposal to establish an Arab Agency with analogous position to that of the Jewish
Agency).
151.
See, for example, the paper annexed to a 'Top Secret" memorandum by
Ernest Bevin, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated January 13, 1947.
The Legal Advisers of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office prepared a paper "on
the legal position of His Majesty's Government, in relation to the United Nations, in
the event of their deciding either to partition Palestine or to introduce a system of
provisional autonomy." In the annexed paper, the Legal Advisers contended that the
word "position" in Article 6 of the Mandate included the political position of the Arabs
in Palestine.
The "Top Secret" seven page memorandum is entitled "Palestine:
Reference to the United Nations," dated January 13, 1947. File no. C.P. (47) 28. This
document is available in the National Archives in Kew. See FOREIGN OFFICE LIST AND
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR YEARBOOK 11 (Godfrey E.P. Hertslet ed., 1947) (stating
that at the time William Eric Beckett, Gerald Gray Fitzmaurice, Richard Samuel
Berrington Best, James Edmund Fawcett and Francis Aime Vallat were legal advisers
at the Foreign Office in London and in Britain's Washington Embassy).
152.
See ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1026-54, paras. 49, 71,
129, 162 (referring briefly to the 1947 partition plan and British Mandate, although
these references were not in the context of self-determination). For further discussion
on the question of self-determination, see League of Nations Covenant art. 22, and
British Mandate for Palestine, Annex 391, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS-OFFICIAL J. 1007
(1922).
Although in 1920 there was no general right of self-determination in
international law, that principle was applied by way of exception to mandated
territories at the Versailles Conference. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 428-29 (2006).

153.
Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System Under the League of
Nations as Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. 47, 55 (2005).
154.
Id. For further discussion of mandates, see Norman Bentwich, Le System
Des Mandats, 29(IV) RACUEIL DES COURS 115-86 (1968); NORMAN BENTWICH, THE
MANDATES SYSTEM (Arnold D. McNair ed., 1930); and JACOB STOYANOVSKY, THE
MANDATE FOR PALESTINE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL MANDATES (1928); QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS (1930); R.N. CHOWDURI, INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1955).
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eventually work its way into the Trusteeship System of the United
155
Nations.
The ICJ then went on to note that the 1995 Israel-Palestinian
Interim Agreement refers a number of times to the Palestinian people
and their "legitimate rights" (citing the preamble; paragraphs 4, 7,
and 8; Article II, paragraph 2; Article III, paragraphs 1 and 2; and
Article XXXII, paragraph 2).156 It therefore considered that these
'157
legitimate rights "include the right of self-determination.
However, it should be noted that although the Palestinian people's
right of self-determination is not dependent upon its recognition by
Israel, the occupying power, Israel implicitly recognized this by being
party to the Interim Agreement. Moreover, the British Mandate
provided both Jews and Arabs with the right of self-determination in
Palestine, which was given recognition by the 1947 U.N. partition
plan1 58 and the effort to establish a U.N. Trusteeship. 15 9 Their right
of self-determination was also confirmed by state practice in the
period preceding the adoption of the U.N. Charter as provided for by
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this regard it
is telling that all "A-class" Mandates would become independent
states, the exception being Palestine. 16 0
It would therefore be
nonsensical for Israel to deny de jure recognition of the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination when the basis for its own
right has its origins with that of the very people with whom it is

155.
In fact, the principle of the "sacred trust," which was enshrined in the
Covenant, had its origins in the 1885 Conference of Berlin and was intimately
connected with "the duty of civilisation." Charles H. Alexandrowicz, Notes and
Commentary, The Juridical Expression of the Sacred Trust of Civilisation, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 149, 154 (1971).
156.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1041-42, para. 118.
157.
Id.
158.
G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. GAOR, 1st Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/310 (Nov. 29, 1947). For the voting record, see U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 128th plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/PV.128 (Nov. 29, 1947).
159.
U.S. Delegation to the U.N., Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine:
Working Paper Circulated by the U.S. Delegation, art. 4, U.N. Doc. AIC.1/277 (Apr. 20,
1948). For the political debate surrounding the trusteeship decision see MICHAEL J.
COHEN, PALESTINE AND THE GREAT POWERS 1945-1948 345 (1982). It is noteworthy
that Article 5 of the Draft Trusteeship, which was proposed by the US, provided that
the territorial integrity of Palestine would be assured by the U.N. For further reading,
see PHILIP JESSUP, THE BIRTH OF NATIONS 255-303 (1974). Jessup was the author of
the draft trusteeship agreement for Palestine, which he discusses in this memoir.
160.
Although the other Arab countries achieved independence during the time
of the League, Trans-Jordan became an independent state after the dissolution of the
League of Nations in 1946. See Treaty of London, U.K.-Trans-Jordan, Mar. 22, 1946, 6
U.N.T.S. 143 (giving Trans-Jordan its independence). This is further precedent
indicating, perhaps, that Palestine could have, and should have, become an
independent unitary state, encompassing a Jewish national home within its borders.
See Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah and Palestine, 14 BRIT. SOC'v MIDDLE E. STUD. 37,

40 (1987) (discussing the independence of Trans-Jordan in 1946 and the reigning
ideology of Arab nationalism).
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destined to share that land. Thus, when the ICJ affirmed the right of
self-determination as an obligation erga omnes, this would apply to
both Jews and Arabs. However, in this particular instance, it is
Israel who is depriving the Palestinians of the exercise of this right,
by building a wall through territory in which they aspire to create
their state. As the ICJ observed:
[T]he obligations violated by Israel include certain obligations erga
omnes. As the Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, such
obligations are by their very nature "the concern of all States" and, "[iun
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection." (Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports
1970, p. 32, para. 33.) The obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are
the obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination....
[I]n the East Timor case, [the Court] described as "irreproachable"
the assertion that "the right of peoples to self-determination, as it
evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an
erga omnes character" (I.C.J.Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29). The Court
would also recall that under the terms of General Assembly resolution
2625 (XXV)....
'Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization
of the
principle
of equal rights
and
self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out
the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the
161
implementation of the principle....'

The HCJ only mentioned the right of self-determination in passing in
the Mara'abe case. 162 It merely noted that Judges Higgins and
Kooijmans criticized in their separate opinions certain aspects of the
ICJ's finding that the wall impinges upon the Palestinian people's
right of self-determination.16 3 In fact, only six ICJ judges (in five
separate opinions and one declaration) referred to the question of the
impact of the wall on Palestinian self-determination.16 4 Judge
Koroma cited the U.N. partition resolution and noted that the
construction of the wall would prevent the Palestinian people from
creating a state.1 65 Judge Al-Khasawneh was of the opinion that it
was Israel's prolonged military occupation and its policy of creating
fait accomplis on the ground (which presumably also includes the
construction of the wall) that prevented the Palestinian people from

161.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1053, paras. 155-156.
162.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202,
48-49 (2006).
163.
Id.
49.
164.
Judges Koroma, Higgins, Kooijmans, A1-Khasawneh, Elaraby, and Owada
issued separate opinions. Judge Buergenthal issued a declaration. ICJ Wall Advisory
Opinion, supra note 2, at 1054-56, para. 163.
165.
Id. at 1056, para. 5 (separate opinion of Judge Koroma).
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exercising their right of self-determination. 166 Judge Elaraby simply
repeated some of the relevant passages from the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion on self-determination. 167 Judge Kooijmans thought that it
would have been better if the Court had left the issue of selfdetermination to the political process. 168 However, he admitted that
"the mere existence of a structure that separates the Palestinians
from each other makes the realization of their right to selfdetermination far more difficult."'1 69
In his Declaration, Judge
Buergenthal also agreed with the court's findings that the wall
severely impedes the Palestinian people's exercise of their right of
170
self-determination and that Israel was breaching this right.
However, he did not necessarily believe that the issue was relevant
"to the case before us" and thought that Israel's right of self-defense
could have precluded any wrongfulness in this regard (which is
discussed more in Part V).171 Judge Higgins considered the ICJ's
finding that the construction of the wall "severely impedes the
exercise by the Palestinian people of its right of self-determination,
and is therefore a breach of Israel's obligation to respect that right" a
non sequitur. She then elaborated upon this point:
The real impediment is the apparent inability and/or unwillingness of
both Israel and Palestine to move in parallel to secure the necessary
conditions-that is, at one and the same time, for Israel to withdraw
from Arab occupied territory and for Palestine to provide the conditions
to allow Israel to feel secure in so doing. The simple point is
underscored by the fact that if the wall had never been built, the
Palestinians would still not yet have exercised their right of selfdetermination. It seems to me both unrealistic and unbalanced for the
Court to find that the wall (rather than "the larger problem," which is
beyond the question put to the Court for an opinion) is a serious
172
obstacle to self-determination.

This passage is illuminating. Judge Higgins is correct to note that
the actual exercise of the right of self-determination is usually
accomplished through a political process, although it has been
accomplished through the use of force, such as in Bosnia, Croatia,
Bangladesh, Slovenia, southern Sudan, and elsewhere. 173
The

166.
Id. at 1075-76, para. 9 (separate opinion of Judge AI-Khasawneh).
167.
Id. at 1089-90, para. 3.4 (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby).
168.
Id. at 1071, para. 31 (separate opinion Judge Kooijmans).
169.
Id. The current trajectory of the wall loops around the settlement Ariel,
which is located deep inside occupied territory. It may also loop around the projected
E-1 extension to Ma'ale Adumim. This would effectively segregate and dissect the
West Bank into cantons. See the Map in the Annex.
170.
Id. at 1078-79, para 4 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
171.
Id.
172.
Id. at 1063, para. 30 (emphasis added) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
173.
See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA (1996)
(discussing Yugoslavia); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The
Tragic Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad(West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66
AM. J. INT'L L. 321 (1972) (discussing Bangladesh); Machakos Protocol, § B(2.5), July
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Zionists also implicitly invoked this right when they created Israel in
1948.174 One may therefore question whether it is necessary for the
Palestinian people-subject to almost four decades of military
occupation-to provide the conditions that allow the occupying power
to feel secure in withdrawing from Occupied Arab Territory.
Whenever attempts have been made to establish a U.N. observer
force to maintain law and order between Israelis and Palestinians,
which could provide Israel with the conditions necessary to enable it
to feel secure in withdrawing from the territories, those attempts
have been vetoed at the U.N. Security Council. 175 The reality is that
many in Israel oppose a withdrawal because they consider that
territory as belonging to Israel (for ideological and other reasons)
regardless of its status under international law, and some Israeli
lawyers have even advanced technical legal arguments to justify
Israel's retention of those territories. 176 This is also the situation
with respect to the Syrian Golan Heights, where there has been
"peace and quiet" for the last four decades. Yet despite this, Israel

20, 2002, reprintedin 10 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 303 (2003-2004) (referring to the
possible secession of southern Sudan); see also James Crawford, State Practice and
InternationalLaw in Relation to Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 85 (1998) (noting that
states are extremely reluctant to recognize or accept unilateral secession outside the
colonial context; and John Dugard, A Legal Basis for Secession: Relevant Principlesand
Rules,

in

SECESSION AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

89-96 (Julie

Dahltiz ed.,

2003)

(discussing secession generally).
174.
See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948-5708, 1
LSI 3-5 (1948) (Isr.) (declaring that the right to a sovereign nation state is a natural
right to the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate); see generally John A. Collins,
Note, Self-Determination in International Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 137 (1980) (discussing Israel, Palestine, and self-determination). See also,
Evan M. Wilson, DECISION ON PALESTINE: HOW THE U.S. CAME TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL

(1979) (discussing in great detail the politics behind the Truman's decision to recognize
Israel and how this left the State Department and the US Department of Defense in
the cold).
175.
See S.C. Draft Res., 5, UN. Doc. S/2001/1199 (Dec. 14, 2001) (co-sponsored
by Egypt and Tunisia) (would have encouraged "all concerned to establish a monitoring
mechanism to help the parties implement the recommendations of the Report of the
Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) and to help create a better
situation in the occupied Palestinian territories"); S.C. Draft Res.,
8, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/270 (Mar. 26, 2001) (drafted by Bangladesh, Colombia, Jamaica, Mali,
Mauritius, Singapore and Tunisia). The latter would have requested
the Secretary-General to consult the parties on immediate and substantive
steps to implement this resolution and to report to the Council within one
month of the adoption of this resolution and expresses the readiness of the
Council to act upon receipt of the report to set up an appropriate mechanism to
protect Palestinian civilians, including through the establishment of a United
Nations observer force.
Id.
176.
See Yehuda Z. Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of
Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968); Meir Shamgar, The Observance of
InternationalLaw in the Administered Territories,1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262 (1971).
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has still to withdraw from that territory. 177 Instead, Israel has
178
annexed the territory and established several settlements there.
All attempts by the Syrian government to make peace with Israel
based upon a full withdrawal from all occupied Arab territory, an
approach that was endorsed by the Arab League twice in Beirut in
2002 and in Algiers in 2005 and has been reiterated several times
since, have fallen on deaf ears. 179 Moreover, Israel unilaterally
withdrew from the Gaza Strip in a matter of days during September
2005, even though the conditions in the strip were, from an Israeli
security perspective, probably worse than they had been at any time
in its history.' 8 0 Israel's unilateral withdrawal had little to do with
whether the Palestinians had provided the necessary conditions for
Israel to feel secure in doing this. Rather, it had everything to do
with power, territory and demography.' 8 ' As Judge Elaraby opined:
[N]otwithstanding the general prohibition against annexing occupied
territories ... on 14 April 2004, the Prime Minister of Israel addressed
a letter to the President of the United States. Attached to the letter is
a Disengagement Plan which one has to interpret as authoritatively
reflecting Israel's intention to annex Palestinian territories. The
Disengagement Plan provides that

See S.C. Res. 497, U.N. Doc. S/RES/497 (Dec. 17, 1981) (rejecting Israel's
177.
decision to impose its laws in Syrian Golan Heights); S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc.
S[RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973) (calling for a cease-fire in the Middle East); S.C. Res. 242,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967) (reaffirming the need for peace in the Middle
East).
178.
Golan Heights Law, 5742-1981, 36 LSI 7 (1981) (Isr.); see also Golan
Settlement Plan Under Fire, BBC NEWS, Dec. 31, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.
ukll/hiworldmiddleeast/3360085.stm (discussing Israel's settlement activity plans).
The Security Council condemned Israel for its decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction,
and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights which it considered "null and
void and without international legal effect." S.C. Res. 497, supra note 177, T 1.
179.
See Letter Dated 24 April 2002 from the Chargg d'Affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/2002/932, A/56/1026 (Aug. 15, 2002) (relaying to the
U.N. the resolutions of the Arab Peace Initiative at the Summit-level Council of the
League of Arab States in Beirut). According to a 2006 Ha'aretz report, the Arab
initiative proposes a new mechanism for furthering talks between Israel, the
Palestinians, Lebanon, and Syria. Akiva Eldar, Arab League Floats New Initiative for
Resuming the Peace Process,HA'ARETZ (Jerusalem), Aug. 31 2006. This report proposes
that the Security Council manage and oversee the negotiations, and that the results of
these talks be brought before the U.N. in a year. Id. The proposal suggests that
during the period of negotiations, all hostilities cease and the U.N. is permitted to
impose sanctions on cease-fire violators. Israeli PM Tzipi Livni told Annan that Israel
intends to oppose the new Arab initiative. Id. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has
publicly described the Heights as "an integral part of the State of Israel," saying that
he would never hand it back to Syria. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 26, 2006.
180.
See Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, supra note 48
(detailing the disengagement of Israel from the Gaza Strip).
181.
On the impact of Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in its immediate
aftermath, see Special Report: Palestinians in Gaza, Will They Sink or Swim?,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2005, at 29-31. "Israel's withdrawal has left Gaza seething,
lawless, poor, cut off from the outside world." Id.
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'it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be
part of the State of Israel, including cities, towns and villages,
security areas and installations, and other places of special
interest to Israel.'
The clear undertakings to withdraw and to respect the integrity and
status of the West Bank and Gaza legally debar Israel from infringing
upon or altering the international legal status of the Palestinian
territory.182

The Oslo Accords viewed the West Bank and Gaza as one territorial
18 3
unit which is to be preserved for the final-status negotiations.
Judge Elaraby was of the view that it would have been appropriate
"to refer to the implications of the letter of the Prime Minister of
Israel and its attachments [regarding the Gaza Disengagement Plan]
and to underline that what it purports to declare is a breach of
Israel's obligations and contrary to international law.' 84 When
Israel invaded and occupied the Gaza Strip in the 1956 Suez War, it
refused to withdraw from that territory and was called upon to do so
by the General Assembly.18 5 Israel insisted on firm guarantees from
the international community before it would agree to a withdrawal.
In response, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower said:
This raises a basic question of principle. Should a nation which
attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations
disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal?
If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of
the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of
international order. We will, in effect, have countenanced the use of
force as a means of settling international differences and through this
186
gaining national advantages.

Judge Higgins is correct to note that if the wall had never been built,
the Palestinians would still not have exercised their right of selfdetermination.
But this is precisely because Israel refuses to
withdraw (or make a commitment to withdraw) from the territories it

182.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1086, para. 2.5 (separate
opinion of Judge Elaraby).
183.
See Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, supra note 89, art. XXXI.7; see
also lain Scobbie, An Intimate Disengagement: Israel's Withdrawal From Gaza, the
Law of Occupation and of Self-Determination, 11 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 3 (20042005) (arguing that Israel's Gaza disengagement plan was inconsistent with the Oslo
Accords and international law).
184.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1086, para. 2.5 (separate
opinion of Judge Elaraby).
185.
A draft U.N. Security Council was vetoed by the UK and France. But see
G.A. Res. 1120 (XI),
1, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emer. Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. AIResll20
(Nov. 24, 1956) ("not[ing] with regret that ... no Israel forces have been withdrawn
behind the armistice line although a considerable time has elapsed since the adoption
of the relevant General Assembly resolutions." (omission of emphasis)).
186.
Address by President Eisenhower on the Situation in the Middle East, Feb.
20, 1957, 36 DEP'T ST. BULL. 387 (1957), reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
VOLUME III: DOCUMENTS 643, 647 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
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occupied in June 1967.187 Israel's refusal stands even though the
Arab world has made it clear that it would be prepared to terminate
its state of belligerency with Israel and to recognize Israel's
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence-as
Egypt did in 1979 and Jordan did in 1994-if Israel were to
withdraw.18 8
Moreover, according to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242, Israel is obliged to negotiate a withdrawal from the
territories it captured in the June 1967 War. 189 The onus to secure
the necessary conditions for negotiations is upon Israel, not upon the
Palestinian people (who are not even mentioned in that resolution). 190

187.
See, e.g., Israel Hints at Jerusalem Talks, BBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2007,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7033450.stm (noting that since its
occupation in 1967 Israel has claimed the entire city of Jerusalem as an "eternal,
indivisible capital").
188.
See Treaty of Peace, Egypt-Isr., art. III(1), Mar. 26, 1979, reprinted in 18
I.L,M. 362 (1979) [hereinafter Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace] (declaring that the parties
will "recognize and . . . respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence"); Treaty of Peace, Isr.-Jordan, art. 2.1, Oct. 26, 1994, reprinted
in 34 I.L.M. 46 (1995) (also declaring that the parties will "recognize and ... respect
each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence").
189. See S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967) (calling for the
"[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict");
see also G.A. Res. 2799 (XXVI) (Dec. 13, 1971) (reaffirming the same call for
withdrawal); G.A. Res. 2628 (XXV) (Nov. 4, 1970) (reaffirming the same call for
withdrawal); see also G.A. Res. 3414 (XXX) (Dec. 5, 1975) ("request[ing] the Security
Council . . . to take all necessary measures for the speedy implementation . . . of all

relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council . . . which
ensures complete Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories"); see also
G.A. Res. 36/226, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/226 (Dec. 17, 1981) (condemning Israel's
continued occupation); G.A. Res. 35/169, U.N. Doc. AIRES/35/169 (Dec. 15, 1980)
(same); G.A. Res. 34/70, U.N. Doc. AIRES/34/70 (Dec. 6, 1979) (same); G.A. Res. 32/20,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/20 (Nov. 25, 1977) (same); G.A. Res. 31/61, U.N. Doc. AIRES/31/61
(Dec. 9, 1976) (same).
190.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 only calls upon Israel (not the Arab
States) to withdraw its forces from those territories. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 189, 1.
The withdrawal phrase of resolution 242 provides for "[w]ithdrawal of Israel armed
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." Id. Arthur J. Goldberg, the U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. said this "refers, and was always intended to refer, to the
armed forces of Israel." U.N. SCOR,
63, UN Doc. S/PV.1377 (Nov. 15, 1967).
According to the "right-wing," Israeli interpretation of that phrase, Israel is not obliged
to withdraw from all territories it captured in 1967 because the English text of
resolution 242 does not include the definitive article "the" or the adjective "all" before
the phrase "territories occupied in the recent conflict," as it does in the French text
which is equally authoritative. See Michla Pomerance, A Court of 'UN Law,' 38 ISR.
L.R. 134, 149 (2005) (citing with approval Eugene V. Rostow's, Legal Aspects of the
Search for Peace in the Middle East, 64 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC 64, 68-69 (1970)).
Rostow, interestingly, does not provide any authority for this logic, which is clearly
incorrect. See John McHugo, Resolution 242: A Legal Reappraisal of the Right-Wing
Israeli Interpretationof the Withdrawal Phrase with Reference to the Conflict Between
Israel and the Palestinians, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 851 (2002). For an Arab view,
which it is submitted is correct in this instance, see the late Musa E. Mazzawi's
thorough analysis in MUSA E MAZZAWI, PALESTINE AND THE LAW: GUIDELINES FOR THE
RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT 199-238 (1997).
However, the plain
meaning of the withdrawal phrase is clear. The text refers specifically to "Israel armed

1462

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40.1425

This principle was subsequently reaffirmed in Resolution 338, which
was passed after Israel managed to keep hold of those territories in
the October 1973 War. 191 Israel is thus obliged to negotiate an end to
its occupation of Arab territories, including Palestine, meaning that it
cannot postpone negotiations indefinitely by refusing to negotiate,
creating obstacles on the ground that would hinder a full withdrawal,
or by claiming that it has nobody with whom to negotiate. 192 The

1. It then refers to
forces" and to no one else. S.C. Res. 242, supra note 189,
"territories occupied in the recent conflict." Id. This obviously refers to territories
Israel captured in June 1967, and not to territories the pre-1948 Yishuv (the Jewish
settler community then living in Palestine) and their militias captured in 1947-1949.
See McHugo, supra note 189, at 880. Indeed, this interpretation was how Abba Eban,
Israel's Ambassador to the U.N., understood it at the time. In a diplomatic note, Eban
wrote: "The words 'in the recent conflict' convert the principle of eliminating occupation
into a mathematically precise formula for restoring the June 4 Map." See id. at 875
n.62 (citing 'Comment by Foreign Minister of Israel' and Telegram 3164, UK Mission in
New York to Foreign Office, 12 Nov 1967. FO 961/24). The ICJ noted in its 1950
Advisory Opinion on South-West Africa that interpretations placed upon legal
instruments by the parties to them have considerable probative value when they
contain recognition by a party of its own obligations under an instrument. See
International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 135 (July 11);
see also SYDNEY D. BAILEY, THE MAKING OF RESOLUTION 242, at 155 (1985) (arguing
that resolution 242 requires a full withdrawal).
S.C. Res. 338, U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (Oct. 22, 1973).
191.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 calls upon all the parties concerned
192.
"to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council
2 (emphasis added). Although this
resolution 242 (of 1967) in all of its parts." Id.
Resolution does not expressly refer to any of the provisions of Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter (such as Article 39), it was evident that the situation in the Middle East
amounted to a threat to international peace and security, and the situation was
referred to as such throughout the debates both preceding the adoption of Resolution
338 and afterwards. See U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1747th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1747
(Oct. 22, 1973) (including statements made by Mr. Scali (United States) and Mr. Malik
(U.S.S.R.)). Although Resolution 338 does not invoke Chapter VII, it "decides that,
immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the
parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable
peace in the Middle East." S.C. Res. 338, supra note 191, 3 (emphasis added). In its
1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the ICJ said that it is for member states to comply
with decisions adopted under Article 25, which would include even those members of
the Security Council who voted against them and those members of the United Nations
who are not members of the Council. See U.N. Charter art. 5; Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. 52 (June 21) [hereinafter
Namibia Advisory Opinion] (discussing S.C. Res. 276, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2706 (Jan. 30,
1970)). Many of the delegates participating in the Security Council debate in October
1973, including those ambassadors representing France, the United States, and the
U.S.S.R., expressly referred to Resolution 338 as a "decision" as opposed to a
"recommendation." U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1747, supra note 192. In explaining
his country's vote in favor of Resolution 338, Mr. Perez de Cuellar said that it was
"binding," and that Peru would fully cooperate in the Council "so that it can discharge
its duty in enforcing its resolutions." Id. 7 136-37. The representative of Yugoslavia
thought that the Council had an "obligation" and a "duty" under the Charter to make
89. The
Israel stop its firing and to immediately implement Resolution 242. Id.
U.S.S.R. warned Israel of "very serious consequences" if it continued with its
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point is that even as Israel prepares for a partial withdrawal, it is
preemptively building a wall which it knows will hinder the exercise
of that right. Even if Israel withdraws from parts of the West Bankand it is still unclear whether it will actually do so-the Palestinian
people would still not be able to exercise their right of selfdetermination (which, in this case, would be to create a sovereign,
viable, and independent state in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and
the Gaza Strip) because what will remain will be less than a state
(see the maps in the Appendix). Although what remains of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip may amount to a self-determination unit, it
is highly unlikely that it will amount to a state that would be truly
independent of Israel, viable, or contiguous. 193 As Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin told the Knesset upon ratification of the IsraeliPalestinian Interim Agreement on October 5, 1995:
We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel
[sic] which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was
under the rule of the British Mandate and alongside it a Palestinian
entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living
in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
We would like this to be an entity which is less than a State and
which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its
authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent
solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War.
194
We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.

campaigns against the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Republics. Id. T 108 (statement of
Mr. Malik). Subsequently, the U.S.S.R. expressed its satisfaction that the Council had
taken "effective measures" for the "immediate dispatch" of observers to the cease-fire
line, "so as to compel Israel" to respect its decisions. Id. Several African countries
immediately severed their diplomatic relations with Israel. In Resolution 339, the
Security Council confirmed its decision "on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing
and of all military action .. " S.C. Res. 339, 1, U.N. Doc. S[RES/ 339 (Oct. 23, 1973)
(emphasis added). In referring to U.N. resolutions on the Namibia question, Rosalyn
Higgins observes: "The binding or non-binding nature of those resolutions turns not
upon whether they are to be regarded as 'Chapter VI' or 'Chapter VII' resolutions ...
but upon whether the parties intended them to be 'decisions' or 'recommendations."'
Rosalyn Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are
Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?,21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 270, 281-82 (1972). In
this regard, reference must also be made to the European Court of First Instance,
which recently ruled that "Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations draws a
distinction between 'recommendations,' which are not 'binding,' and 'decisions,' which
are." Case T-253/02 Chafiq Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, para. 156, (Jul.
12, 2006), para. 156, available at Westlaw UK.
193.
For further reading on the question of Palestinian statehood, see James
Crawford, Israel (1948-1949) and Palestine (1998-1999): Two Studies in the Creation of
States, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE

95 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999); Omar M. Dajani, Note, Stalled
Between Seasons: The International Legal Status of Palestine During the Interim
Period, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY 27 (1997).

194.
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, Address to the Knesset on the
Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, Oct. 5, 1995, reprinted in 15 ISRAEL'S FOREIGN
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Likewise, Prime Minister Ehud Barak was quoted as saying
something along the same lines on May 18, 1999, the night of his
election victory:
We will move quickly toward separation from the Palestinians within
four security red lines: a united Jerusalem under our sovereignty as the
capital of Israel for eternity, period; under no conditions will we return
to the 1967 borders; no foreign army west of the Jordan River; and most
of the settlers in Judaea and Samaria will be in settlement blocs under
our sovereignty. As I undertook, any permanent arrangement will be
put to a national referendum. In the long run, you, the people of Israel,
195
will decide.

With regard to Israel's Gaza Disengagement Plan, which, as Judge
Elaraby points out, must be seen in the context of the wall and settler
expansionism in the West Bank, the question of control over the
is
territory is measured by the extent to which the occupying power 196
population.
occupied
the
of
self-determination
of
limiting the right
In other words, it is the wall and its associated rdgime that is
hindering the exercise, by the Palestinian people, of their right of selfIndeed, the combined effect of the wall, the
determination.
checkpoints, the settlements and the settlement roads, the permit
system, and the economic stranglehold Israel has over the territories
has a direct impact upon the right of the Palestinian people to pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development. This is because the
Palestinian Authority (PA) is unable to function as an independent
political entity when it is completely dependent on the international
community and Israel to accomplish the basic tasks associated with
statehood, and when almost every aspect of the daily lives of the
Palestinian people from whom the PA derives its legitimacy is
affected by the occupation. The Palestinians cannot be free and
independent or pursue their right of self-determination culturally,
economically, and socially when they are ruled by another people.

RELATIONS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1995-1996, at 322, 323 (Meron Medzini ed., Isr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995-1996) (emphasis added).
195.
See Barak's Victory Speech, May 18, 1999, BBC NEWS, available at
(including excerpts of the
http://news.bbc.co.ukl/hi/world/monitoring/346507.stm
victory speech of Ehud Barak, Prime Minister of Israel, given at the Dan Hotel in Tel
Aviv).
As a Policy Brief on the Gaza Disengagement Plan, prepared by the
196.
Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research notes: "The test is not
per se the military presence of the occupying forces in all areas of the territory, but the
extent to which the Occupying Power, through its military presence, is exerting
effective control over the territory and limiting the right of self-determination of the
CLAUDE BRUDERLEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ISRAEL'S
occupied population."
DISENGAGEMENT PLAN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8 (2004), available
at http://www.ihlresearch.org/opt/pdfsfbriefing3466.pdf. This paper was initially issued
in, and is dated, November 2004, but at some later point it was revised, modifying the
original analysis of "effective military control." The paper does not indicate that it has
been amended and, moreover, it retains its original date. See lain Scobbie, supra note
183.
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Had Israel simply withdrawn from the occupied territories to the
1949 armistice lines without constructing the wall along its current
route and relocated the settlers as it has done in Gaza, there would
have been no obstacle to the exercise of that right.
It is important to note that the "Performance-Based Roadmap to
a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestine Conflict,"
which was mentioned by the ICJ in the final paragraph of its
Advisory Opinion, does speak of an "independent, democratic, and
viable" Palestinian state. 197 And yet when Israel accepted the
Roadmap, it submitted fourteen separate reservations that rendered
the Roadmap practically devoid of its object and purpose. 9 8 Of the
fourteen reservations Israel submitted when it accepted the Road
Map, the fifth reservation is of particular relevance:
The character of the provisional Palestinian State will be determined
through negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
The provisional state will have provisional borders and certain aspects
of sovereignty, be fully demilitarized with no military forces, but only
with police and internal security forces of limited scope and
armaments, be without the authority to undertake defense alliances or
military cooperation, and Israeli control over the entry and exit of all
persons and cargo, as well as of its air space and electromagnetic
199

spectrum.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how a "provisional
Palestinian state" can really be a state at all when it will have no
sovereignty, security, or control over its borders, airspace, or
electromagnetic spectrum. Surely the real impediment to peace and
stability in the Middle East is Israel's apparent unwillingness to
move in parallel with those countries in the Arab world that have
repeatedly stated they are prepared to recognize it in exchange for a
full Israeli withdrawal from Arab occupied territory.
Judge Kooijmans agreed with his colleagues in his separate
opinion "that the wall and its associated r6gime impede[d] the
exercise by the Palestinian people of its right of self-determination"
because it "establishes a physical separation of the people entitled to
enjoy this right. ' 20 0 But the wall and its associated regime not only
separate Israelis from Palestinians, but also Palestinians from each

ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1054, para. 162 (emphasis
197.
added); see also Letter Dated 7 May 2003 From the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. SI200315291Annex (May 7, 2003)
(containing the same language).
5-6, 9-10 (May 25, 2003),
See Israel's Response to the Road Map,
198.
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap-response-eng.htm (setting forth all 14
reservations).
Id. 5 (emphasis added).
199.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1071-72, para. 32 (separate
200.
opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
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other. 20 1 The wall segregates their land and the natural resources
below that land and repartitions the territory into cantons for the
benefit of the settlers. 20 2 The Palestinian people cannot freely pursue
their economic, social, and cultural development if they are
dependent on Israel for tax rebates, trade, water, security, and the
movement of people, among other things. 20 3 As Catriona Drew
observed in relation to the Israeli settlements (writing before Israel
began constructing a wall around those settlements):
Once the right of self-determination has been conceptually stripped of
its core entitlements to territory and resources, it becomes possible-for
states, institutions and commentators alike [and it should also be
added judges]-to assert both the inalienable,jus cogens character of
the Palestinian right to self-determination, and declare the future of
Israeli settlements as a matter for political negotiation; to affirm the
primacy of the right of self-determination, including the option of a
state, and envisage a future for Israeli settlements on the West
204
Bank.

If self-determination is viewed not just as a one-off right of a people to
participate in a political process, but is viewed as a substantive
right-to territory, resources, and demography-it becomes
immediately apparent why a wall that prevents, among other things,
farmers from accessing their land, doctors from visiting their
patients, children from going to school, and the faithful from reaching
their places of worship (as well as a future Palestinian government
from having access to its own natural resources and control over its
economy, borders, sea, and airspace) is problematic. 20 5
Judge

201.
Not only are Gazans and West Bankers separated physically from each
other (by Israel), but West Bankers are also separated (by the Ma'ale Adumim
settlement bloc which will effectively partition the West Bank into two separate parts)
and East Jerusalemites are separated from their kindred in the West Bank.
202.
See, e.g., B'TSELEM, GROUND TO A HALT: DENIAL OF PALESTINIANS'
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE WEST BANK 26-57 (2007), available at
http://www.btselem.org/Download/20070805 Ground to-a HaltEng.pdf.
203.
For an interesting book looking at the economics of state formation in
Palestine during the Oslo period in the mid to late 1990s, see STATE FORMATION IN
PALESTINE: VIABILITY AND GOVERNANCE DURING A SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION (Mushtaq
H. Khan, George Giacaman & Inge Amundsen eds., 2004); see also Victor Kattan, State
Formation in Palestine, 4 BORDERLANDS E-J. (2005), http://www.borderlandsejournal.
adelaide.edu.au/vol4nol_2005/kattan-stateformation.htm.
204.
Catriona Drew, The East Timor Story: InternationalLaw on Trial, 12 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 651, 666-67 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
205.
On the impact of Israeli settlements on the Palestinian people's right of
self-determination more generally, see Catriona Drew, Self-Determination, Population
Transfer and the Middle East Peace Accords, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SELF-DETERMINATION
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 119 (Stephen
Bowen ed., 1997). That self-determination is also mentioned in common Article 1 to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights could be
construed as granting an economic as well as a political right of self-determination.
MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 24-25 (1998).
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Kooijmans seemed to suggest that it is the "terror" attacks that are
impeding the Palestinian people's right of self-determination rather
than the wall and the regime associated with it. 20 6 In other words, if
the Palestinian Authority stops the "terror," then Palestinians will be
able to exercise their right of self-determination (presumably because
Israel will agree to withdraw its armed forces from the occupied
territories). However, there is simply no evidence to support this
proposition. As Alexander Orakhelashvili aptly highlights:
Judge Kooijmans failed to distinguish between acts that harm the
cause of self-determination and the specific and purposive action by the
state, in this case the occupying power, that impedes the exercise of the
right of self-determination. With regard to the latter category, it can be
safely affirmed that every kind of impediment towards the exercise of
207
self-determination amounts to the breach of this principle.

Ultimately, the ICJ should have dealt with the question of
Palestinian self-determination in a more forthright fashion, especially
as it found that the wall directly interferes with the exercise of that
right. 208 It is, perhaps, understandable that the HCJ would not want
However, selfto deal with this issue in any great detail.
determination can provide a useful tool through which a common
narrative can be forged, as both peoples-Israelis and Palestiniansare destined to share that land together in one way or another.

V. THE WALL

AND SELF-DEFENSE

Of all the issues that arose in the ICJ's Wall Advisory Opinion,
none attracted more attention and criticism than the tersely worded
three-paragraph statement on the question concerning Israel's right
Judges
of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Buergenthal, Higgins, and Kooijmans all expressed serious
reservations regarding the way in which their colleagues had dealt
with the matter. 20 9 Nevertheless, it should be said that, with the
exception of Judge Buergenthal, the judges ultimately agreed with

Judge Kooijmans writes: "As was said by the Quartet in its statement of
206.
16 July 2002, the terrorist attacks (and the failure of the Palestinian Authority to
prevent them) cause also great harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian
people and thus seriously impede the realization of the right of self-determination."
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1071, para. 32 (separate opinion of Judge
Koojimans).
207.
Alexander Orakhelashvili, Legal Consequences of the Constructionof a Wall
in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory: Opinion and Reaction, 11 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.
119, 122-23 (2006).
208.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1042-43, para. 122.
209.
Id. at 1079, paras. 5-6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. at 1063,
paras. 33-34 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. at 1072, para. 35 (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
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the rest of their colleagues in finding that Israel could not rely on
Article 51 to construct the wall in the West Bank.2 10 If any further
criticism is warranted, it is in the way the ICJ refrained from
elaborating upon why it considered Article 51 irrelevant to the matter
at hand. 211 In the following pages, the question of self-defense and
the construction of the wall will be examined in more depth, and an
attempt will be made to explain why the ICJ was ultimately correct
in concluding that Article 51 was, in fact, irrelevant.
It will be recalled that Israel did not argue the case on the
merits, and therefore the ICJ had to deduce Israel's justifications
from its statement before the U.N. Security Council and from the
dossier prepared for the Court by the U.N. 212 Thus far, the debate
has concerned four issues: (1) whether Article 51 has no relevance to
the present situation because it only applies to armed attacks
emanating from states, (2) whether the ICJ was correct to conclude
that Israel does not have a right of self-defense from attacks
originating from occupied territory according to Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, (3) whether Palestinian attacks can be characterized as
international in terms of the U.N. resolutions cited, and (4) whether
the law of state responsibility precludes any wrongfulness on the part
of Israel in building a wall in a territory over which it has no
sovereignty.
Of course, Israel, like all states, has a right to defend itself in
accordance with international law by referring to Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. No one has ever questioned this right-neither the
judges at the ICJ nor counsel for the Palestinians.2 13 However, there
are good grounds for questioning the extent and the scope of that
right and its applicability to the century-long conflict between Israel
and those Palestinians inhabiting East Jerusalem, the West Bank,
and the Gaza Strip.
In a situation of prolonged belligerent
occupation, the answer to Israel's security concerns vis-a-vis those
people (as opposed to a conflict with another state) lies in the law of
belligerent occupation and not in the law of self-defense. 2 14

210.
Id. at 1063, para. 35 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. at 1072, para.
36 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
211.
Id. at 1049-50, para. 139.
212.
See U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 21st mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. AIES-10/PV.21 (Oct.
20, 2003); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPreparedPursuant to
General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, 6, delivered to the Security Council and the
GeneralAssembly, UN Doc. A/ES-10/248/Annex I (Nov. 24, 2003).
213.
The following lawyers acted as counsel for Palestine and made oral
submission before the ICJ: Professors James Crawford, Georges Abi-Saab, Vaughan
Lowe, and Jean Salmon.
214.
See Jean Cohen, The Role of InternationalLaw in Post Conflict Constitution
Making: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for "Interim Occupations," 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
497, 504 (2006) (discussing the law of belligerent occupation).
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One should also bear in mind that Israel frequently resorts to
justifying its actions as defensive, even when they are, by all objective
accounts, punitive. 215 It was therefore, perhaps, hardly surprising
that it chose to justify constructing the wall in occupied territory by
claiming that the construction was consistent with Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, its inherent right of self-defense, and Security Council
Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001).216 Israel did so without
providing any explanation as to why those provisions were relevant to
a situation in which it exercised effective control over the territory
217
from which the terrorist attacks it complained of came.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
2 18
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
2 19
the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 4 (1) provides:
Membership in the United Nations is open to all ... peace-loving States
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in
the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out
2 20
these obligations.

In order to make a legitimate claim of self-defense according to a
strictly textual analysis of Article 51, three conditions must be
satisfied: (1) the state must be actually acting in self-defense,
meaning that its territorial integrity or political independence is
under threat; (2) it must have been the subject of an armed attack
222
22 1
must
(i.e. "if an armed attack occurs"); and (3) an armed attack

215.

On Israel's claims of self-defense and their rejection by the Security

Council, see STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-79 (1996).

216.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1021, para. 35.
217.
Id.
218.
U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added).
219.
Id. art. 2, para. 4.
220.
Id. art. 4, para. 1.
221.
Yoram Dinstein writes that such a restrictive reading of Article 51 is
required (i.e., that it permits self-defense solely when an armed attack occurs), as in his
opinion any other interpretation would be "counter-textual, counter-factual and
counter-logical."

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 182-87

(2005). In his view, the most that can be said is that if a state knows-on the basis of
hard intelligence available at the time-that an attack is in the process of being
mounted, it may "intercept the armed attack with a view to blunting its edge." Id. Cf.
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occur against a member of the U.N. (in other words, it must be an
Resorting to Article 51 to defend Israeli
attack on a state).
settlements can therefore be dismissed. Under international law,
Israel has no sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the West Bank
settlements, and they are thus not considered Israeli "territory" by
the international community. 223 Even assuming that the terrorist
attacks against the settlements meet the threshold of an "armed
attack" for the purposes of Article 51, as opposed to a frontier
incident, 224 they cannot be considered armed attacks against a
member of the U.N. 2 25 The Israeli civilian settlements, which are in
any event illegal, cannot be assimilated to a foreign embassy, for
example, or a state's armed forces. 226 In any event, the Israeli

The Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges & Change, A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) (reporting a somewhat different view
of the high-level panel on threats, challenges, and change). The report concluded that
"a threatened State ...
can take military action [in self-defense] as long as the
threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is
188. For criticisms of the report of the high-level panel on
proportionate." Id.
threats, challenges, and change on self-defense, see Christine Gray, A Crisis of
Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?, 56 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 157, 160-64
(2007).
222.
See Norman Menachem Feder, Reading the UN Charter Connotatively:
Toward a New Definition of Armed Attack, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 395 (1987)
(discussing the problems associated with the term "armed attack" and the
accumulation of events or Nadelstichtaktik theories).
See S.C. Res. 471, U.N. Doc. S/RES/471 (June 5, 1980) (stating that under
223.
the Geneva Convention, the occupied territories have no legal validity); S.C. Res. 465,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (Mar. 1, 1980) (same); S.C. Res. 452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/452 (July
20, 1979) (same); S.C. Res. 446, U.N. Doc. S/RES/446 (Mar. 22, 1979) (same); S.C. Res.
298, U.N. Doc. S/RES/298 (Sept. 25, 1971) (same); S.C. Res. 267, U.N. Doc. SJRES/267
(July 3, 1969) (same); S.C. Res. 252, 2, U.N. Doc. S[RES1252 (May 21, 1968) (same).
224.
Although many academic commentators have criticized the distinction
between armed attacks and frontier incidents, Christine Gray notes that the reason
behind this distinction concerned collective self-defense, as the ICJ in Nicaragua
wanted to limit third-state involvement. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 148 (2004) ("Its insistence on a high threshold for armed attack
would serve to limit third party involvement. If there was no armed attack, there could
be no collective self-defence. The use of necessity and proportionality alone would not
exclude third party involvement, merely limit the scope of their permissible response.").
225.
For pre-Charter authority that small border incidents cannot give rise to a
claim of self-defense because there is no unequivocal intention to commit an armed
attack, see Arbitrage entre Le Portugal et LAllemagne, Sentence arbitraledu 31 juillet
1928 concernant la responsabilitgde L'Allemagne & raison des dommages causds dans
les colonies portuguaisesdu Sud de LAfrique (NaulilaaCase), (Germany v. Portugal),
July 31, 1928, reprinted in 2 R. INT'L ARBITRAL AWARDS 1011, 1026-28 (1949).
The Definition of Aggression annexed to the General Assembly Resolution
226.
3314 (XXIX) on December 14, 1974, mentions in Article 3(d) that an attack by the
armed forces of a state on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another
state is as an act of aggression. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) Annex, 2319th Sess., U.N. Doc
With regard to
A/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
embassies, it could be argued that they are an emanation of statehood as they
represent the capacity of a state to enter into international relations. See 1933
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art.1(d), Dec. 26, 1933, 165
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settlements in the OPT are populated by civilians as opposed to
military personnel; it is therefore difficult to see how they could be
considered a representation of statehood or a component of the Israeli
armed forces. 227 To do so would conflict with Article 2(4) of the
Charter and Article 49(6) of Geneva Convention IV. Israel, therefore,
cannot justify defending its settlements on the basis of Article 51,
which may explain why Judge Barak relied on Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations. 228 Consequently, building a wall to defend the
settlements must a fortiori be illegal.
Moreover, even if Israel had invoked a right of self-defense or a
right of "humanitarian intervention" to protect its nationals in the
West Bank settlements, Israel would have been required to repatriate
them into Israel (i.e., behind the 1949 ceasefire lines in territory
internationally recognized as belonging to Israel). 229 It could not

L.N.T.S. 19. It is, however, not entirely clear whether an armed attack against an
embassy can be assimilated to an armed attack upon a state. Although the ICJ in the
Tehran Hostages case used the terminology "armed attack" twice to describe the
actions by Iranian militants in seizing the U.S. Embassy and staff in Tehran, it did not
address the legality of the failed American military rescue operation, which was
justified as an act of self-defense. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, paras. 32, 57, 64, 93-94 (May 24).
Nor, for that matter, did the Security Council characterize the attacks upon the U.S.
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam as "armed attacks." S.C. Res. 118,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (Aug. 13, 1998). It would seem that today the doctrine of
extraterritoriality does not apply to embassies. See EILEEN DENzA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: A
COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 113-14 (1998)
(citing a number of cases including Tietz et al. v. People's Republic of Bulgaria,in which
the Supreme Restitution Court for Berlin held that the doctrine is "an artificial legal
fiction which does not appear to be accepted as sound law anywhere in the world
today"). However, Ruth Wedgewood considers the bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Africa an "armed attack," although she does not address the issue as to whether an
embassy can be considered extra-territorial.
Ruth Wedgewood, Responding to
Terrorism: The Strikes against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 564 (1999). Instead,
she writes that "Article 51 recognises the inherent right of self-defense in the face of an
armed attack, and declares that a victimized nation is entitled to engage in unilateral
or collective self-defense until and unless the Security Council has addressed the
issue." Id. (emphasis added). Article 51 of the U.N. Charter actually refers to
'Members of the United Nations" and not to "victimized nations." In other words, the
attack has to be against a state. This is an objective factor and not a subjective factor.
It is irrelevant whether a state does or does not consider itself a victim.
227.
See Israel Hints at Jerusalem Talks, supra note 187 (reporting that Israel
has settled hundreds of thousands of citizens in Jerusalem since its 1967 victory in the
Arab-Israeli war).
228.
See Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied Territory in
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED

TERRITORIES, supra note 18, at 247 (arguing that that the Occupying Power is free to
take such measures are as necessary for the protection of its armed forces, but that this
license would not necessarily apply to civilian settlers).
229.
Examples of this controversial doctrine include the U.S.-Belgian
Stanleyville Rescue Operation in the Congo on November 24, 1964 and Israel's rescue
mission in Entebbe, Uganda on July 4, 1976. In both instances, the rescued nationals
were repatriated to their countries of origin. In the case of the Congo, Belgium and the
United States acted with the permission of the Congolese government, whereas
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claim a right to protect its nationals by sending its military to remain
in the occupied territory indefinitely or by building a semi-permanent
Addressing Israel's security
structure around the settlements.
justifications, the ICJ abruptly concluded:
Article 51 of the Charter thus recognises the inherent right of selfdefence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State.
However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are
imputable to a foreign State....
The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which
it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within,
and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different from that
contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those
resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of selfdefense....
Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has
230
no relevance in this case.

Although this paragraph has been subject to criticism, it will be
recalled that Israel did not enter a plea on the merits of the case in its
written statement.23 ' Nor did Israel participate in the oral pleadings
before the Court.23 2 Moreover, none of the states that submitted
written statements or made oral pleadings before the Court
"supported Israel's claim that the construction of the wall was
justified as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.'' 233 In fact, many argued that it was inapplicable. Perhaps
the reason why the ICJ's interpretation of Article 51 was so brief was
because self-defense was not pleaded before it as an exculpatory
justification for building the wall, although this would not have
prevented the Court from engaging with this issue in more depth.
A. Self-Defense, Self-Determination, and State Attacks
In the Mara'abecase, the HCJ expressed its bewilderment that
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter only applies when one state militarily
attacks another state. 23 4 As Judge Higgins duly noted, "There is ...

See Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS
Uganda assisted the hijackers in Entebbe.
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 195-211 (1973)
(discussing the situation in the Congo and U.S. and Belgian intervention); Leslie C.
Green, Rescue at Entebbe: Legal Aspects, 6 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 312 (1976) (discussing
the situation in Uganda).
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1049-50, para. 139.
230.
231.
-a at W28, Tr-. 57.
232.
Id. at 1015-16, para. 12.

233.

lain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me-"In Defense of the

InternationalCourt," 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 77 (2005).
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
234.
45 I.L.M. 202, 213, 23 (2006).
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nothing in the text of Article 51 that thus stipulates that self-defence
'235
is available only when an armed attack is made by a State.
Rather, this qualification is a result of the ICJ so determining in
Nicaragua, which based this finding of law upon the consensus
interpretation placed upon the Definition of Aggression annexed to
General Assembly resolution 3314. Article 3 of the Definition
stipulates that an act of aggression must originate from another
state, which stipulation the ICJ assimilated to an armed attack for
the purposes of its discussion of Article 3(g). 23 6 That an armed attack
must originate from a State is also, according to one study, a
reflection of the majority interpretation advanced by international
lawyers. 23 7 As the ICJ held in its Nicaraguaruling:
The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the
prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of
armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation,
because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed
attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out
23 8
by regular armed forces.

The ICJ's opinion on this point of law has been subject to intense
criticism because, some argue, the practice of states since the late
1990s allows them to invoke the right of self-defense under Article 51
in the event of an attack by a non-state actor. 239 There may also be
difficulties in ascertaining how much force is necessary before an
attack amounts to an armed attack as opposed to "a mere frontier
incident. '240 Taking its cue from a number of critical commentaries
in the American Journal of InternationalLaw, the HCJ in Mara'abe

235.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1063, para. 33 (separate
opinion of Judge Higgins); see also HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe,
23 ("[Article] 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations recognizes the right of self-defense, when one state
military attacks another state.").
236.
Definition of Aggression, supra note 226. See also, Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 41, para. 195.
237.
The issue is succinctly discussed by Jorg Kammerhofer, Uncertaintiesof the
Law of Self-Defence in the United Nations Charter, 35 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 143, 178-87
(2004).
238.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 41, para.
195 (emphasis added).
239.
For support for this view, see Matthew Scott King, The Legality of the
United States War on Terror: Is Article 51 a Legitimate Vehicle for the War in
Afghanistan or Just a Blanket to Cover- Up International War Crimes?, 9 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 457 (2002-2003); and Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of
"ArmedAttack" in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41 (2002). See also
Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as 'Armed Attack The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51
(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 35,
35-54 (2003) (generally discussing U.S. intervention in Iraq following September 11,
2001).
240.

See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

How WE USE IT 251 (1994) (examining the difficulties with ascertaining how much
force is necessary for an attack to amount to an "armed attack").
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found the ICJ's reasoning regarding Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
"hard to come to terms with," and doubted whether it "fits the needs
of democracy in the struggle against terrorism." 241 Without entering
into a debate over definitions of democracy and terrorism, since the
definitions of both are rather controversial in the Middle East, 242 it is
fair to say that the reasoning of the ICJ on the scope of Article 51
leaves something to be desired.2 43 But it is arguable that the ICJ
summarily dismissed Israel's plea, because when Article 51 is looked
at in its entirety (meaning when one considers it in the context of the
U.N. Charter as a whole), it is evidently inapplicable to the facts at
hand; the U.N. Charter only applies to its members, with
'244
membership of the organization restricted to "peace-loving States.
Furthermore, Article 51 is an exception to the prohibition of
aggression contained in Article 2(4), which only applies to states, and
which, when coupled with Article 2(3), requires them to settle their
disputes peacefully with one another. 245 This also tallies with the
principles of sovereign equality mentioned in Article 2(1) and the
doctrine of non-intervention. 246 The law on the threat or use of force

241.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 213, 23 (2006).
242.
It is highly questionable whether all forms of Palestinian resistance can be
labeled "terrorism." Certainly, Palestinian groups do engage in "acts of terror," as does
the Israeli military on occasion. Therefore, if this term is to be used at all, it should be
used to describe both Israeli and Palestinian actions. See Jorg Friederichs, Defining the
International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle Behind the Legal Debate on
International Terrorism, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 69 (2006) (discussing terrorism and
international law generally); BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006) (studying terrorism and international law).
243.
For a critique of the ICJ's determinations of the scope of Article 51, see
Sean D. Murphy, Self-defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit
From the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005), and Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory
Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT'L L.
52, 57-61 (2005).
244.
The traditional view is probably best expressed by Josef Kunz: "Art. 51
must be interpreted with regard to the doctrine of non-intervention and Art. 2, par. 7,
of the Charter. 'Armed attack' gives the right of self-defense if directed against a
member of the U.N.; how it is done, on land, by sea, in the air, by invasion of territory
by armed forces, or by long-range guided missiles, and so on, is legally irrelevant."
Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charterof the
United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947) (footnote omitted).
245.
This also addresses the fear that an expansive interpretation of Article 51
could create a loophole enabling states to rationalize military adventurism. See U.N.
Charter art. 2, para. 3 ("This provides: 'All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international security, and justice,
are not endangered."').
246.
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter provides: "Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." U.N.
Charter art. 2, para. 7. In other words, self-defense under the Charter is only
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in the Charter is state-orientated. Whether the law has changed in
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States so
that it can apply to armed attacks carried out by non-state actors is
still open to debate 24 7 and will depend somewhat on the nature of the
non-state actor (as not all non-state actors are considered terrorist
organizations). 248 Moreover, the practices of states such as Israel and
the United States (and even the United Kingdom) in the "global war
on terror" are not universally accepted as representing the current
state of international law on the use of force and self-defense. 249 In
order to determine whether the law has indeed changed, one would
have to consider the Charter provisions as interpreted through both
state practice and opinio juris.250 Although there has been a definite
trend since September 11, with most members of the Security Council
(as well as NATO) invoking the right of self-defense against non-state
actors, 251 this is not necessarily universally accepted as reflecting the

concerned with conflict between states and not within states or in those areas where it
exercises domestic jurisdiction as it may do in occupied territories.
247.
See Gray, supra note 221, at 160-64 (setting forth and analyzing the debate
about armed attack against non-state actors after 9/11); Said Mahmoudi, Self-Defence
and InternationalTerrorism, 48 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 203 (2005) (arguing that the
right to self-defense against international terrorism cannot be challenged after the
September 11 attacks).
248.
The current debate over whether to keep the Mujahideen al-Khalq
(commonly known as the People's Mujahadeen Organisation of Iran) on the proscribed
list of terrorist organizations in the EU is of interest. See, e.g., Constant Brand,
European Court Overturns EU Decision to Add IranianResistance Movement to Terror
List, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 12, 2006 (reporting on the EU ruling).
249.
In order to assess state practice, one must look beyond American, British,
and Israeli practice.
See generally Mary Ellen O'Connell, Taking Opinio Juris
Seriously: A Classical Approach to International Law and the Use of Force, in
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE: A METHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 9, 30 (Enzo Cannizzaro & Paolo Palchetti eds., 2005) (proposing that it is not

enough to just look at state practice on issues of customary law formation and treaty
interpretation, the scholar must also "pay careful attention to the legal opinion of
international actors in connection with that practice").
250.
Ruys and Verhoeven at the University of Leuven have undertaken one
recent study. Tom Ruys & Sten Verhoeven, Attacks by PrivateActors and the Right of
Self-Defence, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 89 (2005). They write:

In the end, the present authors are of the opinion that this extreme position
[that attacks by private actors always trigger the right of self-defense] must be
rejected, not only because legal literature traditionally confirms the need for
state involvement in private attacks, but mostly because state practice has
consistently upheld the need for a certain link with a state.
Id. at 312.
251.
For instance, Wood cites a statement made by the Russian Defense
Minister in the context of its struggle with Chechnya to the effect that Article 51 does
not stipulate that an armed attack must emanate from a state. Michael C. Wood,
Towards New Circumstances in Which the Use of Force May be Authorized? The Cases
of HumanitarianIntervention, Counter-Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY AND REALITY-A NEED FOR

CHANGE? 87 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005).
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law in parts of Africa and the Islamic world (or amongst the nonaligned movement). 25 2 For instance, while there may be agreement
that attacks by terrorist organizations fall within the scope of Article
51, depending on the severity of the attack, there may be
disagreement as to whether a state can use force in "self-defense"
against a people struggling to exercise their right of selfdetermination (such as in Kashmir, Western
Sahara, and
elsewhere). 253 From the statements made in various international
forums, 254 it is evident that many states do not view Israeli attacks
against Palestinians in the OPTs as legitimate acts of "self-defense,"
and they do not view Palestinian attacks against Israel as
"terrorism," although many such actions could be described as

such. 255 For example, the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference provides that its objectives include, among other things,
"to co-ordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and

support of the struggle of the people of Palestine, to help them regain
their rights and liberate their land," as well as "to strengthen the
struggle of all Moslem peoples with a view to safeguarding their
dignity, independence and national rights. '2 56 One should therefore
be careful in assessing state practice, especially because some sixty
states in the world today (which is almost a third of the entire

252.
For a discussion about Islamic 'perceptions' of the use of force, see Said
Mahmoudi, The Islamic Perception of the Use of Force in the Contemporary World, 7 J.
HIST. INT'L L. 55 (2005). Mahmoudi concludes that the recent practice of Islamic States
with respect to the use of force seems not to have been influenced by their character as
Islamic countries. However, condemnation of Israel's occupation of Palestine is a
permanent issue in the statements of all Arab countries in the debates of the General
Assembly. Id.
253.
For example, when the Islamic Republic of Iran acceded to the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages on November 20, 2006, it
issued an interpretative declaration to the effect that fighting terrorism should not
affect the legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation in the exercise of
their right of self-determination. International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, Accession: Iran, Nov. 20, 2006, C.N.1105.2006.TREATIES-5 (Depositary
Notification).
254.
For example, in the Security Council debate over Israel's assassination of
Salah Shehahdeh in Gaza City, which resulted in the deaths of fifteen other
Palestinians, including several children, terms like "extra-judicial execution,"
"terrorism," and "state terrorism" were all used by a number of delegates to describe
Israeli and Palestinian actions. See U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4588th mtg., U.N. Doc
S/PV.4588 (July 24, 2002) (including these terms by several of the delegates).
255.
Richard Falk aptly made the point when he expressed his view that "[i]t is
profoundly misleading to criminalize Palestinian terrorism while simultaneously
treating state terrorism associated with Israeli military operations as 'security' or as
'anti-terrorism."' Richard Falk, InternationalLaw and PalestinianResistance, in THE
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: PALESTINE AND ISRAEL, 1993-2005, at 315, 323 (Joel

Beinin & Rebecca L. Stein eds., 2006).
256.
Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference art. 2, paras. 5-6,
Mar. 4, 1972, 914 U.N.T.S. 103, 104-110.

20071

1477

THE LEGALITY OF THE WEST BANK WALL

membership of the General Assembly) have
populations. 25 7 As Christine Gray writes:

majority

Muslim

[T]he natural focus of writers on controversial cases where states
invoke self-defence in protection of nationals, anticipatory or preemptive self-defence, and response to terrorism inevitably gives an
unbalanced picture or distorts our perception of state practice; it helps
to give the impression that the far-reaching claims of states like the
258
USA and Israel are normal rather than exceptional.

Critics25 9 of the paragraph on the inapplicability of self-defense in the
260
ICJ's Wall Advisory Opinion have also cited the Caroline precedent
as a case in which a state used force against a non-state actor.
However, the Caroline precedent should be used with the utmost
caution, for it emanates from an era when there was no prohibition
on the use of force by states.2 61 If it is at all relevant today, it is
regarding the question of necessity and not self-defense. Moreover,
the Caroline case can hardly be compared to the present conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians. The U.S. was not an occupied
territory but a sovereign state when the Caroline incident
occurred. 26 2 Moreover, at the time, both Upper and Lower Canada
were British colonies (hence the protest by Great Britain over the

257.
There are currently fifty-six member states of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), including Palestine, though it is not technically a state.
Other countries with significant Muslim populations (35-50% of the population) who do
not have membership in the OIC include Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and
Tanzania (Zanzibar is 99% Muslim). Ghana, India, Kenya, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Sri Lanka also have relatively large Muslim minorities (ranging from 5-15% of the
population).

See

U.S.

CENT.

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY,

WORLD

FACTBOOK,

https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbooklindex.html
(last visited
Oct. 19, 2007).
258.
Gray, supra note 221, at 97.
259.
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 239, at 43-44 (criticizing the conclusions of
governments, scholars, and the ICJ about the issue of self-defense in this context).
260.
See Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Henry Fox, British
Minister in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129
(1840-1841) (discussing the Caroline decision); see also Werner Ming, The Caroline, 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 537-38 (1992) (including a very brief synopsis of the facts
in the Caroline); R. Y. Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82
(1938) (including commentary on the Caroline).
261.
This is because back then the concept of self-defense did not exist. Rather,
it was used interchangeably with terms like "self-preservation" and "self-help," which
are no longer recognized as lawful justifications for using force. See Ian Brownlie, The
Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 183, 241 (1961).
[T]o regard any form of action formerly held to be self-defence, at a time when
self-defence was a phrase regarded as interchangeable with 'self-preservation'
and 'necessity,' as within a surviving 'customary right,' is a very arbitrary
process. To go further, and assert that the Charter obligations are qualified by
this vague customary right, is indefensible.
Id.
262.

The United

States declared

independence

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).

on July 4,

1776.
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arrest of Alexander McLeod, as it claimed that the destruction of the
Caroline was the public act of persons on Her Majesty's service and
that, as a consequence, individuals acting under such authority were
not personally responsible for executing the orders of their
government). 263 The same certainly could not be said about Israel's
relationship with the Palestinians, which could hardly be described
as peaceful (or as a relationship between equals).264 Of course, this
also took place before the U.N. Charter was drafted and before selfdetermination was established as a legal right and an obligation erga
omnes. 265 Citing the Caroline as a precedent for acting in selfdefense-as opposed to its continuing relevancy to the question of
necessity-also ignores the development of customary international
2 66
law prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter and afterwards.
Moreover, the Caroline criterion can be abused all too easily if it is
not used with caution. 267 Although it has been suggested that Article
51 of the U.N. Charter can apply to non-state actors because the
threat in the Caroline came from a non-state entity, 268 this surely
would not make any difference today because, at the time, the legal
status of the entity that carried out that attack was irrelevant.
Rather, the dispute between Great Britain and the United States
during the Carolinedebacle arose on an interpretationof the law: the
circumstances and conditions under which the concept of what they
understood at the time to be "self-defense" could serve as a proper
justification for the use of force by one nation against another. 269 In

263.
See Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins, Jr., The Caroline Incident and the
Development of InternationalLaw, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 493 (1990).
264.
It should be added that the rebels took refuge in the territory of the United
States and not in occupied territory. Israel controls the occupied territories, and
therefore the situation is not analogous to the case of the Caroline, which involved a
violation of U.S. territory.
265.
The U.N. Charter was officially adopted on June 26, 1945. U.N. Charter
art.111, para. 3.
266.
See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States
Revisited, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 1, 4-8 (2002) (making this point forcefully).
267.
For example, Saddam Hussein's government relied on it in order to justify
their invasion of Iran in September 1980. See R.K. Ramazani, Who Started the IraqIran War?: A Commentary, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 69, 78 (1992) (noting the comparison
Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Ministry made between the preventative strikes
against Iran and the Carolinecase); Erik B. Wang, The Iran-IraqWar Revisited: Some
Reflections on the Role of International Law, 32 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 83, 88 (1994)
(discussing Iraq's justifications in light of the Caroline case).
268.
See CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, War, Terrorism and InternationalLaw, in
ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 420 (2006).
The threat in the Carolinecame from a non-state group of the kind most would
probably call terrorist today ....
[N]owhere in the correspondence . . . is it
suggested that this fact might make a difference and that the Webster formula
might not apply to armed attacks that did not emanate from a State.
Id.
269.

See supra notes 260, 263 and accompanying text.
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1840, the question as to whether a state could only act in self-defense
against another state was not an issue; it only became relevant after
the adoption of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco in 1945, which only
applies to its constituent states. 270 Furthermore, it is even doubtful
whether Israel could justify building the wall as a legitimate act of
self-defense along its present trajectory according to the Caroline
criteria because the Israeli government would have to show a
"necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation. '27 1 In other words, Israel
would have to prove that it was absolutely necessary to build the wall
in occupied territory as opposed to building it within its own territory
or along the 1949-ceasefire lines. To date, Israel has provided no
272
valid justification for building the wall where it is.
Admittedly, this may be a conservative analysis of Article 51 and
the customary international law rules on the recourse to armed force.
It is also true that the world is a very different place today than it
was when the Charter was drafted in 1945.273 Yet one must not
forget that the struggles in the Middle East are not new. Any
difficulties that have arisen with the Charter's interpretation in light
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not the fault of the draftsmen.
In this particular instance, it is the result of Israel's refusal to
withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967. In so doing, it is
forcibly depriving the Palestinian people of their right to exercise selfdetermination and stretching the limits of self-defense into uncharted
waters-for belligerent occupation is supposed to be a relatively
temporary phenomenon. 274 Forcibly depriving a people of their right

270.
Edward Stettinius, the U.S. Secretary of State in 1945 and one of the chief
architects of the U.N. Charter, opposed the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's
request for an expansionist interpretation of the term "armed attack" that would
appear in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Eden wanted a phrase that would have
permitted action against every sort of aggression, direct or indirect. However,
Stettinius refused to budge, contending that a broader phraseology would allow states
too great a leeway, including the right of preventative actions, which could legally
wreck the organization. He said that World Wars I and II,after all, had begun with
preventative attacks. The British backed down. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER, ACT OF
CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 184-85 (2003).

271.
Letter from Daniel Webster, supra note 260, at 1138 (emphasis added).
272.
See generally Press Release, United Nations Information Service,
International Meeting on Impact of Wall Built by Israel in Occupied Palestinian
Territory Enters Second Day, U.N. Doc. GAJPAL/952 (Apr. 19, 2004) (discussing the
Wall's location).
273.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the rules are robust enough to withstand
the times even if it seems as though states behave with little regard for the law. For
instance, see Oscar Schacter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986).

274.

See Andrew Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupations: The Israeli-Occupied

Territories Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990) (discussing prolonged occupations);

Ardi Imseis, CriticalReflections on the InternationalHumanitarianLaw Aspects of the
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 105-09 (2005) (criticizing the ICJ's
Advisory Opinion on Article 6 of Geneva Convention IV).
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to exercise self-determination is considered a breach of an obligation
erga omnes by the ICJ, and is in itself a violation of international
law.27 5 In such circumstances, resistance is inevitable. The United
Nation's Definition of Aggression provides:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way
prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom and independence, as
derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right ...
particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of
alien domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end
and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of
the Charter
and in conformity with the above-mentioned
276
Declaration.

It is well known that all peoples subjected to colonial and racist
regimes or other forms of alien domination have resisted such
injustices at one time or another. 2 77 In his separate opinion in the
Namibia case, Judge Ammoun considered that "the struggle of
peoples in general has been one, if not indeed the primary, factor in
the formation of the customary rule whereby the right of peoples to
self-determination is recognized. 2 78 Although positive international
law provides no explicit basis for a people struggling for freedom and
independence to achieve this, no rule of international law prohibits
this either (it only proscribes the conduct of those struggling for this
right). In fact, such resistance need not necessarily be violent. For
instance, non-violent resistance is reflected in the terminology
employed by the Definition of Aggression ("struggle" as opposed to
"armed struggle") and exemplified by Mahatma Gandhi's revolt
against the British in India, the struggle of black South Africans
against the minority white apartheid government in Pretoria, and
even the Palestinian people's struggle for freedom against Israeli
occupation from 1987 until 1993.279 Of course, any quasi-military

275.
See HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 91-103 (1988).

276.
Definition of Aggression, supra note 226.
277.
An example is the struggle against Nazi Germany by the Dutch, French,
Polish, and Yugoslav partisans. See W. J. Ford, Resistance Movements and
InternationalLaw, 7 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 579 (1967) (providing a useful survey of
resistance during the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and World War
II). Yasser Arafat in his famous "gun and olive branch" speech before the General
Assembly in 1974 recalled that there are just causes where people fight for the freedom
and liberation of their land "from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists."
Yasser Arafat, Question of Palestine, U.N. GAOR, at 48, 29th Sess., 2282d mtg., UN
Doc. AJPV. 2282 (Nov. 13, 1974).
278.
Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note 192, at 70 (separate opinion of VicePresident Ammoun).
279.
In fact, contrary to popular belief, most Palestinian resistance to Israeli
occupation remains non-violent. This can take the form of ignoring curfews (which can
sometimes last for weeks) at great risk to one's personal well-being, or throwing stones
and Molotov cocktails. See Richard A. Falk & Burns H. Weston, The Relevance of
InternationalLaw to PalestinianRights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defence
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actions taken by Palestinian organizations against Israel would be
subject to the customary rules of IHL, and in particular Article 48 of
Additional Protocol 1, which provides as a basic rule that the
belligerents "shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives." 28 0 Islamic international law also proscribes the
conduct of belligerents: "Those non-combatants who are unable to
participate in hostilities are classed as protected persons and cannot
be attacked, killed or otherwise molested.128 1 It should be added that
as the Charter's provisions on self-defense only apply to its members,
and as there is no Palestinian state at present with membership in
that organization, it is arguable that they are not bound by its
constraints-such as a prior armed attack-but only by the
customary law principles of proportionality and necessity.
Consequently, the Palestinians could claim that they have an
28 2
"inherent" right to protect themselves from Israeli aggression.
Since the occupation of foreign territory, even if it resulted from an
act of justifiable self-defense, could constitute by itself an act of
armed aggression, 28 3 the Palestinians could always argue that they
have a right to respond and to anticipate future Israeli attacks. In
this respect, those in Israel who advocate an expansive interpretation
of self-defense should be aware that such arguments could be used
against them.28 4 However, it is submitted that the conflict between

of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (1991) (discussing the first Palestinian and
mostly non-violent intifada). According to one recent study, it is only violent actions
such as suicide bombings that make the headlines in the West. Most forms of nonviolent resistance are not deemed newsworthy. GREG PHILO & MIKE BERRY, BAD NEWS
FROM ISRAEL (2004).
280.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict art. 48, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also Pocar, supra note 83, at 153 (discussing the status of
Article 48 as a customary rule of international law).
See Shaheen Sardar Ali & Javaid Rehman, The Concept of Jihad in Islamic
281.
InternationalLaw, 10 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 321, 338 (2005).
282.
See, e.g., E.C. UDECHUKU,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2d ed. 1978).

LIBERATION

OF

DEPENDENT

PEOPLES

IN

That the Charter did not purport to abolish the inherent right of self-defence of
all peoples and confer it only on U.N. Members can be seen from the fact that
during the Korean War in 1950 several U.N. Members took the position that
the action taken under U.N. auspices against North Korea was in pursuance of
the right of collective self-defence of South Korea, even though South Korea
was not a Member of the United Nations.
Id.
See AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: A STUDY OF THE
283.
LEGAL CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND DEFINITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127 (1979)
(arguing that occupation of foreign territory constitutes an act of armed aggression).
See, e.g., Yehuda Z. Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 GERMAN
284.
Y.B.INT'L L. 223, 235 (1976) ("In fact, it would appear that it is extremely difficult-to
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Israel and the Palestinian people within the occupied territories is
not a question to be determined according to the jus ad bellum, but
rather by the jus in bello, and that consequently the question of selfdefense is not really relevant to this debate. 28 5 Widening the scope of
self-defense so that it can be invoked by both Israelis and
Palestinians is likely to lead to further conflict contrary to the spirit
of the U.N. Charter, which is "to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind."
But perhaps the debate on the nature of the attacker is all really
"beside the point" as Judge Kooijmans noted, since Israel was not
claiming that the terrorist attacks against its civilian population
emanated from another state. 28 6 Even if it is accepted that state
practice has changed since September 11 and Article 51 can apply to
non-state actors, 287 Israel would still be precluded from invoking
Article 51 because it exercises effective control in the OPT as the
occupying power, and therefore the situation, as the ICJ noted, is
different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368
288
(2001) and 1373 (2001), which speak of international terrorism.
B. Self-Defense and Occupied Territory
An occupying power may not invoke self-defense under Article 51
of the U.N. Charter to respond to attacks coming from occupied
territory because it has effective control there.2 8 9 In this regard, it
would be nonsensical for a state to claim such a right, as attacks that
come from a territory and a population over which it exercises
effective control is equivalent to an attack emanating from its own
territory and population. In this respect, a state would not invoke
self-defense to attack itself. Furthermore, jurisprudence from World
War II provides support for the view that occupying powers cannot
claim a right of self-defense to attack rebels situated in a territory
under its effective control. This is because self-defense does not

the point of being almost impossible-to apply the traditional concept of proportionality
to acts of terrorism.").
285.
"Jus in Bello" (justice in war) is a theory identifying a moral framework
during the conduction of war, while "Jus ad Bellum," (just war theory) identifies the
concept that some wars are "morally and legally justifiable, such as those against a
totalitarian (or) aggressive regime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
286.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1072, para. 35 (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
287.
This argument was offered forcibly by Greenwood before the ICJ rendered
its Advisory Opinion on the Wall. See CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, International Law
and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida and Iraq, in ESSAYS ON WAR
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 268, at 667-700.
288.
S.C. Res 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Dec. 21, 2001); S.C. Res 1373, U.N.
Doc SJRES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
289.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
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belong to the rules regarding the conduct of hostilities (the jus in
bello) but instead to the rules governing the recourse to armed force
(the jus ad bellum). The only possible justification for using force
the
against an occupied people is provided by the rules regulating
290
conduct of belligerent reprisals, not the law of self-defense.
The fact that Israel is an occupying power in the West Bank
(which includes East Jerusalem) is significant precisely because
Israel, as the ICJ noted, exercises effective control there. 291 Israel is
consequently caught in a legal limbo: on the one hand it has no
sovereignty over the territory, but on the other hand it exercises
effective control as the occupying power with the concomitant
responsibilities set out in the Geneva Conventions. The simple fact is
that Israel cannot have it both ways. Either, it must withdraw from
the territories and give the Palestinians the opportunity to create a
viable and independent state, or it must accept its responsibilities as
the occupying power and abide by the rules of belligerent occupation.
Israel evidently desires the territory but not the people who inhabit
it, which is precisely why it has never annexed the West Bank or
Gaza, an act that would trigger its obligation to grant citizenship
rights to the native population. 292 The whole question of the IsraelPalestine conflict, the use of force, and self-defense are inextricably
tied up with the question of self-determination. Until this is resolved
in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international law, these
problems will remain.
It should be recalled that Israel was not created in a territorial
vacuum. 293 The Palestinian Arabs have every right to be there as the

The Geneva Convention codified the current law of belligerent reprisals.
290.
Convention Relative to the Protection Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33, para. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
See HCJ 593/82 Leah Tsemel, Att'y v. Minister of Def. and Commander of
291.
the Ansar Camp [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 365, translated in 1 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 164
(1984) (concerning Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, in which the HCJ accepted
that Geneva Convention IV was applicable). Presumably if Geneva Convention IV was
applicable there-where Israel exercised effective control-then it should also be
applicable to the OPTs.
See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 67.
292.
The courts shall apply only those provisions of law which were applicable prior
to the offence, and which are in accordance with general principles of law, in
particular the principle that the penalty shall be proportionate to the offence.
They shall take into consideration the fact the accused is not a national of the
Occupying Power. (emphasis added)
Hague Regulations, supra note 50, art. 45 ("It is forbidden to compel the inhabitants of
occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.").
The Palestinian Arabs already lived in Palestine at the time that it was
293.
promised by a third party, the British, to another third party, the Zionists, in
November 1917. Had the land been empty, there would have been little opposition or
conflict today. See generally GEORGE ANTONIUS, THE ARAB AWAKENING: THE STORY OF
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indigenous population of any territory. They are not "foreign" to
Israel. Therefore, one cannot invoke their "foreign nationality" as an
external link or basis for invoking the right of self-defense. 294 Rather,
their statelessness, meaning their lack of nationality, is a direct
consequence of actions taken by the Israeli legislature, which
unlawfully denationalized them (that is, stripped them of their prior
nationality status) in 1952.295 The passage of time does not cure that
illegality. 296 Therefore, it is arguable that Palestinian attacks
against Israel come very close to domestic forms of violence, and that

Article 51 is therefore inapplicable. 297 However, the situation is more
complex. The Palestinians have stated that they want to establish an
independent Palestinian state in the OPTs, from which Israel refuses
to withdraw. 298 As with most self-determination disputes, the conflict
has both international and domestic characteristics. 2 9 9 The ICJ is
therefore not being inconsistent when it ruled that Article 51 is
inapplicable because Palestine is not a state;30 0 this is a matter of

fact.

The rules of belligerent occupation continue to apply because

THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT (1938) (discussing the rise of Arab nationalism in
Palestine).
294.
See Iris Canor, When Jus ad Bellum Meet Jus in Bello: The Occupier'sRight
of Self-Defence Against Terrorism Stemming From Occupied Territories, 19 LEIDEN J.
INT'L L. 129, 137 (2006) (discussing the "foreign national" issue).
295.
Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 11 LSI 50 (1952) (Isr.), reprinted in
FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 254 (Joseph Badi ed., 1961).
296.
See Victor Kattan, The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians, 74
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 67, 90-93 (2005).
297.
This would, of course, not preclude an individual defending himself in case
of attack, but this would not, strictly speaking, be a question of international law but of
a state's criminal laws and, possibly, human rights law. The only exception to this may
be in the case of self-defense in relation to war crimes. See Timothy L.H. McCormack,
Self-Defence in International Criminal Law, in THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR RICHARD MAY 231, 232-39 (Hirad Abtahi
& Gideon Boas eds., 2006).
298.
See ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Statement Submitted by the
Palestinian Center for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/20021NGO/161 (2002) ('The
internationally recognised right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
includes the establishment of a viable and independent state on territories occupied by
Israel in 1967. Yet under the Oslo accords, 82% of the OPT remains under direct Israeli
military control.").
299.
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions which deals
with international armed conflicts includes
armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 280, art. 1, para. 4.
300.
See ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1050, para.
(concluding that Article 51 is irrelevant in the case).
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when that territory was captured in 1967, it was Jordanian territory
(even though its annexation was only recognized by three states), and
the inhabitants of the West Bank had Jordanian nationality (though
30
many lost it in 1988, when Jordan gave up its territorial claims). '
The conflict has therefore evolved politically from one between Israel
and Jordan to one between Israelis and Palestinians.
Geneva
Convention IV remains applicable, however. That Jordan claimed
sovereignty over the West Bank until 1988 "only strengthens the
argument in favour of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva
Convention right from the moment of its occupation by Israel in
June 1967. '' 30 2 In fact, Jordan was, at the time of the June 1967 war,
a "High Contracting Party" within the meaning of Article 2 of Geneva
Convention IV.30 3 To claim that certain Palestinian organizations are
somehow alien to the territory and part of a "shadowy network of
foreign fighters" is a fallacy unsupported by the facts.3 0 4 Any analogy
with the United States' "global war on terror" is simply inappropriate
to the question of Palestine, which has been on the U.N. agenda
30 5
longer than the existence of the Jewish state.
As long as Israel exercises effective control over the OPTs, it
remains (for the purposes of legal responsibility) equivalent to its own
territory.
Therefore, Israel's claim of a right of self-defense to
respond to attacks that come from the OPTs (over which it exercises
effective control) is equivalent to Israel claiming a right of selfdefense from an attack emanating from its own territory and
population. In other words, there is no right of self-defense against a
civilian population under belligerent occupation; there is only the
right to enforce the law in accordance with the laws of belligerent
occupation.3 0 6 The question is not one of allegiance, as an occupied
people owe no allegiance to an occupying power other than to obey

301.
See His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan, Statement Concerning
Disengagement from the West Bank and Palestinian Self-Determination, Address to
the Nation (July 31, 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1637 (1988).
302.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1067, para. 9 (separate opinion
of Judge Kooij mans).
303.
Convention Relative to the Protection Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 290, art. 2.
304.
But see Rebecca Kahan, Building a Protective Wall Around Terrorists-How
the International Court of Justice's Ruling in the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Made the World Safer
for Terrorists and More Dangerous for Member States of the United Nations, 28
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 827 (2005) (arguing the contrary).
305.
See Question of Palestine,Letter from the United Kingdom Delegation at the
United Nations to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/286
(Apr. 2, 1947) (requesting the question of Palestine be put on the Agenda of the
General Assembly annual session).
306.
See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [2005] (Isr.)
para. 4., available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/Files-ENG/02/690/007/a3402007690.
a34.pdf (noting that petitioners made this same argument, although in this case it was
not specifically addressed by the court).
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legitimate orders issued by it. 30 7 However, according to Article 43 of
the Hague Regulations, just because a population under belligerent
occupation owes no allegiance to the occupying power does not mean
that it has no responsibility for ensuring public order and life in the
occupied territory. 30 8 Nor can the Palestinian civilian population be
compelled to accept living under the yoke of Israeli occupation
indefinitely. Indeed, due to the length of the Israeli occupation and
the extent of the settlement enterprise, some Israeli lawyers are now
openly referring to the situation in the OPTs as an "illegal
309
occupation."
During World War II, Danish, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Swedish,
and Yugoslavian partisans fought the Nazis by concealing their
weapons, mingling with the local population, and killing and
torturing members of the occupying power.3 10 Indeed, many of their
actions, grotesque as they were, were not too dissimilar to many of

307.
See Convention Relative to the Protection Civilian Persons in Time of War,
supra note 290, art. 68(3) ("The death penalty may not be pronounced against a
protected person unless the attention of the court has been particularly called to the
fact that, since the accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to
it by any duty of allegiance."); see also COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
12 AUGUST 1949, supra note 43, at 346.
[t]he accused is not a national of the Occupying Power, but on the contrary the
inhabitant of a country which is suffering as a result of its invasion and
occupation by its enemies . . . The words 'duty of allegiance' constitute an
acknowledgment of the fundamental principle according to which the
occupation does not sever the bond existing between the inhabitants and the
conquered State.
Maj. Richard R. Baxter, The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant, 27 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 235 (1950) (discussing the complexities of duties of inhabitants of occupied
territories).
308.
1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 50, art. 43.
309.
See, e.g., Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M. Gross & Keren Michaeli, Illegal
Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 551
(2005) (exploring the question of whether the continued Israeli occupation of
Palestinian territory conquered in 1967 is legal or illegal).
310.
See In re List and Others (Hostages Trial), [1948] 15 A.D.I.L. 632, 638-39
(Nuremberg Trib.) (describing these facts in detail); see also Varrone v. S.U.R.C.I.S.,
Trib., 14 Jan. 1950, 75 Foro It. 1950, I, 946 (holding that partisans are to be regarded
as lawful belligerents for the purpose of international law as well as of Italian
municipal law); Baffico v. Calleri, Corte app., 5 Jan. 1948, 70 Foro It. 1947, I, 1016
(discussing this same issue of whether to regard partisans as lawful belligerents); see
also In re Weizsaecker and Others (Ministries Trial), [19491 16 A.D.I.L. 354, 354-56
(Nuremberg Trib.) (discussing the role played by Norwegian, Finnish, Danish and
Swedish guerrillas); In re Kniest, [1949] 16 A.D.I.L. 507, 507-08 (Den.) (setting forth
the fact that the accused, the German police, occupying that country tried to justify
their ill treatment of the Danish resistance as an act of "self-defense," and holding in
response that the treatment could be not justified on this basis and was contrary to
international law and the customs of war); In re Hoffman, [1949] 16 A.D.I.L. 508 (Den.
E. Provincial Ct.) (coming to the same conclusion that the German armed forces could
not justify their acts as self-defense even if their actions were undertaken to protect
their own soldiers).
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the disturbances in the OPTs today. 311 Although the partisans were
not generally considered lawful combatants 312 because they concealed
their identities and their weapons, the actions of the German Armed
Forces were not considered as lawful measures of self-defense
either. 313 Self-defense is not available to an occupying power when it
has already subdued its enemy and taken control of its territory; it is
only available at the start of hostilities, not when they come to an
end. 314 Once the occupied territory is under the effective control of
the occupying power, the right of self-defense is no longer applicable.
An occupying power also does not have the right to determine for
itself whether its actions amount to self-defense; only an authorized
tribunal or a competent body, such as the Security Council, can
validly make the determination. 315 For example, at Nuremberg, the
Tribunal found that the question as to whether Germany's actions
could be justified as self-defense or whether the manner in which it
acquired those territories was legal was ultimately irrelevant, as it
could not make that determination for itself.316 In Tokyo, the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East held: "Under the
most liberal interpretation of the Kellog-Briand pact, the right of selfdefence does not confer upon the State resorting to war the authority
'317
to make a final determination upon the justification of its action.
Jurisprudence from World War II also provides support for the
view that self-defense does not belong to the rules regarding the
conduct of hostilities (the jus in bello) but to the rules governing the
recourse to armed force (the jus ad bellum).3 18 This distinction was
made at Nuremberg in In re List and others,319 when it pointed out
that there is no reciprocal connection between the manner of the
military occupation of territory (i.e., whether this entailed a violation

311.
See Joseph Massad, Palestiniansand Jewish History, 30 J. PALESTINIAN
STUD. 1, 56-59 (2000) (describing disturbances in the occupied territories throughout
recent history). For extensive accounts of Palestinian "terrorist" acts, see Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terrorism since 2000, available at http://www.mfa.gov.ill
MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000.
312.
Though there were exceptions. See, e.g., Varrone, 75 Foro It. at 946;
Baffico, 70 Foro It. at 1016 (both providing examples where the Italian Courts
concluded that the partisans were not unlawful under international law or Italian
municipal law).
313.
See, e.g., In re Weizsaecker, 16 A.D.I.L. at 349 (concluding that "the doctrine
of self-defence and military necessity was never available to Germany as a matter of
international law, in view of its prior violation of that law").
314.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
315.
Id. art. 39.
316.
In re Weizsaecker, 16 A.D.I.L. at 349.
317.
In re Hirota, [1948] 15 A.D.I.L 356, 364 (Int'l Military Trib. for the Far
East, Tokyo).
318.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 285 and accompanying text

(defining and comparingjus in bello and jus ad bellum).
319.
See In re List and Others (Hostages Trial), [1948] 15 A.D.I.L. 632
(Nuremberg Trib.).
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of the jus ad bellum) and the rights and duties of the occupant and
population to each other after the relationship has in fact been
established (the jus in bello).320 In other words, a distinction is made
between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, so that a violation of
the former does not affect the applicability of the latter.3 2 1 It is a
cardinal principle of humanitarian law that jus ad bellum applies to
all conflict situations irrespective of the justifications advanced in
support of military action.3 22 In fact, this principle was considered so
important that it was subsequently drafted in the preamble to AP1
and is regarded as one of the foundations of the law of armed
conflict.3 23 Consequently, one must conclude that the law of selfdefense has no relevancy to the law of occupation.3 24 As Georges AbiSaab elucidated in his oral pleading before the ICJ on behalf of
Palestine regarding the question of self-defense and the laws which
regulate the conduct of hostilities in occupied territories:
One of the justifications, self-defence, does not belong to international
humanitarian law or the jus in bello, but to the jus ad bellum. Israel
makes here an impermissible confusion between the two branches of
the law of war that have to be kept radically apart. Once an armed
conflict is brought into being, the jus in bello (or international

Id. at 637.
320.
See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
321.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 306 (Routledge, 7th ed. 1997) (1970) ("It is reasonable to treat
both areas separately [i.e. the ius in bello and the ius ad bellum], because of the
recognized principle that ius in bello is applicable in cases of armed conflict whether
the conflict is lawful or unlawful under ius ad bellum.").
See MARCO SASS LI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN
322.
WAR: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 84 (1999).
[F]rom a humanitarian point of view, the victims of the conflict on both sides
need the same protection, and they are not necessarily responsible for the
violation of the ius ad bellum committed by 'their' party. IHL has therefore to
be respected independently of any argument of ius ad bellum and has to be
completely distinguished from ius ad bellum.

Id.
323.

See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 280, pmbl.

Further that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are
protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed
to the Parties to the conflict.
Id.
See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 1 n.1 (Adam Roberts & Richard
324.
Guelff eds., 2d ed. 1989) (noting conflicts in the past between Israel and its neighbors
where the uses of force may have constituted self-defense).
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humanitarian law) comes into play, as the lex specialis governing the
325
ensuing situation regardless of the rules of the jus ad bellum.

Consequently, occupying powers cannot rely on Article 51, which
326
belongs to the jus ad bellum, once major combat operations end.
Rather, the law is to be governed by the rules of belligerent
occupation, the jus in bello.3 27 For an occupying power, the issue is
one of maintaining law and order in the occupied territory, which is
not, strictly speaking, a question of self-defense. As one prominent
international lawyer has noted, it would be odd to conclude that
Israel could rely on self-defense to justify its response to acts that
denote a breakdown of the same law and order for which it bears
328
responsibility under international law.
It would therefore seem that Israel is using the concept of "selfdefense" as a subterfuge for undertaking belligerent reprisals, which
is permitted in the law of armed conflict but only in exceptional
circumstances. 329 It is noteworthy that Israel has not signed or
acceded to AP1, which severely curtails the targets a state may attack
in response to a prior violation of international law by those it
perceives to be its "enemies. '330 However, even then, the reprisal
must be directed at those persons responsible for the prior violation,
and it must be undertaken for the purpose of putting an end to that
violation or preventing further violations, rather than for revenge. 33 1
Reprisals must also be proportionate and necessary, in the sense that
their purpose is to prevent future unlawful conduct and to seek
325.
Georges Abi-Saab, Oral Pleading, Advisory Opinion on the Construction of
a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 44 (Feb. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1503.pdf.
326.
See Christian J. Tams, Light Treatment of a Complex Problem: The Law of
Self-Defence in the Wall Case, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 963, 970 (2005) (noting that the law of
belligerent occupation essentially derogates from the right of self-defense in Article 51
of the U.N. Charter).
327.
See L. C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 320 (1993)
(stating that Article 51 "relates to the jus ad bellum, the right to resort to war, and has
nothing to do with the jus in bello, what may be done during a war undertaken by way
of self-defence").
328.
Scobbie, supra note 233 at 83.
329.
See Shane Darcy, What Future for the Doctrine of Belligerent Reprisals?, 5
Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 107 (2002) (critiquing of the concept of "belligerent
reprisals").
330.
See C. Greenwood, The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, 20
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 35, 51-54 (1989) (discussing the impact of API on the law of
belligerent reprisals).
331.
See Darcy, supra note 329, at 112.
Belligerent reprisals by their very nature rely on a principle of collective
responsibility, whereby an enemy's military, government and civilian
population are treated as a single group, and measures directed at certain
members of that collective will, in theory, coerce the actual guilty members of
the group to cease in their unlawful conduct.
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redress rather than to exact retribution.33 2
However, as one
commentator notes: "The notion of collective responsibility upon
which the taking of reprisals is based [i.e., that an enemy's military,
government, and civilian population may be targeted] has become
increasingly at odds with the rules and spirit of contemporary
3 33
international humanitarian law."
C. Self-Defense and InternationalTerrorism
The ICJ was correct to conclude that Security Council
Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) do not apply to Israel's
struggle with "Palestine" because Palestine is not a state, and the
Resolutions refer to "international terrorism. 3 3a 4
The Resolutions
thus require some form of trans-boundaryviolence to trigger the right
of self-defense under Article 51. It is not by accident that official
Israeli maps do not include the 1949 armistice line between Israel
33 5
and Jordan or the 1967 cease-fire line (known as the "Green Line").
For example, the map produced by Israel's Ministry of Defense to
show the route of the wall does not include the Green Line, which is
usually portrayed on international maps.3 3 6 The line is omitted
3 37
because the 1949 cease-fire lines are not political boundaries.
Border crossings for Israelis between the West Bank and Israel also
do not exist (the new crossings currently being constructed along the

332.
For the classic 1971 text on belligerent reprisals by Frits Kalshoven, which
recently has been republished, see FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (Brill
2005) (1971).
333.
Darcy, supra note 329, at 113.
334.
See ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1050, para. 139
(determining that the situation is different from that contemplated in the Security
Council resolutions); see generally S.C. Res 1368, supra note 288; S.C. Res 1373, supra
note 288.
335.
See
Israel's
Security
Fence,
Israel
Ministry
of
Defence,
http://www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/route.htm (displaying a map of Israel's
revised route of the security fence as of April 30, 2006).
336.
Id.
337.
See The Acting Mediator to the Secretary General, Text of the Egyptian-

Israeli General Armistice Agreement, art. XI, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/1264/Corr.1 (Mar. 11, 1949) (noting that no provision of the agreement
prejudices the rights and claims of the parties); The Acting Mediator to the Secretary
General, Text of the Jordan-IsraelGeneral Armistice Agreement, art. 11(2), delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev.1 (Apr. 3, 1949) (recognizing that the
agreement is "dictated exclusively by military and not by political considerations"); The
Acting Mediator to the Secretary General, Text of the Lebanese-Israeli General
Armistice Agreement, art. 11(2), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1296
(Mar. 23, 1949) (recognizing that the agreement is "dictated exclusively by military
considerations"); The Acting Mediator on Palestine to the Acting Secretary General,
Text of the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, art. 11(2), delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1353 (July 20, 1949) (recognizing that the agreement is
"dictated exclusively by military and not by political considerations").
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route of the wall are for Palestinians only). 338 It would therefore
seem that the legal significance of the armistice line is simply to
delineate the starting point of Israel's occupation of non-Israeli
territory. 339 There is consequently nothing international about the
acts of terror committed by Israelis against Palestinians and viceversa; they are endemic to a self-determination dispute. As Professor
Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University writes (while specifically
referring to the Wall Advisory Opinion):
Of course, when non-State actors attack a State from within-and no
other State is involved-this is a case of an internal armed conflict or
domestic terrorism. In neither instance does Article 51 come into play
at all. An armed attack against a State, in the meaning of Article 51,
posits some element external to the victim State. Non-State actors must
340
strike at a State from the outside.

Similarly, the Chatham House Principles of International Law on the
Use of Force in Self-Defence provide that
[a]n armed attack is an attack directed from outside the territory
controlled by the State. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, the ICJ's observations may be read as reflecting the obvious
point that unless an attack is directed from outside territory under the
control of the defending State, the question of self-defence in the sense
34 1
of Article 51 does not normally arise.

By characterizing the September 11 attacks as "terrorist," the
Security Council's intent seemed to have been to subject the
perpetrators to the ordinary criminal law and process, as the relevant
international conventions on terrorism-referred to in Resolutions
1368 and 1373-require.3 4 2 This would, therefore, not give Israel
carte blanche to go after the Palestinians in the name of the "global

338.
Moreover, maps in Israeli schoolbooks make no reference to the 1949
armistice lines. Currently, schoolbooks in Israel show its territorial conquests in the
1967 war-the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights-as part of
Israel. But see Row Erupts Over Israeli Textbooks, BBC NEWS, Dec. 5,2006, available
at http://news.bbc.co.ukll/hi/world/middleeast/6210144.stm (reporting that Israel's
new Education Minister, Yuli Tamir, has vowed to change this, which prompted sharp
criticism from the settler movement).
339.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1077, para. 11 (separate
opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh). For an interesting commentary on the significance of
the 1949 line from an Israeli perspective, see Robbie Sabel, The InternationalCourt of
Justice Decision on the Separation Barrier and the Green Line, 38 ISR. L. REV. 316
(2005).
340.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 221, at 204-05.
341.
See The Chatham House Principles of InternationalLaw on the Use of Force
in Self-Defence, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 963 (2006) (noting participants Sir Franklin
Berman QC, James Gow, Christopher Greenwood QC, Vaughan Lowe, Sir Adam
Roberts, Phillipe Sands QC, Malcolm Shaw QC, Gerry Simpson, Colin Warbrick,
Nicholas Wheeler, Elizabeth Wilmhurst and Sir Michael Wood).
342.
See generally, PHILLIP SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: MAKING AND BREAKING
GLOBAL RULES 155 (2005).
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war on terror" and to act as though there is no military occupation in
the OPT by freeing itself from the constraints imposed by the
relevant rules of IHL. 3 4 3 As Judge Buergenthal acknowledged in his
separate opinion, "I agree that the means used to defend against
terrorism must conform to all applicable rules of international law
and that a State which is the victim of terrorism may not defend itself
against this scourge by resorting to measures international law

prohibits."

34 4

It will be recalled that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer
solely international in character (the P.L.O. having abandoned such

methods as hijackings, kidnappings, and holding foreign governments
to ransom), and has not been so since the mid-1980s. 345 The conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians in the OPTs is therefore not an
international armed conflict between two states, but one between an

occupying power and an occupied people (although this could change
rapidly, and will to a certain extent depend on outside factors). This
was essentially the finding of the March 2001 Report of the U.N.
Human Rights Inquiry Commission into violations of Human Rights
in the Occupied Arab Territories, including Palestine.
The
Commission found that
there is no international armed conflict in the region, as Palestine,
despite widespread recognition, still falls short of the accepted criteria
of statehood. The question then arises as to whether there is a noninternational armed conflict, defined by the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the
Tadic case, as "protracted armed violence between governmental
34 6
authorities and organized armed groups.

As this Commission stressed, Palestine is not a state for international
law purposes and it is therefore not a member of the U.N.; instead, it
has observer status. 347 Israel has no sovereignty over the West Bank

343.
See Chris McGreal, Sacred Right to Fight Terror Overrides Court, Says
Sharon, GUARDIAN (London), July 12, 2004 (reporting Sharon having said, "On Friday,
the sacred right of the war on terrorism received a slap in the face by the ICJ after it
decided that the terrorism-prevention fence is illegal and that Israel must dismantle
it.").
344.
ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1078, para. 2 (separate opinion of
Judge Buergenthal).
345.
This is when the last major international act of terrorism by a P.L.O.
faction took place, on the cruise ship Achille Lauro. Gregory V. Gooding, Fighting
Terrorism in the 1980s: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J.
INT'L L. 158 (1987).
346.
ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human
Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine,
39, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2001/121 (Mar. 16, 2001) (emphasis added).
347.
See G.A. Res. 52/250, U.N. Doc. A/RES/521250 (July 13, 1998) (recalling
Palestine's "[olbserver status"); G.A. Res. 43/177, U.N. Doc. 43/177 (Dec. 15, 1988)
(recalling the P.L.O.'s "observer status"); G.A. Res. 43/160, U.N. Doc. A/RESI43/160
(Dec. 9, 1988) (recalling the P.L.O.'s "observer status"); G.A. Res. 3237, 2, U.N. Doc.
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(or over East and West Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and Syria's Golan
Heights). Resolutions 1368 and 1373 do not apply in circumstances
where attacks on the territory of the occupant emanate from the
territory of the occupied-as there is no international dimension to it
(although wars of national liberation are considered international
conflicts for the purposes of Geneva Convention IV).3 4 8 And it was
this consideration, as Judge Kooijmans noted in his separate opinion,
that proved decisive in determining those resolutions irrelevant:
The right of self-defence as contained in the Charter is a rule of
international law and thus relates to international phenomena.
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 refer to acts of international terrorism as
constituting a threat to internationalpeace and security; they therefore
have no immediate bearing on terrorist acts originating within a
territory which is under control of the State which is also the victim of
these acts. And Israel does not claim that these acts have their origin
elsewhere. The Court therefore rightly concludes that the situation is
different from that contemplated by resolutions 1368 and 1373 and that
349
consequently Article 51 of the Charter cannot be invoked by Israel.

It may even be questioned whether the Charter's rules on the use of
force and self-defense have any application to this situation at all.
Judge Higgins, for instance, was unconvinced that non-forcible
measures such as building a wall would fall within the scope of
Article 51 (although it would seem that the violence accompanying
the wall's construction, such as demolishing houses and firing on
demonstrators with rubber-coated-metal bullets, is a use of force). 35 0
Furthermore, it is plainly evident from reading the Charter that
these rules are state-oriented. 3 51 One is therefore not dealing with
the jus ad bellum, since major combat operations ended in the West
Bank after Israel captured it in 1967.352 Instead, the rules of

A/RES/3237 (Nov. 22, 1974) (noting that the U.N. the P.L.O. had been invited to
participate as an observer in various conferences).
348.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 280, art. 1, para.
4.
349.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1072, para. 36 (separate
opinion of Judge Kooijmans).
350.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1063, para. 35 (separate
opinion of Judge Higgins). However, in a recent lecture, Kooijmans (who recently
retired from the bench) made the point that non-forcible measures are covered by
resolutions 1368 and 1373 (although not by Article 51). Judge Pieter H. Kooijmans,
Annual Grotius Lecture, British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
London House, Mecklenburgh Square (Dec. 11, 2006). Israel has resorted to the use of
force on numerous occasions when clearing land for the wall's construction. For
examples of this use of force, see Security Forces FiredLive Ammo at Anti-fence Protest,
HA'ARETZ (Jerusalem), Nov. 6, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/
783632.html; and 6 Protestors, Officer Injured in Fence Protest, YNETNEWS.COM, June
6, 2006, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/O,7340,L-3258049,00.html.
351.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (stating that the basis for the U.N. itself is
the sovereign control each member has over its territory due to its status as a state).
352.
The Six Days War ended with a cease fire on June 11, 1967, enforced by the
United Nations. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
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international humanitarian law, those governing the conduct of
hostilities known as the jus in bello, are more appropriate, as
353
discussed above.
D. CircumstancesPrecluding Wrongfulness
Article 21 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility provides: "The wrongfulness of an act of a
State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of selfdefence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations."354 ' According to the Commentary, "the term 'lawful' implies
that the action taken respects those obligations of total restraint
applicable in international armed conflict, as well as compliance with
the requirements of proportionality and of necessity inherent in the
notion of self-defense. '355 Moreover, the action in self-defense must
be taken in conformity with the principles and purposes of the U.N.
356
Charter.
It would be difficult to describe Israel's actions in constructing
the wall in OPT as in conformity with the Charter, especially because
the ICJ has accepted that Israel's actions amount to de facto
annexation.3 5 7 The wall interferes with the Palestinian people's right
of self-determination mentioned in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the
Charter, and elaborated
upon in the Friendly Relations
35 8
Declaration.
Its construction would also seem to be contrary to the
maintenance of international peace and security, which is mentioned
in the first article and paragraph of the Charter. 359 Nor could it be
said that Israel is settling its dispute with the Palestinian people
through "peaceful means" or "in such a manner that international

353.
Id.
354.
G.A. Res. 56/83, art. 21, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (emphasis
added). The Articles were approved, without vote, by the General Assembly in
Resolution 56/83, 12 December 2001. Id.
355.
CRAWFORD, supra note 64, at 167.
356.
Id.
357.
See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (setting forth provisions that directly
conflict with Israel's actions).
358.
See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc
A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) (explaining that States have a duty to co-operate with one
another as stipulated by the U.N. Charter).
359.
See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
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peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. ' 360 Rather, it
would seem as though it is the Palestinians who are attempting, in
this instance, to settle their dispute peacefully with Israel.
On the question of necessity and proportionality, the ICJ, in its
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, recalled its ruling in Nicaragua,in which it held: 'there is
a specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond
to it, a rule well established in customary international law.' 36 1 The
Court then ruled: "This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of
the Charter, whatever the means of force employed. '362 On the
question of proportionality and Article 51 of the Charter, it is worth
quoting the opinions of a number of judges from the ICJ in the Wall
opinion. None of them accepted that building a wall through the OPT
was a necessary or proportionate measure to respond to the terrorist
attacks emanating from there. 363
Judge Higgins acknowledged,
"[E]ven if it were an act of self-defence, properly so called, it would
need to be justified as necessary and proportionate. '3 64 She
continued, "While the wall does seem to have resulted in a diminution
of attacks on Israeli civilians, the necessity and proportionality for
the particular route selected, with its attendant hardships for
'365
Palestinians uninvolved in these attacks, has not been explained.
This may indeed be the case, but surely the point is that Israel could
have ensured its security by withdrawing from the OPT and building
a wall on what is internationally recognized as its territory (i.e.,
within the 1949 armistice lines). 36 6 Judge Buergenthal stated that,
given the demonstrable great hardship to which the affected
Palestinian population is being subjected in and around the enclaves
created by those segments of the wall, I seriously doubt that the wall

360.
Id. art. 2, para. 3.
361.
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Advisory Opinion,
supra note 95, 41.
362.
Id.
363.
See id. (explaining that building wall was not a necessary and
proportionate measure).
364.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1063, para. 35 (separate
opinion of Judge Higgins).
365.
Id. (emphasis added).
366.
It would seem that if one builds a series of eight-meter-high concrete walls
and fences with electronic sensors, accompanied by dirt tracks, trenches and armed
watch-towers, accompanied by regular military incursions into the OPT with the
attendant extra-judicial assassinations, there will inevitably be a diminution on
attacks on Israeli civilians from there simply because its inhabitants have effectively
been "imprisoned," making it all but impossible to escape into Israel. For a description
of the situation in the occupied West Bank along the route of the Wall, see ECOSOC,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied
Arab Territories, Including Palestine, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/6/Add.1 (Feb. 27, 2004)
(preparedby John Dugard).
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would here satisfy the proportionality requirement to qualify as a
367
legitimate measure of self-defence.

Judge Kooijmans opined:
[I]n my view it is of decisive importance that, even if the construction of
the wall and its associated r~gime could be justified as measures
necessary to protect the legitimate rights of Israeli citizens, these
measures would not pass the proportionality test. The route chosen for
the construction of the wall and the ensuing disturbing consequences
for the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory are manifestly
disproportionate to interests which Israel seeks to protect, as seems to
368
be recognized also in recent decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court.

The Court as whole ruled that it was not convinced
that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was the only
means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has
invoked as justification for that construction ... Israel cannot rely on a
right of self-defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the
369
wrongfulness of the construction of the wall.

It is evident from these quotations that the learned judges cited above
only considered the wall disproportionate and unnecessary because of
the particular route chosen. As the late Sir Arthur Watts observed in
his oral pleading before the ICJ on behalf of Jordan:
Had Israel built a wall wholly within its own territory, we would not all
be here today. And I would just observe that the Court has been given
no cogent reasons why it was necessary to build this Wall in Occupied
Territory, and why a wall built within Israel's own territory would not
have met the security concerns which are alleged to have provoked
it. 3 7 0

What is of particular interest is whether a wall of the kind Israel is
constructing in the OPT could be considered necessary or
37 1
proportionate if it was constructed solely within Israeli territory.
It is evident that such a wall would not be contrary to the U.N.
Charter, as it would not amount to acquiring territory by force or in
violation of IHL or the law of self-determination if it was
accompanied by a full-Israeli withdrawal. 372
But could a 721

367.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1081, para. 9 (separate opinion
of Judge Buergenthal) (emphasis added).
368.
Id. at 1072, para. 34 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) (emphasis
added).
369.
Id. at 1050, paras. 140, 142 (emphasis added).
370.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Req. for Advisory Op.) (Order of Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/131/1511.pdf at 57 (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
371.
See THE BERLIN WALL: A DEFIANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Int'l Comm'n of
Jurists 1962) (finding that the Berlin Wall violated several provisions in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on free movement and the right of residency).
372.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
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kilometer (448 mile) wall 373 be considered proportionate to
Palestinian terrorist attacks if Israel maintained the occupation?
How would one determine proportionality in such a situation?
It is submitted that if Israel was serious about pursuing peace
with the Palestinians in the wider Middle East, it could start by
entering into negotiations with a view to concluding peace treaties
with Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria-countries from the 1948 conflict with
which it has still not made peace-while implementing Resolutions
242 and 338. 374
This would, of course, require a full Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories, which could lead to full
peace and normalization with the entire Muslim world (assuming
that these countries are acting in good faith when they say they are
prepared to make peace with Israel).375 In order to ensure the
mutual security of both Israelis and Palestinians, security
arrangements could be created between Israel and the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem), Gaza, and the Golan Heights that are
similar to those provided for in Article 4 of the Israel-Egypt and the
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaties. 376 These security arrangements would

373.
On April 30, 2006, the Israeli cabinet approved a revised route of the wall
and published a map on the Ministry of Defence website. The previous map was
released on February 20, 2005. Based on this revised map, the total length of the
wall's route will be 703 kilometers long, compared to 670 kilometers of length
envisioned in the previous route. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian
Implications of the April 2006 Barrier Projections (July 2006), http://www.ochaopt.org/
documents/OCHABarrierProj_6jul06.pdf. But see U.N. Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Three Years Later: The
HumanitarianImpact of the Barrier Since the International Court of Justice Opinion
(July 9, 2007), http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ICJ3_SpecialFocus July2007.pdf
(according to the most recent assessment, Israel's barrier will be 721 kilometers long).
374.
For further reading on the 1948 conflict between Israel and the Arab world,
see AVI SHLAIM, THE IRON WALL: ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD (2000). For its
consequences and further insights, see BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN
REFUGEE PROBLEM REVISITED (2004); ILAN PAPPt, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF
PALESTINE (2006); HENRY CArrAN, PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL: THE SEARCH
FOR JUSTICE (1969); MICHAEL PALUMBO, THE PALESTINIAN CATASTROPHE: THE 1948
EXPULSION OF A PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMELAND (1987); LT. COLONEL NETANEL LORCH,
THE EDGE OF THE SWORD: ISRAEL'S WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1947-1949 (1961); WALID
KHALIDI, WHY DID THE PALESTINIANS LEAVE? AN EXAMINATION OF THE ZIONIST VERSION

OF THE EXODUS OF 1948 (1963); WALID KHALIDI, ALL THE REMAINS: THE PALESTINIAN
VILLAGES OCCUPIED AND DEPOPULATED BY ISRAEL IN 1948 (1993); and NORMAN G.
FINKELSTEIN, IMAGE AND REALITY OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT (2003).
375.
Relevant Muslim countries include Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and others that have not yet established diplomatic relations with Israel.
When Israel withdrew its armed forces from southern Lebanon after its 34-day war
with Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, it complained about the presence of
peacekeepers in that country with whom it did not have diplomatic relations. Israel
Puts Demands on Peacekeepers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 21, 2006.
376.
Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, supra note 187, art. 4. For discussion of the
Israel-Egypt treaty, see generally Michael Akehurst, The Peace Treaty Between Egypt
and Israel, 7 INT'L RELATIONS 1035 (1981).
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be without prejudice to the parties' inherent right of self-defense in
accordance with the U.N. Charter. In the event that a Palestinian
state is created, there would be no question concerning Israel's right
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself. 377 A
Palestinian government would also be obliged to prevent hostile
attacks emanating from territories over which it has effective
3 78
control.

VI. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADVISORY OPINION

Since the ICJ rendered its opinion on the legal consequences of
the construction of the wall in the OPTs on July 9, 2004, Israel has
adopted a posture of defiance by ignoring the opinion and continuing
with the construction process.3 79 Although the U.N. has established a
register of damage for all natural and legal persons affected by the
wall's route, little has been done to urge compliance by Israel with
international law. The Arab group did not attempt to lobby the U.N.
Security Council for a resolution imposing countermeasures against
Israel, nor did it get the U.N. General Assembly to pass a series of
38 1
non-binding resolutions38 0 in the Emergency Special Session
calling on third states to undertake countermeasures.3 8 2 In fact, a
draft resolution demanding that all U.N. members comply with their
legal obligations as identified in the opinion was defeated.38 3 The EU,
for its part, still allows Israeli companies to benefit from preferential
trade with it, even though this is conditional upon respect for human

377.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
378.
But see The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1, at 22 (Apr. 9)
(determining that the international responsibility of a state will only be engaged if it
knowingly allows its territory to be used to attack another state).
379.
See Sharon Defies Court Over Barrier, BBC NEWS ONLINE, July 11, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middleeast/3884887.stm (reporting that the Israeli
government continued to build barrier in the West Bank after World Court held that
such a barrier is illegal).
380.
Francis Aim6 Vallat, The Competence of the United Nations General
Assembly, 97 RECUEIL DES COURS 207 (1959). However, the view of Francis Aim6
Vallat, a former Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office, who in his lecture before
the Hague Academy of International Law said that the legal effect of a U.N. General
Assembly resolution would be of the "greatest significance" in the context of the
maintenance of peace and security, if the Security Council fails to take any action to
deal with a breach of the peace, and the Assembly recommends measures, for the
purpose of restoring the peace, to be taken by member states against one and in
support of the other party to a conflict.
381.
See G.A. Res. 377(V), 5th Sess. (Nov. 3, 1950) (adopting a "uniting for
peace" resolution).
382.
See G.A. Res. ES-10/L.18/Rev.1, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/L.18/Rev.1 (July 20,
2004) (demanding merely that Israel, the occupying power, comply with its legal
obligations as mentioned in the advisory opinion).
383.
Id.
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rights, democracy, and the rule of law.38 4 Looking at the way in
which the Advisory Opinion has been received by the international
community in the three years since it was rendered, one might
therefore conclude that the opinion has little, if any, legal
significance. However, to hold this position would be imprudent.
Although a number of countries expressed reservations with the
Advisory Opinion's paragraph on the question of self-defense, they
did not question the court's findings of law in the other 162
paragraphs. 38 5 In the present political climate, there are many
reasons that may explain why the international community has failed
to enforce international law on the rules regarding the recourse to
force, from the invasion of Iraq without prior U.N. Security Council
authorization to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in July 2006.386
However, just because some states get away with breaching their
international legal obligations does not mean that those legal
obligations are not binding upon them in the first place.

Victor Kattan, The Wall, Obligations Erga Omnes and Human Rights: The
384.
Case for Withdrawing the European Community's Terms of Preferential Trade With
Israel, 13 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 87 (2004-2005). It is noteworthy in this respect
that in the case of Zimbabwe, the European Council implemented a series of targeted
sanctions. See 2002 O.J. (L 50) 1, 4.
See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, Emer. Spec. Sess., 25th mtg., U.N. Doc. AlES385.
10/PV.25 (July, 16 2004) (including the statement made by Mr. Danforth (United
States) in the debate on the General Assembly resolution following the rendering of the
Advisory Opinion:
The judicial process is not the political process, and the International Court of
Justice was not the appropriate forum to resolve this conflict.... So the Court
opinion . . . seems to say that the right of a State to defend itself exists only
when it is attacked by another State, and that the right of self-defense does not
exist against non-State actors. It does not exist when terrorists hijack planes
and fly them into buildings, or bomb train stations or bus stops, or put poison
I would suggest that, if this were the meaning of Article
gas into subways ....
51, then the United Nations Charter could be irrelevant at a time when the
major threats to peace are not from States but from terrorists.
Id.
See generally Lord Alexander of Weedon QC, Iraq: The Pax Americana and
386.
the Law, 9 Y.B. ISLAMIc & MIDDLE E. L. 3 (2002-2003) (discussing the legality of the
invasion of Iraq); see also Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92
GEO. L.J. 173 (2003-2004) (arguing that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegal);
Richard A. Falk, What Futurefor the UN Charter System of War Prevention?,97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 590 (2003) (providing an argument that the war was contrary to international
law); Christopher Greenwood, Britain's War on Saddam Had the Law on Its Side, 9
Y.B. ISLAMIc & MIDDLE E. L. 3 (2002-2003) (arguing that the invasion of Iraq in 2003
was legal). For an examination of the legality of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 2006,
see Victor Kattan, The Use and Abuse of Self-Defense in InternationalLaw: The IsraelHezbollah Conflict as a Case Study, 12 Y.B. ISLAMIc & MIDDLE E. L. (2005-2006). See
also Israel, Hezbollah and the Conflict in Lebanon: An Act of Aggression or SelfDefense?, 14 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26 (2006), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/
hrbrief/14/lkattan.pdfrd=1 (providing a shorter version of the Kattan article). See also
Georgina Redsell, Illegitimate, Unnecessary and Disproportionate:Israel's Use of Force
in Lebanon, 3 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 70 (2007).
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Of course, this will also depend on what one means by "binding."
In this respect, it is submitted that a distinction should be made
between what is "binding" in the sense that a state, a group of states,
or an international organization is obliged to comply with a particular
rule, and what is enforceable (i.e., what is politically acceptable to the
permanent five countries in the Security Council in the sense that
one of them will not exercise its right to veto a resolution imposing
countermeasures against a delinquent state). It would, therefore, be
advisable for international lawyers, including judges before municipal
courts, to make a distinction between politics, the law, and its
enforcement.
For instance, after citing a passage from the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion concerning the proprietary of giving its advice to the U.N.
General Assembly on the legal consequences of constructing the Wall,
the HCJ in Mara'aberuled that the ICJ's opinion is not binding upon
states. 38 7 However, this statement, which was based upon an
erroneous citation,38 8 misses the point. No state that submitted a
written statement or made an oral submission before the Court
claimed that the opinion was binding upon them. 38 9 Indeed, it was
the members of the U.N. General Assembly acting collectively who
requested the opinion and not its individual member states. 390 In
other words, the ICJ's advice is rendered to the U.N. General
Assembly, and the Assembly ultimately decides whether to accept the
ICJ's advice.3 91 It is not up to states A, B, or C to ignore the collective
will of the international community.3 92 No state can prevent the ICJ

387.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 56 (2006) ("As the ICJ itself noted in its opinion (paragraph 31), it does
not bind the States.").
388.
See Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Mar. 30) (recalling its jurisprudence); Western
Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 24 (Oct. 16) (quoting 1950 I.C.J. 71).
389.
See HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe,translated in 45 I.L.M. 202 (listing petitioners
bringing the case, which includes no nation-states).
390.
This is because the U.N. is a separate legal person from its members. It
has international personality, and is a subject of international law. Its constituent
members have clothed it with the competence required to enable it to effectively
discharge its functions, duties, and responsibilities. As the ICJ ruled,
[t]he functions of the Organization are of such a character that they could not
be effectively discharged if they involved concurrent action, on the
international plane of fifty-eight or more Foreign Offices, and the court
concludes that the Members have endowed the organization with the capacity
to bring international claims when necessitated by the discharge of its
functions.
Reparation of Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 178, 180 (Apr. 11).
391.
And indeed, it did precisely this, acknowledging the opinion in G.A. Res.
ES-10/L.18[Rev.1, supra note 382.
392.
The principle of "persistent objection" only applies to the creation of new
rules of international law. However, the ICJ was not dealing with any new rules of
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from giving an Advisory Opinion, and no state can declare that the
ICJ's findings of law are without legal effect. 393 A state that seeks to
argue that a considered opinion of the Court does not represent the
correct state of the law (particularly where the Court's findings, as in
394
the Wall opinion, verge on unanimity) will be in a weak position.
The HCJ in Mara'abe seemed to be confusing three separate issues:
the nature of Advisory Opinions, the role of the U.N. General
Assembly, and the irrelevance of res judicata, which only applies
395
when there are parties to a case.
The purpose of Advisory Opinions is to provide authoritative
guidance on points of law arising from the functions of organs and
specialized agencies of the U.N. But one cannot simply assume that
because of the word "advisory" the ICJ's advice is without legal
significance altogether. As ICJ noted itself in its Advisory Opinions
concerning the Peace Treaties in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
and on the status of Western Sahara,"The Court's reply is only of an
advisory character: as such, it has no binding force. '396 Thus, there
may be situations and circumstances under which its opinions will
have legal consequences. For instance, in the Wall opinion, the ICJ
ruled: "The obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are the
obligation to respect the right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination, and certain of its obligations under international
humanitarian law. '39 7 Erga omnes obligations are, by their very
definition, binding. 398 They are concerned with the enforcement of
international law, the violation of which is deemed to be an offense
not only against the state or entity in question, but against all
members of the international community.3 99 Whether these norms

international law in its Advisory Opinion on the wall. See generally Ted L. Stein, The
Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in
InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985) (discussing this principle in depth).
393.
See ADAM BASAK, DECISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANS IN THE
JUDGMENTS AND OPINIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 35 (1969) ("[N]o

State can cancel the legal effects of a decisions [sic] in which an organ of the UN has
decided to ask for an opinion. One must then acknowledge that in the opinion of the
Court such a decision is in this sense indirectly binding on all member States.").
394.
Hugh Thirlway, The International Court of Justice, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
561, 582-83 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2003).
395.
See Scobbie, supra note 4, at 269, 289-91 (discussing the fact that res
judicata does not attach to an advisory opinion if there are no parties).
396.
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
supra note 388, at 71 (emphasis added).
397.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1053, para. 155.
398.
See Peter D. Coffman, ObligationsErga Omnes and the Absent Third State,
39 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 285, 285 (1996) (discussing the binding nature of erga omnes
obligations).
399.
For discussion on obligations erga omnes, see Coffman, supra note 398, at
285-333; Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and
Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 211, 211-39 (1997); and Karl Zemanek, New
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are actually enforced or not is an entirely different matter and has
little to do, strictly speaking, with the law. This is the difference
between domestic and international law: the latter is not selfexecuting (if the law ever is). But this is not the same as saying that
the law is not binding. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice once wrote:
The law is not binding because it is enforced: it is enforced because it is
already binding. Enforcement presupposes the existence of a legal
obligation incumbent on those concerned. The prospect of enforcement
is in fact little more than a factor or motive inclining people to obey
rules that they are in any case under an obligation to obey: but it is not
4 00
itself the source of the obligation.

Even before the ascendancy of so-called peremptory norms of
international law and obligations erga omnes, it was argued by some
international lawyers that the difference between Advisory Opinions
and contentious decisions of the ICJ was minimal. 40 1 In fact, some
went so far as to write that there was, in reality, no fundamental
difference between a "non-binding" Advisory Opinion and a "binding"
judgment. 40 2 For instance, Blaine Sloane, a former director of the
U.N. General Legal Division, made the point in an article he wrote in
1950: "While in a formal sense it may be true that an opinion does
not have the binding force of a judgement, practically, it does, as an
' 40 3
authoritative statement of law, have almost the same legal effect.
In other words, the ICJ states what the law is in both its advisory
capacity and when there is a contentious case between states. Andr6
Gros, formerly a French judge at the ICJ, took a similar view:
The distinction habitually drawn between Advisory Opinions and
judgments, whereby the former do not have the binding character of the
latter, is not an absolute one. In the first place, it is only the operative
part of a judgment that is distinct from an Advisory Opinion as to its
obligatory force. As regards the reasoning, this, in both cases,
represents the Court's legal conclusions concerning the situation which
is being dealt with, and its weight is the same in both cases: there are
no two ways of declaring the law. Second, even advisory proceedings

Trends in the Enforcement of Erga Omnes Obligations, 4 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 1, 152 (2000).
400.
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Foundationsof the Authority of InternationalLaw
and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1956).
401.
F. Blaine Sloan, Advisory Jurisdictionof the International Court of Justice,
38 CAL. L. REV. 830, 855 (1950) (discussing the fact that advisory opinions and
decisions of the ICJ have the same legal effect).
402.
Id.
403.
Id.; see also Blaine Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty
Years Later), 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39 (1988) (looking back at the more than 6,000
General Assembly resolutions over the past forty years and discussing the unresolved
legal status of such resolutions); F. Blaine Sloan, The Binding Force of a
'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 1 (1948) (discussing whether U.N. resolutions possess any binding force on Member
states).

20071

THE LEGALITY OF THE WEST BANK WALL
may involve acts that operate with finality both for the Court itself and
40 4
for the participating states or organizations.

It could be argued that even if this had been a contentious case
between Israel and "Palestine," or between a third state such as
Jordan (doing what Ethiopia and Liberia tried to do regarding SouthWest Africa in the 1960s), the result would have been the samealthough in a contentious case, Israel would probably have put in full
evidence and arguments on the merits.40 5 However, in the present
circumstances, this would probably not be possible because Israel has
40
withdrawn its consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 6
Although Assembly resolutions are only recommendatory according to
Articles 10-14 of the Charter, this does not affect the legal quality of
an Advisory Opinion; it is still a contemporary statement of the law

404.
Andr6 Gros, Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of
Justice, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP
C. JESSUP 313, 315 (Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972).
405.
Of course, in a contentious case, the losing State would be in violation of
the U.N. Charter if it did not comply. From 1949 to 1971, the case of South-West
Africa (now Namibia) engaged the International Court of Justice's attention. This
resulted in four Advisory Opinions (1950, 1955, 1956 and 1971) and two judgments
(1962 and 1966). From 1949 to 1962, South Africa did its best to thwart the
supervisory role assigned to the U.N. General Assembly, and just like Israel, it ignored
the ICJ's advisory opinions. But by the 1960s, with many new African states as
members of the U.N., a new idea took root: to explore the possibility of contentious
litigation through a judgment from the ICJ. However, South-West Africa was not a
State in the 1960s (it did not attain independence as the state of Namibia until 1990),
and it had to rely on Ethiopia and Liberia (who were both members of the League of
Nations) to bring the case to the ICJ on its behalf. In 1966, "the white man's court"
held that Ethiopia and Liberia were not entitled to receive judgment on the merits of
the case, because they had not "established any legal right or interest appertaining to
them in the subject matter" of the claims. This judgment came as a surprise to many,
and it is generally thought that were it not for the death of Judge Badawi, the illness of
Judge Bustamante, and the withdrawal of Judge Zafrullah Khan, the outcome might
have been very different. For a commentary by one of the lawyers who participated in
that case, see Richard A. Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, in RICHARD
A. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 378-402 (1970). Today, the
matter seems to be settled as Article 42 of the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility (2001) allows an injured state to invoke the
responsibility of another state if the obligation breached is owed to that state, a group
of states, or to the international community as a whole.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY art. 42 (2001).
406.
Israel followed the US in withdrawing its consent from the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ in the aftermath of the Nicaraguajudgment. The notification of
termination of the declaration of 17 October 1956, received from the Government of
Israel on 21 November 1985 reads as follows: "On behalf of the Government of Israel, I
have the honour to inform you that the Government of Israel has decided to terminate,
with effect as of today, its declaration of 17 October 1956 as amended, concerning the
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." This
statement was signed by Benjamin Netanyahu.
See Declarations Recognizing
Jurisdiction,38-40 I.C.J. Y.B. 79, 79-80 (1983-1986) (including the statement signed
by Golda Meir showing Israel's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in
the years before 1985).
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by the principal judicial organ of the U.N. Judge Elias went so far as
to advance his view that:
If there is unanimity in the Assembly during the vote, all are bound....
If the vote is divided, then those states that vote for a particular
resolution by the requisite majority are bound on the grounds of
consent and of estoppel. Those that abstain are also bound on the
ground of acquiescence and tacit consent, since an abstention is not a
negative vote; while those that vote against the resolutions should be
regarded as bound by the democratic principles that the majority view
should always prevail when the vote has been truly free and fair and
407
the requisite majority has been secured.

Resolution ES-10/L.18/Rev.1, passed in the Advisory Opinion's
aftermath, demanded that Israel comply with its legal obligations in
the Advisory Opinion. 40 8 This Resolution differs substantially from
resolution ES-10/13. 40 9 The latter was adopted on October 27, 2003
(i.e., before the Assembly petitioned the ICJ), and demanded that
"Israel stop and reverse the construction of the Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which
is in departure of the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to
relevant provisions of international law.'' 410 Not only is Israel now
obliged to stop and reverse construction of the wall, but according to
resolution ES-10/L.18/Rev.1, the Secretary-General is to establish a
411
register of damage caused to all natural or legal persons.
It should not be forgotten that there is no higher judicial
authority that can rule on the legal issues involved in this case. The
issues addressed in the ICJ's opinion on the Wall formed the corpus of
law that guides the U.N. on the question of Palestine. After all, by
analogizing to the ICJ's Advisory Opinions in the South-West Africa
cases, one could argue that the U.N., as a successor to the League of
Nations, has assumed a supervisory role over the Palestinian
territories, which Israel has been effectively administering since June
1967.
The "sacred trust" as encapsulated in Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, as preserved by Article 80 of the
U.N. Charter, 412 would render relevant Judge Sir Hersch

407.
T. Olawale Elias, Modern Sources of InternationalLaw, in TRANSNATIONAL
LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PHILIP C. JESSUP, supra note 404, at
34, 51.
408.
G.A. Res. ES-10L.18/Rev.1, supra note 382.
409.
See G.A. Res. ES-10/13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/13 (Oct. 27, 2003)
(discussing illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the

OPTs).
410.

Id.

411.

See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to

General Assembly Resolution ES-10/15, para. 4, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. AIES-10/361 (Oct. 17, 2006) (discussing the purpose and legal nature of the
register of damage).
412.
U.N. Charter art. 80, para. 1.
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Lauterpacht's classic statement in the Voting Procedure Case.4 13 As
he noted in his separate opinion while commenting upon the legal
effect of Assembly resolutions on South-West Africa:
Whatever may be the content of the recommendation and whatever
may be the nature and the circumstances of the majority by which it
has been reached, it is nevertheless a legal act of the principal organ of
the United Nations which members of the United Nations are under a
duty to treat with a degree of respect appropriate to a resolution of the
General Assembly . . . Although there is no automatic obligation to
accept fully a particular recommendation or series of recommendations,
there is a legal obligation to act in good faith in accordance with the
An
principles of the Charter and the System of Trusteeship.
administering State may not be acting illegally by declining to act upon
a recommendation or series of recommendations on the same subject.
But in doing so it acts at its peril when a point is reached when the
cumulative effect of the persistent disregard of the articulate opinion of
the Organization is such as to foster the conviction that the State in
question has become guilty of disloyalty to the Principles and Purposes
of the Charter. Thus an Administering State which consistently sets
itself above the solemnly and repeatedly expressed judgment of the
Organization, in particular in proportion as that judgment
approximates to unanimity, may find that it has overstepped the
imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality, between
discretion and arbitrariness, between the exercise of the legal right to
disregard the recommendation and the abuse of that right, and that it
has exposed itself to consequences legitimately following as a legal
4 14
sanction.

Resolution ES-10/L.18/Rev.1 was adopted on the basis of an Advisory
Opinion and is thus distinct from political rhetoric. Linguistically,
this Resolution is of a legal and not of a moral quality. 415 Certain
mechanisms have been established to monitor compliance by Israel.

Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made
under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship
system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this
Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights
whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international
instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be
parties.
Id.
413.
Voting Procedures on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions
Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June
7).
414.
Id. at 120 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
Richard A. Falk, Comment, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the
415.
GeneralAssembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 787 (1966).
If the resolution enters a political process that looks toward implementation,
then the legislative nature of the claim is more clear-cut, that is, there seems to
be some explicit connection between the status of the claim as legislative and
the prospects for effective implementation: the better the prospects, the more
appropriate the label 'legislative.'
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Operative paragraph 6 "calls upon both the Government of Israel and
the Palestinian Authority to immediately implement their obligations
under the Roadmap, in cooperation with the Quartet, as endorsed by
Security Council Resolution 1515 (2003), to achieve the vision of two
states living side by side in peace and security, and emphasizes that
both Israel and the Palestinian Authority are under an obligation
scrupulously to observe the rules of international humanitarian
law. '4 16 Operative paragraph 7 "calls upon all States parties to the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 to ensure respect by Israel for the
Convention, and invites Switzerland, in its capacity as the depositary
of the Geneva Conventions, to conduct consultations and to report to
the General Assembly on the matter, including with regard to the
possibility of resuming the Conference of High Contracting Parties to
the Fourth Geneva Convention. '4 17 The Assembly has clearly taken
steps towards ensuring the effective implementation of this
Resolution, emphasizing that the political process should lead to a
vision of two states living in peace and security.
It is important to distinguish between the ICJ, the U.N.'s
principal judicial organ, and the U.N. General Assembly and U.N.
Security Council, which are political bodies. According to the U.N.
Charter, only the Council can take legally binding decisions under
Article 25 of the Charter, directing member states to impose economic
sanctions or use force to maintain international peace. 418 But this is
a political decision made by a political body subject to the possibility
of a veto by one of its permanent members. Politics and law, though
closely intertwined in international relations, are fundamentally
different. Interestingly, Judge Higgins wrote in her separate opinion
that the Court's finding that an act or situation is illegal is the same
as a binding decision of a U.N. organ (such as the Security Council)
acting under Chapter VI and VII of the Charter. 4 19 She wrote:
Although in the present case it is the Court, rather than a United
Nations organ acting under Articles 24 and 25, that has found the
illegality; and although it is found in the context of an Advisory Opinion
rather than in a contentious case, the Court's position as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations suggests that the legal
consequence for a finding that an act or situation is illegal is the
4 20
same.

It may therefore be concluded that the obligations that the ICJ
outlined are binding upon the U.N., which is estopped from
undertaking measures that would conflict with the Advisory Opinion.
As Judge Gros stated in Western Sahara:

416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

G.A. Res. ES-10/L.18/Rev.1, supra note 382, para 6.
Id. para. 7 (emphasis added).
U.N. Charter art. 25.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1064, para. 38.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The advisory opinion determines the law applicable to the question put;
it is possible for the body which sought the opinion not to follow it in its
action, but that body is aware that no position adopted contrary to the
Court's pronouncement will have any effectiveness whatsoever in the
42 1
legal sphere.

Whether or not the Palestinians are successful in persuading the
international community to urge compliance by Israel with its legal
obligations at some future point in time will depend upon geopolitical
considerations. 422 Of course this is not, technically speaking, a legal
issue, but a question of politics. After all, states can always ignore
423
international law, or dismiss it when it is politically inconvenient.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is evident from comparing the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on Wall
to the HCJ's decisions in the Beit Sourik and Mara'abe cases that
there was little agreement on the substantive issues relating to
Israeli civilian settlement activity, self-determination, and selfdefense. On the legality of the wall, the Courts were at complete
loggerheads: the HCJ ruled that the wall was a lawful measure to
defend the Israeli civilian settlements established inside the West
Bank including in and around East Jerusalem without actually

421.
Voting Procedures, Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J., supra note 413, at 73,
para. 6.
422.
In this respect, the PLO might want to consider lobbying friendly states in
the General Assembly to petition the ICJ for a further Advisory Opinion, as suggested
by the U.N. Special Rapporteur. For a discussion, see U.N. Human Rights Council,
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled
"Human Rights Council," U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 29, 2007) (prepared by John
Dugard). Indeed, further recourse to the ICJ for Advisory Opinions on legal questions
connected to the question of Palestine, and in particular on the legal consequences of
prolonged occupations more generally, will be of particular use for third states who
may refrain from taking coercive measures against Israel without an explicit legal
mandate to do so. In this respect, it could be argued that the Advisory Opinion on the
wall already provides a legal mandate to call for countermeasures (such as imposing a
comprehensive arms embargo) against Israel, as was done against apartheid South
Africa. See S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977) (condemning the South
African government for its massive violence and further recognizing the arms embargo
against the nation to prevent further aggravation of the situation). Of course, that
Resolution explicitly referred to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which is unlikely to
be accomplished in the case of Israel. In this regard, it would have been preferable if
the ICJ could have explicitly enumerated the consequences for states, either in the
opinion itself or in the separate opinions of the judges participating in the case, as was
done, for example, by Vice-President Ammoun. Namibia Advisory Opinion, supra note
192, at 70 (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun).
423.
See Oliver Burkeman & Julian Borger, War Critic Astonished as US Hawk
Admits Invasion was Illegal, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 20, 2003, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1089158,00.html (noting that when asked
about the legality of the invasion of Iraq, Richard Perle said, "I think in this case
international law stood in the way of doing the right thing.").
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addressing their illegality, whereas the ICJ found that the wall was
unlawful precisely because it encloses those settlements, which
As
already breach Article 49(6) of Geneva Convention IV. 42 4
examined in Section IV, the way in which both Courts dealt with the
question of Palestinian self-determination was at best peripheral and
ultimately unsatisfactory, although the ICJ did at least address the
issue in some depth. 425 However, the ICJ should have established
more clearly what states should do to ensure Israel's compliance with
international law. It also should have elaborated further upon the
question of self-defense, particularly as to whether the law has
changed in the aftermath of September 11, although its reluctance to
engage in a discussion of this issue was probably because the parties
426
did not adequately argue self-defense before the court.
In its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ considered the wall's route as a
whole, whereas the HCJ only dealt with certain sections of it in a
piecemeal fashion. 427 This has allowed the HCJ to obfuscate the fact
that the wall's route is in fact segmenting the already miniscule
territorial area in which the Palestinian people desire to create a
contiguous, sovereign, and viable state as envisaged by the
"Performance-Based Road Map to a Two-State Solution to the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict. '428 The wall's route has a direct impact upon
the question of self-determination for the Palestinians, as it affects
their economic, social and cultural development. As is clearly evident

424.
Daphne Barak-Erez, Israel: The Security Barrier-Between International
Law, ConstitutionalLaw, and Domestic Judicial Review, 4 INT'L J. CON. L. 540, 547-48
(2006) ("Paradoxically, the two courts have something in common-namely, a narrow
view of the motivations behind the construction of the barrier. The ICJ held that the
barrier was a political move and, therefore, refused to acknowledge its security
purposes. By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court firmly held that the barrier was not
politically motivated, and that its sole concern was security. The two courts were not
open to the possibility that, in fact, both motivations were inseparably linked in the
considerations inspiring the barrier's construction.").
425.
See U.N. GAOR, Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice on
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/273 (July 13, 2004) (discussing the International Court of
Justice opinion regarding the wall).
426.
Id.
427.
Id.
428.
See Press Release, USDOS, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent
Two-State Solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict (Apr. 30,
2003),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm
(stating that
"[a]
settlement,
negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent,
democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with
Israel and its other neighbors"); ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1054,
para. 162 ("Illegal actions and unilateral decisions have been taken on all sides,
whereas, in the Court's view, this tragic situation can be brought to an end only
through implementation in good faith of all relevant Security Council resolutions, in
particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The 'Roadmap' approved by Security
Council resolution 1515 (2003) represents the most recent of efforts to initiate
negotiations to this end.").

20071

THE LEGALITY OF THE WEST BANK WALL

1509

from examining the various maps of the wall's route (the latest route
is shown in map 4 in the Appendix), the adjustments made to the
wall's route after the HCJ's rulings in Beit Sourik and Mara'abe are
cosmetic only. 429 In this respect, it should not be forgotten that there
are still hundreds of checkpoints scattered throughout the West Bank
as well as so-called "flying checkpoints. '43 0
Not all of these
checkpoints-which are more akin to military barricades-separate
Israelis from Palestinians. Some of them separate Palestinians from
each other, and in these cases, it is difficult to see what the security
rationale for their existence is. 43 1 Moreover, many parts of the West
Bank-an area that is itself designated for a future Palestinian
state-are off limits for Palestinians and are accessible to the settlers
only. 432 Palestinians are also prohibited from traveling on many of
the roads within the West Bank (different types of number plates
distinguish Palestinian vehicles from those driven by the settlers and
the military), and they need security permits to visit relatives
inhabiting other Palestinian cities, towns, and villages in East
Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza, as well as in Israel. 43 3 By
analyzing only a small section of the wall's route in Beit Sourik and
Mara'abe,the HCJ was able to ignore the "bigger picture," whereas
the ICJ at least took some of these factors into account (although
inadequately in the opinion of the author). In this respect, the
"bigger picture" is that after Israel has carved out its most valuable
land and resources through constructing the wall, all that remains of
the West Bank is a rump entity that will not satisfy Palestinian
aspirations for independence and statehood. As a result, Palestinians
are likely to remain in a state of permanent dependence upon Israel,
unable to pursue their right of self-determination through their
economic, social, and cultural development. And the sad thing is that
all this has the stamp of approval of the highest Court of law in Israel
(the Supreme Court, which was acting as a HCJ in this case). Having
said this, as legal precedents, there is little doubt that despite some of
the criticisms leveled at the ICJ in academic writings (it should be
said, mostly in the United States), the ICJ's Advisory Opinion,
outside Israel, has been a persuasive authority.4 3 4
It has, for

429.
See Appendix 4.
430.
See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs [OCHA], OCHA
Closure Update occupied Palestinian Territory (Apr. 2007), http://www.ochaopt.org/
documents/Closure%20AprO7-2.pdf (discussing flying checkpoint positions and limits
on Palestinian access to different parts of Israel).
431.
Id.
432.
Id.
433.
Id.
434.
See, e.g., Orakhelashvili, supra note 207, at 134-39 (favoring the ICJ's
Advisory Opinion over that of the HCJ).
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instance, galvanised the international NGO community and
435
Palestinian civil society.
In the Mara'abe case, Vice-President M. Cheshin said he found
the ICJ's decision "objectionable. '436 He criticized the factual basis
upon which the ICJ built its opinion, which he termed a "ramshackle
one." 437 He failed to mention that whatever "defects" there were
concerning the facts, Israel did not furnish the Court with any
additional information for what he claims would have affected the
legal outcome (and it is noteworthy that in the three years since the
Advisory Opinion was rendered on July 9, 2004, over 80 percent of
the wall continues to pass through occupied territory). 438 Although
Israel has alleged that the wall it is building in the West Bank is
solely a protective measure, it still has not accounted for its route in a
satisfactory manner or explained why the wall "just happens" to loop
around all the major Israeli civilian settlement blocs established in
the West Bank. Presumably Israel is not building the wall in a
haphazard manner, but deliberately and carefully. According to
Judge Barak,
[t]he only reason for the route beyond the Green Line is a professional
reason related to topography, the ability to control the immediate
surroundings, and other similar military reasons. Upon which rules of
international law can it be said that such a route violates international
439
law?

The ICJ, in its 163-paragraph opinion, has already examined the
rules of international law that Israel is violating in constructing the
wall in the OPT, and this will not be elaborated upon here. 440 It is
interesting to note that a "professional reason related to topography,"
presumably determined by the Israeli military, just happens to
coincide with the Israeli civilian settlements scattered on practically
every major hill top around East Jerusalem. Surely, this cannot be a
matter of sheer coincidence? A journalist writing for the Israeli
newspaper Ha'aretz has since written that the wall's route in the

435.
See, e.g., Palestinian Civil Soc'y, Calls for Boycott, Divestment and Sanction
against Israel Until It Complies with International Law and Universal Principles of
Human Rights, July 9, 2005, available at http://www.stopthewall.org/downloads/pdfI
BDSEnglish.pdf (calling on civil organizations and people around the world to impose
sanctions against Israel similar to those imposed upon South Africa during Apartheid);
BADIL, The Electronic Intifada, Palestinians Attend World Social Forum, Jan. 20,
2007,
http://wsf2007.org/info/media-articles-online/palestinians-attend-world-socialforum (reporting that a Palestinian delegation supporting this initiative attended the
World Social Forum in Nairobi in January 2007).
436.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 244 (2006).
437.
Id. at 245, para. 4.
438.
Id.
439.
Id. at 231, para. 70.
440.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1054-55, para. 163.
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Jerusalem area is "suspiciously congruent" with the master plan of
the adjacent settlements:
When Shaul Arieli of the Council for Peace and Security examined the
Defense Ministry's route close to the northernmost neighbourhood of
the capital, Neveh Yaakov [an Israeli settlement located in northeast
Jerusalem], he could not understand why, contrary to the basic rules of
planning a security fence, the fence wound along at the foot of the ridge.
Why and for what purpose did the planner decide to deviate at that
particular place nearly a kilometre and a half from the eastern border
of the neighborhood and go out of the municipal area of Jerusalem into
the territories of the West Bank? The riddle was solved when Arieli
obtained Master Plan number 240.3 for the establishment of a new
neighbourhoodlJewish settlement, by the name of Geva. According to
the plan, Geva is to link up via a bridge with the settlement of Geva
44 1
Binyamin (Adam) to the east.

The HCJ has since castigated the Israeli government for misleading
it as to the reasons underlying its route. 442 In a recent decision, the
HCJ ruled that "a complete picture was not presented" after what the
Court referred to as a "grave phenomenon" was revealed (i.e., that the
443
route of the wall is linked to Israeli civilian settlement activity).
Nevertheless, Judge Barak ruled that "our words are not intended to
express a position as to the lawfulness of the new route now being
considered by the Respondents, nor to express a position as regards
other petitions concerning the route of the fence in the Northern and
Southern sections. '444 With respect, it is still submitted that, for the
HCJ to have even suggested that that the factual basis had changed
since July 2004 (as Judge Barak implicitly did in paragraphs 59-72 of
his decision in Mara'abe, where he cited statements by the State's
counsel that called the findings in a number of U.N. reports "far from
precise," "exaggerated," and "completely baseless"), and that ICJ's
opinion
was
consequently
outdated and
irrelevant,
was
disingenuous. 445
The HCJ should not have accepted the
government's contentions so uncritically in the first place, when it

441.
Eldar Akiva, Pulling Out Phase Two of the Road Map, HA'ARETZ
(Jerusalem), June 14, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/
PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=726062.
442. I would like to thank John Dugard and Aeyal Gross for drawing this to my
attention. Ha'aretz reported that Justices Aharon Barak, Dorit Beinisch, and Ayala
Procaccia severely criticized the government for concealing in earlier High Court
hearings that the existing route was determined partly by a master plan for expanding
the settlements, and not solely for security considerations. See Yuval Yoaz, Court
Orders Section of Separation Fence Torn Down, HA'ARETZ (Jerusalem), June 16, 2006,
available at http://www.haaretz.comfhasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=727626.
443. HCJ 2732/05 Hassin and Radwan v. Israel [2005] (Isr.), translation
provided courtesy of Michael Sfard, Adv. (on file with author).
444. Id.
445. HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 230, para. 67 (2006).
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was evident to all and sundry that something was amiss. As James
Crawford pleaded in his oral statement before the ICJ:
Israel cannot plead lack of facts as a ground to have the Court refuse to
decide, when any deficiency in the facts could have been corrected by
Israel itself....
Anyway the basic facts are perfectly clear. The
dominant fact is the US$2billion fact of the Wall, growing daily and
dividing Palestinian communities from each other and from their lands
and water. That is the essential fact, this US$2billion so-called
"temporary" edifice. So much is now known about the Wall, and what
is not known can be deduced from its route, its size, its cost, its r~gime,
its effects, and the avowed intentions of those who are building it to
44 6
impose a unilateral settlement.

Although Crawford was speaking before the ICJ rendered its
Advisory Opinion, events since that time have only strengthened this
argument. 447 Israel is still building the wall in direct contravention
of international law as determined by the ICJ, its cost has increased,
Palestinians have been displaced, the settlements continue to grow
unabated, Israel imposes a unilateral settlement in Gaza, and the
conflict continues. 448 Many people can confirm the deterioration of
the situation; there are no shortages of NGOs, journalists and U.N.
personnel on the ground in Israel and the surrounding areas who are
able to travel there and examine the situation for themselves
(although things have become more difficult in recent years,
particularly in the OPTs). There is also an abundance of information
human-rights
and
Palestinian
Israeli,
from
international,
organizations. 44 9 Judge Owada thought it reasonable to conclude
"that the political, social, economic, and humanitarian impacts of the
construction of the wall, as substantiated by ample evidence supplied
and documented in the course of the present proceedings, is such that
the construction of the wall would constitute a violation of
international obligations under various international instruments to
which Israel is a party."4 50 It will be recalled that in Nicaragua,the
ICJ ruled that it could consider factual material "in the public

446.
Legal Consequence of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 36, paras. 28-29 (Feb. 23).
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1028, paras. 55-58 (stating the
447.
facts and events).
448.
For monthly reports on the situation in the OPT, see the Reports From the
(2006),
http://www.nad-plo.org/main.php?view=
Palestinian Monitoring Group
pmgpmg. See also UNDER THE GUISE OF SECURITY: ROUTING THE SEPARATION
BARRIER TO ENABLE THE ExPANsION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK
(2005), available at http://www.btselem.orgDownload200512Under the Guise of_
SecurityEng.pdf (examining the connection between the settlements and the
separation barrier's route).
See Amnesty Int'l, Links to Israeli and Palestinian (Human Rights)
449.
Organizations, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/isr-links-eng (providing a list of 45
organizations that are dedicated to human rights work in Israel and Palestine).
450.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1097, para. 24 (separate
opinion of Judge Owada).
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domain," whether or not the parties refer to them. 45 1 After citing the
Brazilian Loans case by the Permanent Court of International Justice
and its own jurisprudence in the Nuclear Test cases, it ruled: "As to
the facts of the case, in principle the Court is not bound to confine its
consideration to the material formally submitted to it by the
parties. '452 Evidently, the ICJ may therefore take other material into
consideration. Although, according to the ICJ's Practice Direction
XII, information submitted by international NGOs are not considered
to be part of the case file, "[s]uch statements and/or documents shall
be treated as publications readily available and may accordingly be
referred to by States and intergovernmental organizations presenting
written and oral statements. '4 53 Because the ICJ's judgments and
Advisory Opinions are not known for their comprehensive references
to the sources relied upon for its legal conclusions, it could consider
NGO amicus briefs without explicitly saying it has done so. 454 The
HCJ therefore cannot assume that the ICJ did not take Israel's
security justifications into consideration. The ICJ did recognize that
"Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of
violence against its civilian population" and it ruled that it has "the
right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its
citizens. '4 55 However, it said, "[t]he measures taken are bound
nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international
law. ' 456 Several judges also made reference to this in their separate
opinions. 4 57 Therefore, to attack the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the
ground that the facts have changed is perhaps a demonstration of the
desperation on the part of the HCJ. It cannot attack the opinion on
the law, which is clear, so it goes for the facts-which only Israel
could have "corrected" had it taken part in the oral pleadings or
submitted a written statement addressing the merits of the case.
Vice-President M. Cheshin also claimed that "the opinion was
colored by a political hue" and that it almost completely ignored "the
horrible terrorism and security problems which have plagued Israel"
without mentioning any of the terrible atrocities committed by the
Israeli army in the OPT since 1967 (which were also hardly

451.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 41,
paras. 29-31 (explaining that I.C.J. is not bound to confine its consideration just to the
facts that have been submitted).
452.
Id. para. 30.
ICJ, Practice Directions (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/
453.
index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0.
454.
For this view, see Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae before
International Courts and Tribunals, 5 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT'L L. 209, 223-24

(2005).
455.
ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1050, para. 141.
456.
Id.
See id. at 1066, paras. 4-5 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id.at
457.
1079, para. 5 (declaration of Judge Beurgenthal); id. at 1097-98, paras. 30-31
(separate opinion of Judge Owada).
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455
addressed by the HCJ in either the Beit Sourik or Mara'abecases).
He called the "silence" over the terrorist attacks on Israel "foreign
and strange" before emotionally concluding, "I am sorry, but the
decision of the ICJ cannot light my path. Its light is too dim for me to
guide myself by it to law, truth and justice in the way a judge

does."

459

There is no doubt that Palestinian attacks against Israeli
civilians (or civilians anywhere for that matter) contravene
international humanitarian and human rights law as well as
domestic criminal law. It would be both hypocritical and ultimately
self-defeating for the Palestinian leadership to invoke international
law in support of their claims to self-determination and statehood and
then breach it by deliberately attacking civilians.4 6 0 But for Israel to
react by imprisoning an entire nation for the actions of a minority
will not solve its security dilemma either. As Vaughan Lowe declared
in his oral pleading before the ICJ on behalf of Palestine:
The Palestinian Authority has consistently condemned terrorist attacks
on Israeli civilians; and it is as absurd as it is offensive to imply that all
Palestinians are engaged in a murderous conspiracy to attack Israel.
To impose the Wall, and all the consequent restrictions on movement
and access to property, jobs, welfare, education and families, as a
punishment on the whole Palestinian population is unfair,
46 1
unprincipled, and illegal.

No one is questioning the legitimacy of a people's right to resist
occupation, particularly if it is prolonged and protracted, but there
are rules and boundaries that should not be crossed. In this respect, it
is worth heeding the words of wisdom of Justice Albie Sachs from a
very moving and thought-provoking lecture he gave on terrorism and
the African National Congress's struggle against apartheid South
Africa on 26 April 2006.462 Simply put, terrorism, whether committed

458.
See id. at 1050, para. 141 (addressing the terrorist attacks on Israel).
Interestingly, neither the Beit Sourik court nor the Mara'abe court addressed the
question of Israeli attacks on Palestinians.
459.
HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.), translated in
45 I.L.M. 202, 245, para. 4 (2006).
460.
See ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 2, at 1035, para. 91 (ICJ
acknowledging the P.L.O.'s request to unilaterally accede to the Geneva Conventions in
1982). But see Application to Accede to the Geneva Convention, 5 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L
L. 318, 319 (1989) (ICJ failing to mention that this effort to accede was opposed by both
the United States and Israel).
See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 147 (prohibiting collective
461.
punishments under Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV and Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I); Legal Consequence of Construction, ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 446,
at 51, para. 23 (oral pleadings of Vaughan Lowe).
462.
Albie Sachs, Justice of the S. Afr. Constitutional Court, Talk at Logan Hall,
Institute of Education: Tales of Terrorism: I Was Thirty-Nine Years Old and Quietly
Teaching at Southampton University When I Discovered I Was a Terrorist (Apr. 26,
2006) (author attended). This talk was organized and sponsored by the Sir Joseph
Hotung Programme in Law, Human Rights and Peace Building in the Middle East at
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by states or non-state actors, is immoral, self-defeating, and
ultimately harms the legitimacy of the cause in whose names such
4 63
acts are undertaken.
The HCJ in both Beit Sourik and Mara'abelooked at the legality
of the wall from a very narrow perspective related to Israeli
administrative law, military law, and proportionality as defined and
determined by Israel. 464 The HCJ thus completely ignored crucial
issues such as the legality of the vast settlement enterprise, possibly
the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East, and the nature of a
prolonged occupation which has approached its fourth decade (it is
worth bearing in mind that most Palestinians currently living in the
OPT, born after 1967, have never experienced freedom). The question
of self-determination, which is integral to the Israel-Palestine
conflict, was completely marginalized, and the role of the U.N., which
has a continuing responsibility towards the Palestinian people until a
permanent solution is found, was hardly considered by the HCJ apart
from when it addressed the ICJ's Advisory Opinion and the reports of
the U.N. Special Rapporteurs. 465 The ICJ could have addressed the
question of self-defense and prolonged occupations in far more detail,
as the law is not entirely clear in this area. Grappling with this
issue, probably one of the most controversial areas in international
law, may have given the opinion more credibility. The ICJ could have
also provided more of an analysis as to why the construction of the

the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Sachs was severely
injured in a terrorist attack (a bomb was placed under his car) and carried out by a
secret agent working for the apartheid government in the late 1980s.
463.
See EQBAL AHMAD, PLO and ANC: Painful Contrasts, in THE SELECTED
WRITINGS OF EQBAL AHMAD 76 (Carollee Bengelsdorf, Margaret Cerullo, & Yogesh
Chandrani eds., 2006) (discussing the difference in tactics between the PLO and the
ANC).
464.
HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004] (Isr.), translated
in 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004); HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Isr. [2005] (Isr.),
translated in 45 I.L.M. 202, 14 (2006).
Having said this, the ICJ's cursory treatment of Palestinian self465.
determination was dealt with in a similar fashion in the East Timor and Western
Sahara cases. For instance, in its decision on East Timor, the ICJ merely repeated the
relevant U.N. resolutions recognising that the East Timorese have a right of selfdetermination. It did not actually elaborate on the norm in much detail in the context
of the specific circumstances in East Timor. Instead, it simply discussed the issue in a
very general manner. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90
(June 30) (failing to, as Judge Weeramantry noted in his dissent, "examine such
seminal issues as the duties flowing to Australia from the right to self-determination of
the people of East Timor or from their right to permanent sovereignty over their
natural resources"). The fact is that the ICJ could probably have spent more time
examining the issue since Australia's objections as to the admissibility of Portugal's
application "were inextricably linked to the merits and should therefore be determined
within the framework of the merits." Id. at 98, para. 19. For commentaries on East
Timor, see generally Iain G.M. Scobbie & Catriona Drew, Self-determination
Undetermined: The Case of East Timor, 9 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 185 (1996); and Drew,
supra note 204.
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wall along its current route is unreasonable, justifying its decisions
by legal argument.
Although Israel has said that it will not abide by the ICJ's
Advisory Opinion (nor for that matter most of the U.N. resolutions
adopted during the course of the conflict), the Palestinians have
embraced it, including the Hamas and Fatah hardliners in the socalled "prisoners document. '466 This must surely be a positive
development. Rather than acting unilaterally and aggressively, the
Palestinians have attempted to solve their international dispute with
Israel peacefully, through non-violent means. 467 Whether Israel will
reciprocate is another matter. In challenging the authority of the ICJ
in reaching a decision that blatantly ignores the settlement issue and
by sidelining the Geneva Conventions yet again, it is difficult to see
how it can be said that the HCJ is acting independently from the
Israeli government when it comes to policy in the OPT. The
questions of self-defense, the wall, and the settlements would have
been better discussed in the paradigm of self-determination had more
attention been paid to this issue as one of the "legal consequences of
the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," as
ultimately this conflict is about much more than just wire and
concrete. 4 68 It is apparent that the ICJ did itself no favors in
refraining from elaborating upon why it found Israel's self-defense
arguments based on Article 51 of the Charter irrelevant to the matter
at hand; this has given ample ammunition to those persons who are
46 9
not inclined in favor of international law to attack the court.
Having said this, the ICJ was able to produce a concise and coherent

466.
See Full text: The PalestinianTwo-State Blueprint, TIMES ONLINE, May 25,
2006, para. 18, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0251-2196956.html.
To work on expanding the role and presence of the international solidarity
committees and the peace loving groups that support our people in their just
struggle against the occupation, settlements, the apartheid Wall politically and
locally and to work towards the implementation of the International Court of
Justice decision at The Hague pertaining to the removal of the Wall and
settlements and their illegitimate presence.

Id.
467.
Recourse to conciliatory methods of dispute resolution is something the
Palestinians have tried before. In 1947, they lobbied Egypt and Syria to muster
support in the General Assembly to petition the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion which
ultimately failed. See U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 32d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. AIAC.14/SR.32 (Nov. 25, 1947) (prepared by Thor Thors).
468.
See generally Pertile, supra note 2 (discussing the legal consequences of
constructing the wall).
469.
See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Travesty at The Hague, WASH. POST, July
16, 2004, at A21 (describing the ICJ as a "kangaroo court"); Alan Dershowitz, Israel
Follows Its Own Law, Not Bigoted Hague Decision, JERUSALEM POST, July 11, 2004, at
1 (reporting an unfavorable view of the ICJ as of "questionable status" and deserving of
no deference from Israel).
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opinion in a relatively short period of time that could provide a
framework for negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians when a
more enlightened leadership is in a position to assert itself.
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